Examining the experience of recent war veterans who report posttraumatic stress disorder by Raymond, Neda C.
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
8-2011
Examining the experience of recent war veterans
who report posttraumatic stress disorder
Neda C. Raymond
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Health Psychology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Raymond, Neda C., "Examining the experience of recent war veterans who report posttraumatic stress disorder" (2011). UNLV Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 1225.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/1225
 EXAMINING THE EXPERIENCE OF RECENT WAR VETERANS WHO REPORT 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER  
By 
Neda C. Raymond 
 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Santa Clara University 
2003 
 
Master of Arts 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
2008 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
Department of Psychology 
College of Liberal Arts 
Graduate College 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
August 2011
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Copyright by Neda C. Raymond 2011 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
THE GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
We recommend the dissertation prepared under our supervision by 
 
 
Neda C. Raymond 
 
 
entitled 
 
 
Examining the Experience of Recent War Veterans who Report 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder  
 
 
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Department of Psychology  
 
 
Christopher Heavey, Committee Chair 
 
Russell Hurlburt, Committee Member 
 
Murray Millar, Committee Member 
 
Paul Jones, Graduate College Representative 
 
Ronald Smith, Ph. D., Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies 
and Dean of the Graduate College 
 
 
August 2011
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Examining the Experience of Recent War Veterans Who Report Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder  
 
by 
Neda C. Raymond  
Dr. Christopher L. Heavey, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an anxiety disorder that develops following 
exposure to a traumatic event, has long been associated with military combat. Despite the 
well-documented negative effects of PTSD, careful, in-depth accounts of the experience 
of those suffering from PTSD are rare. The present study employed Descriptive 
Experience Sampling (DES) to explore the inner experience of seven Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) veterans with combat-related 
PTSD. Potential participants completed the PTSD Checklist – Military Version to 
determine the presence and severity of PTSD symptomatology. Participants who reported 
significant symptoms of combat-related PTSD participated in DES. A description of the 
inner experience of each participant was prepared and these were examined as a group in 
an attempt to identify similarities or differences in the characteristics of inner experience 
among the participants. Results revealed veterans with PTSD had an unexpectedly low 
frequency of inner speaking and few instances of clearly experienced feelings. They had 
a high frequency of focused attention to the sensory aspects of the environment as well as 
to the inner sensations of the body (sensory awareness). They also had occasional 
experiences that can be described as vigilance and flashbacks; such experiences are rare 
among participants in other DES studies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
"War stories end when the battle is over or when the soldier comes home. In real life, 
there are no moments amid smoldering hilltops for tranquil introspection. When the war 
is over, you pick up your gear, walk down the hill and back into the world." 
-- John Crawford, in The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell  
 
"After wars end, soldiers once again become civilians and return to their families to try to 
pick up where they left off. It is this process of readjustment that has more often than not 
been ignored by society.” 
-- Major Robert H. Stretch, Ph.D, in Textbook of Military Medicine: Vol. 6 
  
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) began in 
2001 and 2003, respectively. Since that time, over 1 million United States soldiers have 
been deployed to Afghanistan and/or Iraq (Tanielian, Jaycox, Schell, Marshall, Burnam, 
Eibner, et al., 2008). The war experience is often traumatic, as is evident by the high 
number of returning troops reporting symptoms of psychological trauma, including 
depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), emotional turmoil, chronic pain and 
increased levels of suicidality (Litz, n.d.). Particularly high numbers of veterans are 
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with symptoms of PTSD and traumatic brain injury 
(TBI); in fact, these two injuries have been referred to as the “signature wounds” of the 
current war (Tanielian et al., 2008, p. iii).  
 Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an anxiety disorder that develops following 
exposure to a traumatic event, has long been associated with military combat. Although 
PTSD did not officially appear in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual until the third edition (DSM-III; APA, 1980), the constellation of 
symptoms that sometimes result from exposure to the trauma of war have long been 
affecting military combatants (Tanielian, et al., 2008). In addition to the trauma of war, 
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the cultural context within which the war takes place likely plays a role in the 
development and course of PTSD in combat veterans.  It has been estimated that soldiers 
returning from the recent wars, which include Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF), are especially at risk for developing 
PTSD in part due to the trauma of the war-zone, in part due to the stress of repeated 
deployments within a relatively short span of time (Litz, n.d.), and in part due to the 
volatile political and cultural climate surrounding the war within the United States.   
The incidence of PTSD in servicemen and women returning from Iraq and 
Afghanistan is estimated to be between 11% and 18% (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, 
Cotting, & Koffman, 2004). The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
describes the criteria of PTSD as experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event that results 
in actual or possible death/serious injury and involves the emotions of intense fear, 
helplessness or horror; the event is persistently re-experienced; stimuli associated with 
the event are avoided; and persistent symptoms of increased arousal are present.  
 Despite the long-standing association between war and PTSD, and the well-
documented negative effects of PTSD on social functioning (Kulka et al., 1988), in-depth 
accounts of the nature of the disorder are rare. Little research has examined the daily, 
lived experience of soldiers with combat-related PTSD. Two prominent features of PTSD 
are the occurrence of intrusive, trauma-related memories and hyperarousal (Brewin, 
2007). These features are centrally concerned with inner experience. This study aims to 
shed light on the inner experience of those suffering from PTSD. 
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The current study used the Descriptive Experience Sampling method (DES; 1990, 
1993) to explore the inner experience of recent war veterans with significant PTSD 
symptomatology. DES is a qualitative method aimed at obtaining faithful accounts of 
pristine inner experience. We used the DES method to randomly sample moments of 
inner experience of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans with combat-related PTSD. We 
aimed to deepen the understanding of the nature of PTSD by exploring the 
phenomenology of individuals with symptoms of the disorder. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Literature Review 
War and the History of Psychological Trauma 
Psychological trauma has long been associated with military combat. In fact, 
psychological symptoms following the trauma of battle have been described for 
centuries; even Shakespeare’s Henry IV includes descriptors such as ‘withdrawn’ and 
‘melancholy’ to describe the affect of Hotspur after returning from battle (Paulson & 
Krippner, 2007). There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that soldiers of all eras have 
been vulnerable to the development of posttrauma psychopathology. In the seventeenth 
century, many troops returning from battle were diagnosed with “nostalgia,” a disorder 
consisting of “deep despair” and social withdrawal (Jones & Wessley, 2005, p. 3). In the 
early 1800s, the Vagrancy Act of Britain was introduced as a result of war veterans who 
were engaging in odd and out-of-character behaviors, including flashing of body parts in 
public, as well as exposing physical war wounds to strangers (Jones & Wessley, 2005). 
As psychology had not yet made its mark, physicians often put forth purely medical 
explanations for the symptoms they witnessed in veterans, a common explanation being 
exhaustion. In some cases, terms such as “windy contusions” (windy in this instance 
meaning lack of courage) were introduced to describe individuals who had no physical 
wounds but were experiencing symptoms of paralysis, tingling, and twitching (Jones & 
Wessley, 2005, p. 2).  During the Crimean War, the term “Crimean Fever” was used to 
describe untreatable symptoms including “pain in all limbs, clammy sweats, parched 
tongue, irritable heart, dizziness, headache and diarrhea, while being utterly unnerved and 
agitated violently by the merest trifles” (Jones & Wessley, 2005, p. 4).  
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During the Civil War the term “soldier’s heart” was used to describe 
hyperarousal, social withdrawal and psychological turmoil evidenced in soldiers. 
Descriptions of soldiers with a combination of physiological and psychological 
conditions continued through WWI and WWII. During WWI, the terms “shell shock” and 
“combat neurosis” (Paulson & Krippner, 2007) were used to describe soldiers 
complaining of a combination of physical and psychological symptoms: fatigue, 
insomnia, nightmares, jumpiness, muscle pain, and so on (Jones & Wessley, 2005). 
During WWII new terms such as “battle fatigue” and “operational fatigue” were used to 
describe the constellation of symptoms similar to those described during WWI (Paulson 
& Krippner, 2007). Jones and Wessley (2005) include a quote from a prominent 
physician at the time, Captain Wilfrid Harris:  
Men in this state may break down in tears if asked to describe their experiences at 
the front. This is especially true if the man’s regiment has been severely handled, 
and numbers of his comrades and brother officers have been killed (p. 23).  
This description suggests, if nothing else, a strong stress reaction to the experience of 
war. Although there is not enough clear information available to determine whether 
“shell shocked” soldiers were in fact experiencing what we today term PTSD, the 
available information suggests it is likely. At the time, shell shock was believed to result 
from hemorrhaging in the brain that occurred following the shock waves of an explosion 
coming into contact with the head (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). However, as the war 
progressed, physicians realized that the majority of soldiers exhibiting symptoms of shell 
shock had not been in close enough proximity to explosions to have suffered physical 
damage. Transitions toward the recognition of shell shock as a combination of 
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psychological and physiological symptoms were beginning. Although these transitions 
were slow, those suffering from the stresses of war were not characterized as cowardly or 
malingering as often (Marlowe, 2001).  The recognition of the psychological effects of 
combat stress are clearly described by Company Quartermaster Sergeant Gordon Fisher:  
I went further along and looked into the next dugout and there was a guardsman 
in there. They talk about the psychology of fear. He was a perfect example. I can 
see that guardsman now! His face was yellow, he was shaking all over, and I said 
to him, “What the hell are you doing here?” He said, “I can’t go. I can’t do it. I 
daren’t go!” Now, I was pretty ruthless in those days and I said to him, “Look, 
I’m going up the line and when I come back if you’re still here I’ll bloody shoot 
you!”… when I came back, thank God, he’d gone. He was a Coldstream. A big 
chap six foot tall. He’d got genuine shell shock. We didn’t realize that at the time. 
We used to think it was cowardice, but we learned later on that there was such a 
thing as shell shock. Poor chap, he couldn’t help it. It could happen to anybody 
(Macdonald, 1995, p.467).  
Futterman and Pumpian-Mindlin (1951) described the following characteristics in 
veterans seen for treatment at the Los Angeles Veterans Administration Hospital:  
Intense anxiety, recurrent battle dreams, startle reaction to sudden or loud noises, 
tension, depression, guilt, and a tendency to sudden, explosive, aggressive 
reactions. Superimposed upon this picture are secondary symptoms resulting 
therefrom, such as a tendency to avoid people, fear of exposure to any type of 
criticism, difficulty making decisions and various types of sleep disturbances (as 
cited in Jones & Wessley, 2005, p. 179).  
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 Prior to WWII, the focus of physicians and psychologists was on proximate 
combat stress casualties. However, focus shifted to post-combat casualties as increasing 
numbers of WWII and Vietnam veterans continued to exhibit PTSD-like symptoms even 
after returning from war. The effects of war on Vietnam era soldiers was termed 
“Vietnam Combat Reaction” and was defined as a psychophysiological reaction to war 
(Marlowe, 2001). This combat reaction was noted most frequently in those nearing the 
end of their tour of duty, and was said to be likely to have long-term consequences 
(Pettera, Johnson, & Zimmer, 1969). The symptoms of combat reaction appear to closely 
parallel the symptoms of PTSD:  
The first symptoms of Vietnam combat reaction are either insomnia, anorexia, or 
both, later progressing to a full blown syndrome which typically … includes: 
Insomnia, recurrent terrifying nightmares, which are usually a reliving of a severe 
psychic trauma (friends and fellow combatants severely injured, mutilated, or 
killed, the subject himself wounded close to a vital organ, or perhaps his unit 
overrun by the enemy with few survivors); anorexia progressing to nausea; 
vomiting (precipitated by enemy contact or explosions) and sometimes even 
watery diarrhea; depression, including guilt over not having saved his buddy’s life 
or perhaps not having grieved enough for him, as well as shame for having broken 
down when others in his unit maintained emotional control; and most prominent, 
severe anxiety with tremulousness, to such a degree as to make the soldier 
ineffective in combat … Subjectively the soldier experiences a deep fear of 
combat or the thought of it, and notices increasing tremulousness beyond his 
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control when in the field, especially if actual enemy contact is made (Pettera, 
Johnson, & Zimmer, 1969, p.675). 
Partially as a result of the research conducted with the high number of soldiers 
returning from the Vietnam War with severe combat-stress reactions, the diagnosis of 
PTSD came to be (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). The Gulf War, also known as Operation 
Desert Storm, occurred several years after the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III. 
Following the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs reported that 
approximately 9% of Operation Desert Storm veterans were positive on screenings of 
PTSD (Rundell & Ursano, 1996).  
 Veterans of war, regardless of their era, are at risk for developing psychological 
symptoms as a result of their experience. This is not to say that all, or even most, will 
develop these symptoms, or even that those who develop symptoms will experience 
significant dysfunction in their lives as a result. However, for those deployed to areas of 
active combat, the constant threat of death and the knowledge that one may have to kill 
another human being in order to survive is no doubt impactful, even if the experience 
does not lead to full-blown PTSD. However, in a significant minority of cases, these 
experiences do lead to PTSD (Adam, 2005). Additionally, many combatants develop 
subclinical symptoms of PTSD as a result of the constant potential of being killed or 
having to kill (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). For the significant minority who do develop 
PTSD following exposure to combat (or other trauma) the prognosis is sometimes poor. 
This poor prognosis was seen in the Harvard Study (1995), a follow-up study of male 
Harvard students who enlisted in the army during WWII. Only a small percentage (5 of 
152) of the study veterans met criteria for what we now term PTSD. However, the 
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outcome for four of the five individuals was poor: one was murdered, two killed 
themselves, and one continued to have significant psychological symptomatology many 
years later (Lee, Vaillant, Torrey, & Elder, 1995).   
 Although it is important to be cautious of viewing psychological reactions to 
trauma across time as universal (Jones & Wessley, 2005), the idea that psychological 
reactions to trauma, and especially combat trauma, have been occurring since the dawn of 
battle does not appear to be unreasonable. As Peter Hayward (2005) writes:  
If you are a soldier a large number of other soldiers are trying, by any means 
possible, to maim or kill you. In such a situation, it wouldn't be surprising to find 
varieties of anxiety and depression, mixed with the desire to escape death by any 
means possible (p. 532).  
War presents a unique set of circumstances and characteristics that may lead to 
psychological trauma.  Although every war does not present the same set of challenges 
and adversities to combatants, every war is similar in that it presents an immediate, and at 
times frequent, threat to one’s life. As Paulson and Krippner (2007) state:  
Physical combat is a massive, potentially traumatic stressor, because it exposes 
the combatant to situations that involve killing, as well as the constant possibility 
of being killed. It is not theoretical, nor can it be deferred into the future; the 
threat is now – a long, continuing, seemingly endless now (p.14).   
Upon returning home, veterans must learn to readjust psychologically, from a 
place of constant vigilance and hyperarousal, to a place of “normalcy.” In many cases this 
is an exceedingly difficult task. Of course, factors such as cultural and societal values at 
the time of trauma likely moderate the manifestation of individual reactions to traumatic 
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events (Jones & Wessley, 2005). Soldiers returning from war to a society that views them 
as heroes may have different experiences than soldiers returning from battle only to be 
met with disdain, political unrest, and negative judgment. In the latter case, servicemen 
and women may be less likely to have opportunities to discuss their experience with 
others, or may be exposed to intensified feelings of guilt for the role they played in an 
unpopular war. As Linderman (1987) notes:  
In the war, wounds had been suffered by some and not by others; the problems 
they created were thus the concerns of the individuals involved, not of society. 
The soldier had wished to rid himself of the effects of body wounds as rapidly as 
possible; the veteran would do everything he could to accelerate the 
disappearance of mind wounds. Disturbing memories were to be kept to oneself 
(p. 268). 
Individuals who are not given the opportunity, or who choose not to discuss their 
traumatic experiences and the memories associated with those experiences, are at greater 
risk for developing mental disorders such as PTSD (Litz & Maguen, 2007). Vietnam 
veterans who became involved within their community were more protected against 
developing PTSD, whereas those who were uncomfortable in disclosing war-related 
experiences were at increased risk for developing PTSD (Litz & Maguen, 2007). Social 
support is therefore of importance for individuals who have experienced the trauma of 
combat, and yet many veterans are not given ample opportunity to share these 
experiences. 
 With the advancement of technology, and shifting political climates and 
intentions, the wars fought by soldiers may appear different from one era to the next and 
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yet the impact of the wars on those fighting them appears to remain steady – some 
soldiers return home and are able to adjust back to civilian life, and others return home 
scarred by their experience and suffering from a constellation of psychological symptoms 
as a result of the brutality of war. The wars may change, yet the symptoms of those 
affected by PTSD appear to stay the same (Stretch, 1995).  
Diagnostic History 
 Although the term posttraumatic stress disorder was not coined until the third 
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM, the constellation of symptoms 
resulting from trauma, and specifically combat, have existed in the DSM since its first 
publication in 1952. With the end of WWII and the growth of the field of clinical 
psychology came an increasing recognition and awareness of the psychological toll that 
combat and unforeseen disaster takes on the individuals involved. At that time, this “toll” 
was described and categorized under the subsection “Transient Situational Personality 
Disorders” and was referred to as “Gross Stress Reaction” and described as follows:  
Under conditions of great or unusual stress, a normal personality may utilize 
established patterns of reaction to deal with overwhelming fear. The patterns of 
such reactions differ from those of neurosis or psychosis chiefly with respect to 
clinical history, reversibility of reaction, and its transient character. When promptly 
and adequately treated, the condition may clear rapidly. It is also possible that the 
condition may progress to one of the neurotic reactions. If the reaction persists, this 
term is to be regarded as a temporary diagnosis to be used only until a more 
definitive diagnosis is established. This diagnosis is justified only in situations in 
which the individual has been exposed to severe physical demands or extreme 
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emotional stress, such as in combat or in civilian catastrophe (fire, earthquake, 
explosion, etc.). In many instances this diagnosis applies to previously more or less 
"normal" persons who have experienced intolerable stress. The particular stress 
involved will be specified as (1) combat or (2) civilian catastrophe (APA, 1952, 
p.40). 
It is clear from this description that the “emotional stress” resulting from combat or 
disaster was recognized at the time but considered short-term in its duration. 
Diagnosticians were advised to consider alternate diagnoses if the stress reaction was to 
persist for an unspecified period of time. Furthermore, the conceptualization was 
somewhat vague and undefined.  
 In 1968, the second publication of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Health was released, and in some ways, took a step further away from 
the recognition of chronic psychological disturbance resulting from trauma. The label of 
“Gross Stress Reaction” was replaced with “Transient Situational Disturbance – 
Adjustment Reaction” and defined as follows:  
This major category is reserved for more or less transient disorders of any severity 
(including those of psychotic proportions) that occur in individuals without any 
apparent underlying mental disorders and that represent an acute reaction to 
overwhelming environmental stress. A diagnosis in this category should specify 
the cause and manifestations of the disturbance so far as possible. If the patient has 
good adaptive capacity his symptoms usually recede as the stress diminishes. If, 
however, the symptoms persist after the stress is removed, the diagnosis of another 
mental disorder is indicated. Example[s of adjustment reaction in adult life]: 
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Resentment with depressive tone associated with an unwanted pregnancy and 
manifested by hostile complaints and suicidal gestures; fear associated with 
military combat and manifested by trembling, running and hiding; a Ganser 
syndrome associated with death sentence and manifested by incorrect but 
approximate answers to questions (APA, 1968, p.48). 
This conceptualization was soon recognized as overly simplified and vague (Tomb, 
1994), and did not account for the chronic symptomatology that was being seen in 
soldiers returning from the Vietnam War. As increasing numbers of veterans returning 
from Vietnam were exhibiting psychopathology of a severe nature, and with the prolific 
work of Horowitz and other prominent trauma researchers, the phenomenon of 
posttrauma psychopathology began gaining attention in the psychological literature 
(Tomb, 1994).  
 The official diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder made its debut in the third 
publication of the DSM (APA, 1980), and was further refined in the DSM-III-R (APA, 
1987). The DSM-III-R describes the essential feature of posttraumatic stress disorder as 
follows, 
 … the development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically 
distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience (i.e., outside 
the range of such common experiences as simple bereavement, chronic illness, 
business losses, and marital conflict). The stressor producing this syndrome would 
be markedly distressing to almost anyone, and is usually experienced with intense 
fear, terror, and helplessness. The characteristic symptoms involve reexperiencing 
the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event or numbing of 
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general responsiveness, and increased arousal (p. 247). 
This definition includes a more detailed description of the manifestation of the disorder 
than did previous descriptions. However, in this conceptualization of PTSD, the traumatic 
incident, or stressor, is central to the diagnosis. In other words, the stressor in question is 
required to “be markedly distressing to almost anyone.” This conceptualization places the 
stressor itself at the heart of the diagnosis and tends to neglect the importance of the 
individual’s subjective experience in the development of PTSD.  
Current Conceptualization of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
The authors of the fourth edition of the DSM shifted their view to a more dualistic 
cause of PTSD symptomatology that includes shared importance of the severity of the 
traumatic event and the individual’s personal reaction to that event.  
Diagnostic criteria.  
 The conceptualization of posttraumatic stress disorder has been once again refined 
in the latest versions of the DSM, the DSM-IV and the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 1994 & 2000, 
respectively). In the current revision of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000), posttraumatic stress 
disorder is defined as:       
The development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme 
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves 
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical 
integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury or a threat to the 
physical integrity of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, 
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serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other 
close associate (p. 463).  
The DSM-IV conceptualization of PTSD differs from previous conceptualizations as the 
emphasis is no longer solely on the nature of the traumatic event but also includes an 
individual’s reaction to that event (Tomb, 1994). To be given a diagnosis of PTSD, the 
response to the traumatic exposure must involve fear, helplessness or horror and must 
result in characteristic symptoms such as persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event 
(flashbacks), persistent avoidance of trauma-associated stimuli, numbing of general 
emotional responsiveness, as well as persistent, increased physiological arousal (APA, 
2000). Another change since the DSM-III-R is the requirement that individuals present 
with both avoidance symptoms and numbing of responsiveness, as opposed to either one 
or the other, as was previously the case. As in the DSM-III, symptoms must be present 
for at least one month to receive a diagnosis of PTSD (APA, 2000).  The DSM-IV-TR 
includes the following list of potential experienced or observed traumas: military combat, 
violent personal assault, being kidnapped or taken hostage, terrorist attack, torture, 
incarceration as prisoner of war/concentration camp, natural or manmade disasters, 
severe motor vehicle accidents, or diagnosis with a life-threatening illness (pp. 463-464).  
Symptomatology. 
As mentioned previously, the major defining symptoms of PTSD are 1) persistent 
re-experiencing of the trauma, 2) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the 
trauma and numbing of responsiveness and, 3) persistent symptoms of increased arousal 
(APA, 2000). The re-experiencing component of PTSD may occur during wakefulness 
but may also manifest itself in nightmares when sleeping, or during periods of 
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dissociation (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). The re-experiencing can occur in the form of 
thoughts, images or perceptions and can include illusions, hallucinations and dissociative 
episodes. Furthermore, reactions of psychological distress and physiological reactivity 
resulting from internal or external cues that represent some aspect of the trauma may be 
present (APA, 2000).  
In their efforts to avoid trauma-related stimuli, individuals may avoid thoughts, 
feelings, conversations, activities, people, or places that remind them of the trauma. 
Individuals may exhibit difficulty in recalling specific details of the trauma and may 
exhibit anhedonia and social isolation. Individuals may also demonstrate a restricted 
range of affect and a sense of a foreshortened future (APA, 2000). Finally, a variety of 
heightened physiological disturbances may be present, such as sleep dysregulation, 
decreased frustration tolerance and increased anger, hypervigilance, decreased 
concentration and an exaggerated startle response (APA, 2000). Individuals with PTSD 
may report feelings of guilt surrounding their survival of the trauma, may experience a 
sense of shame or personal judgment that they are experiencing symptoms and may 
engage in negative self-talk and social withdrawal (Paulson & Krippner, 2007).  
Individuals with PTSD may engage in self-destructive behaviors (e.g., substance abuse), 
have several somatic complaints, report feelings of hopelessness and despair, engage in 
impaired interpersonal relationships, feel constantly threatened and show general changes 
from previous personality characteristics (APA, 2000).  
The DSM-IV-TR describes three specifiers to include when considering a 
diagnosis of PTSD. If the duration of the symptoms is less than three months, the acute 
specifier is used. If the duration of symptoms is three months or more, the condition is 
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considered chronic. Finally, if the initial onset of PTSD symptoms occurs at least 6 
months after initial exposure to the trauma, it is considered to be PTSD with delayed 
onset. (APA, 2000).  
PTSD can occur in children and adults. Symptoms oftentimes develop within the 
first few months following exposure to the stressor, but they can develop as late as 
several years after the trauma (APA, 2000). Approximately 50% of those suffering from 
PTSD recover completely within three months; others take much longer to recover. 
Symptoms can fluctuate with time. Exposure to new life stressors or other traumatic 
events can reactivate the original symptoms (APA, 2000).  
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the three most important factors that play a role in 
the development of PTSD are the severity of the trauma, the duration of the trauma, and 
the proximity of the individual’s exposure to the trauma (APA, 2000). In other words, the 
likelihood of developing PTSD increases with more intense stressors, stressors that are of 
longer duration (e.g., several tours of combat duty for soldiers), and as physical proximity 
to the stressor increases. Other factors affecting the development of PTSD include family 
history, social support, personality characteristics, childhood experiences, and preexisting 
mental disorders (APA, 2000). Factors determined to be stressors specific to war zone 
experiences, and that put individuals at risk for developing PTSD include combat events, 
perceived life threat, malevolent environment, battle aftermath, family concerns, 
harassment and toxic exposure (King, King, Keane, Foy & Fairbank, 1999). 
In addition to the criteria laid out in the DSM-IV-TR, the World Health 
Organization’s Classification of Mental and Health Disorders (1992) includes a category 
outlining the emergence of enduring personality changes that may follow a traumatic 
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experience. These changes include hostile or mistrustful attitudes toward the world, 
social withdrawal, feelings of emptiness/hopelessness, chronically feeling “on edge,” and 
estrangement (World Health Organization, 1992). These additional characteristics 
describing personality changes are important to recognize as many individuals with 
PTSD report significant changes in personality (Shay, 1994).  
Neurological correlates. 
Changes in brain chemistry and brain structure, particularly in the amygdala and 
hippocampus, may also occur in individuals with PTSD as a result of repeated exposure 
to high arousal and high anxiety situations. In some individuals with PTSD a process 
known as “stress sensitization” may occur in which stressors cause an increase in 
behavioral, physiological and biochemical responding to subsequent stressors of the same 
or lesser magnitude (Southwick et al., 2007). Stress sensitization is important in that it 
may be adaptive and allow appropriate response to future stressors. However, 
neurobiological systems that have become stress-sensitized may be maladaptive when 
they cause individuals to overreact to very minor stressors, resulting in the hypervigilance 
often seen in individuals with PTSD (Southwick et al., 2007).  
Researchers have also found that a number of neurotransmitter and 
neuroendocrine systems are hyperreactive in individuals with PTSD, including increased 
activity in the noradrenergic system, which is responsible for excitatory changes during 
times of stress/danger. When an individual with PTSD is stressed and has developed an 
overresponsive noradrenergic system, the amygdala and hippocampus become flooded 
with norepinephrine. The amygdala and hippocampus are thought of as the fear and 
learning areas of the brain – too much norepinephrine in these areas can then enhance 
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fear conditioning and the consolidation of memories (McGaugh, 2002). This can then 
lead to the maintenance of the symptoms of PTSD. Of course, the neurochemical and 
neurobiological factors involved in PTSD are complex and a more elaborate discussion of 
these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this document.  
Shay (1994), describes an example of a combat veteran with PTSD experiencing 
changes in his peripheral visual perception, “One veteran tells that after he returned home 
from Vietnam he shot rats he saw moving out of the corner of his eye. His bedroom wall 
was peppered with bullet holes – “but there were not rats!” (p. 172). Shay (1994) 
describes this veterans experience as resulting from the brain’s inability to effectively 
filter out unnecessary information from the environment due to chemical changes in the 
brain following long-term exposure to the trauma of war. 
Prevalence and course. 
Posttraumatic stress disorder occurs in approximately 8% of the adult United 
States population, and is found in both children and adults who have experienced trauma 
(APA, 2000). The prevalence of the disorder indicates that PTSD is more common than 
initially thought, and can result from traumas that range in severity from mild to extreme. 
Higher rates of PTSD are found in military combatants (as well as victims of rape, 
genocide and captivity; APA, 2000). In fact, military combatants as a subpopulation have 
one of the highest rates of PTSD (APA, 2000), approximately double that of the normal 
population (Hoge et al., 2004), indicating that soldiers appear to be at greater risk for 
developing PTSD.  
Schlenger et al. (1992) found that fully 30% of Vietnam War veterans manifested 
combat-related psychological symptoms in their lifetime. Rates of PTSD in veterans of 
20 
 
the Persian Gulf War range between 8-16% (Wolfe, Erickson, Sharkansky, King, & 
King, 1999). Estimates of the prevalence of PTSD in combat troops returning from Iraq 
and Afghanistan have been found to be in the 11% - 13% range, with some estimates as 
high as 18% (Hoge et al., 2004). These numbers can be broken down further based on 
several factors including exposure to firefights, handling dead bodies, killing an enemy, 
and experiencing the death of a fellow combatant (Hoge et al., 2004). The rate of PTSD 
in combat veterans returning from Iraq escalated in a direct, linear manner with the 
number of firefights experienced during deployment (e.g., 4.5 % for no firefights versus 
19.3% for more than five firefights; Hoge et al., 2004). In addition, the likelihood of 
developing PTSD tends to increase with extended duration of exposure to the stressor 
(APA, 2000). Therefore, troops deployed in war zones for extended periods of time may 
be more vulnerable to developing PTSD and other psychological disorders (Lapierre, 
Schwegler, & LaBauve, 2007). Lapierre et al. (2007) found that 44% of a sample of 
4,089 soldiers returning from deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan self-reported 
symptoms of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, or both. In their sample, males 
and females reported PTSD symptoms at similar rates, a finding not uncommon in 
military samples (Lapierre et al., 2007). Interestingly, Lapierre et al., (2007) also found 
that junior enlisted soldiers were more likely to report symptoms of PTSD than were 
officers or noncommissioned officers. The authors attributed this finding to a potential 
lack of sufficient training and information provided to junior enlisted soldiers regarding 
the nature of war, as well as the symptoms of posttraumatic psychopathology (Lapierre et 
al., 2007).  
Comorbidity. 
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PTSD has been associated with increased rates of other comorbid psychological 
disorders, including major depressive disorder, substance related disorders, panic 
disorder, agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
social phobia, specific phobia, and bipolar disorder (APA, 2000). Major depression and 
dysthymia are two disorders frequently comorbid with PTSD in both men and women 
(Kimerling, et al., 2007). In the Epidemiological Catchment Area Study (Regier, et al., 
1990), men and women with PTSD were significantly more likely to have a drug abuse or 
dependence problem. In the National Comorbidity Study, approximately 59% of men, 
and 43.6% of women with a diagnosis of PTSD had at least three additional diagnoses 
(Kessler et al., 1995). In male veterans, PTSD has been found to be comorbid with 
conduct disorder and major depression (Fu et al., 2007), as well as increased substance 
use.  
Gender and cultural considerations. 
 Several studies have found elevated rates of PTSD in women as compared with 
men within the U.S. (Kimerling, Ouimette, & Weitlauf, 2007). The National Comorbidity 
Study (NCS; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson, 1995) found that although 
men were more likely to encounter a traumatic event, women were more likely to 
develop PTSD as a result of experiencing a traumatic event in civilian settings. In 
general, according to general population and natural disaster research, women are at 
greater risk than men for PTSD (Kimerling et al., 2007). However, as mentioned 
previously, prevalence rates of PTSD in women and men appear to be equivalent in 
military populations. This may be due to the context of war – as the situation or the 
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context in which trauma occurs becomes more dire gender differences may disappear 
(Norris, Foster, & Weissharr, 2002).  
There is a paucity of literature examining the occurrence of PTSD across non-
Western cultures and ethnicities. Nevertheless, some evidence indicates that higher rates 
of PTSD exist in developing countries as compared with more industrialized countries 
(De Girolamo & McFarlane, 1996). Studies of minority, treatment-seeking refugees in 
the United States have found high prevalence rates of PTSD (14-93%; Osterman & de 
Jong, 2007). One study found prevalence rates of PTSD as high as 93% in a sample of 
Mein refugee patients at a United States clinic (Kinzie, Boehnlein, Leung, Moore, Riley, 
& Smith, 1990). A large epidemiological study of psychopathology in four post-war 
regions (Gaza, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Algeria) found PTSD prevalence rates ranging 
from 15.8% to 37.4% (de Jong, et al., 2001). A survey of displaced Senegalese refugees 
indicated a prevalence rate of PTSD of 10% (Tang & Fox, 2001), and another survey 
found a prevalence rate of 27% in Sri Lankan civilians living in a conflict zone 
(Somasundaram & Sivayokan, 1994). However, the role of culture in the process of 
developing PTSD is not yet clearly understood due to the variability across cultures in the 
appraisal of trauma, communication of trauma, risk and protective factors, and 
sociocultural context (Osterman & de Jong, 2007).  
Impact of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
The extant literature provides clear documentation regarding the long-term 
psychological and psychosocial impact of PTSD on the lives of veterans of war and their 
families. Veterans with PTSD (and other mental health disorders) experience negative 
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impacts in the areas of relationships, health, employment, finances and family (Tanielian 
et al., 2008).   
Studies examining the psychosocial characteristics of war veterans suffering from 
PTSD have found the following common threads in veterans from WWII, Korea, 
Vietnam, and the Gulf War: severe, persistent psychological symptoms; increased 
comorbidity of disorders such as depression and substance abuse; increased levels of 
suicidality; involvement in crime; social isolation; inability to gain employment; poverty 
and homelessness (Rosenheck & Fontana, 1996).  
Several studies have found a correlation between increased suicidality and PTSD 
in veterans (Hudenko, n.d.).  A recent study found that male veterans (with and without 
PTSD) in the United States general population were at higher risk for suicide than male 
nonveterans (Kaplan, Huguet, McFarland, Newsom, 2007). Additionally, impaired 
functioning (as a result of psychopathology) increased the risk of suicide completion in 
male veterans (Kaplan et al., 2007). This study used data collected from veterans of all 
eras, and unlike the majority of previous studies assessing suicide risk, derived data 
representative of all veterans in the general population, and not just those seeking care at 
the VA (Kaplan et al., 2007).   
Another recent study examined the risk of suicide among veterans returning from 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and found that the overall risk of suicide among these 
veterans was similar to the risk found in the general population (Kang & Bullman, 2008). 
However, two subgroups of veterans were found to be more vulnerable to the risk of 
suicide: veterans who engaged in active combat and veterans with an identified mental 
disorder (depression, PTSD, acute stress disorder, substance dependence, adjustment 
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disorder and neurotic disorders; Kang & Bullman, 2008). This study highlights the idea 
that PTSD may elevate the risk of suicide in combat veterans, outside of the impact of the 
war itself.  
Veterans with PTSD are also more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors such 
as smoking and overeating; they may have higher rates of physical problems; they may 
tend to be less productive at work; and they are more likely to be unemployed or 
homeless (Tanielian, 2008).  
In addition to the impact of PTSD on the individual, effects of the disorder on 
family and relationships have also been documented; PTSD is a mental health condition 
very commonly associated with intimacy and relationship problems (DeAngelis, 2008). 
The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS) found that Vietnam 
veterans with PTSD had significantly higher divorce rates that veterans returning without 
PTSD (Kulka, et al., 1990). Veterans returning from war with PTSD also tend to have 
increased difficulty in forming intimate emotional relationships and exhibit decreased 
levels of emotional disclosure (Caroll, Rueger, Foy, & Donahoe, 1985). Two separate 
studies of Vietnam veterans with PTSD found that approximately 50% of veterans’ wives 
reported having been battered by their husbands upon their return from the war 
(Matsakis, 1988; Williams, 1980). Studies of Vietnam veterans with PTSD have also 
found that the impact of the disorder extends to their children. Jordan et al. (1992) found 
that the children of veterans with PTSD were significantly more likely to have behavioral 
problems than children of veterans without PTSD. The same study found that veterans 
with PTSD reported significantly more problems with parenting and household, familial 
violence (Jordan et al., 1992). Interestingly, these authors found that exposure to combat 
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trauma and resulting PTSD were much more salient in leading to familial problems than 
any preexisting or predispositional variables (e.g., history of psychological issues; 
childhood adversity or abuse; familial drug or alcohol problems; Jordan et al., 1992).  
Risk Factors 
 The consistent finding that not all individuals exposed to a traumatic event will 
develop PTSD has led researchers to explore potential vulnerabilities that put certain 
individuals at greater risk for the development of PTSD. Psychosocial risk factors for 
PTSD include features of the trauma itself, preexisting attributes of the individual, and 
posttrauma circumstances (Vogt, King, & King, 2007). In a meta-analysis of risk factors 
for PTSD, a positive relationship between trauma severity and PTSD was found (Brewin, 
Andrews, & Valentine, 2000). Researchers have found a greater association between 
traumas that involve injury, that are more grotesque, and that involve subjective distress 
or dissociation and the development of PTSD (Vogt et al., 2007). However, none of these 
characteristics of the traumatic event alone is a particularly potent predictor of PTSD, 
leading researchers to explore other possible risk factors (Vogt et al., 2007), such as 
preexisting attributes. In their meta-analysis of possible risk factors, Brewin and 
colleagues (2000) found that younger age, female gender, low SES, low education, and 
ethnic/minority status are risk factors for PTSD. Other researchers have pinpointed 
exposure to prior trauma and family psychiatric history as risk factors (Dougall, 
Herberman, Inslicht, Baum & Delahanty, 2000). Following exposure to trauma, 
individuals with less access to social support or exposure to additional life stressors are at 
greater risk for developing PTSD (Vogt et al., 2007). Again, it is currently difficult to say 
definitively whether any of these risk factors alone play a causal role in the development 
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of PTSD, as it is likely a complex interaction of various factors that lead to the 
development and maintenance of the disorder (Vogt et al., 2007).  
Finally, researchers are examining the possibility that the factors involved in 
developing and maintaining PTSD may differ. In a sample of Vietnam veterans, 
development of PTSD was predicted by high levels of combat exposure, perceived 
negative homecoming reception, and increased levels of anger or depression. 
Additionally, comfort level in disclosing trauma memories and experiences predicted the 
development of PTSD in this sample, whereas the course of the disorder was predicted by 
level of community involvement and ethnic/minority status (Koenen, Stellman, Stellman, 
& Sommer, 2003).   
Theories of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
There are a variety of theories that attempt to explain why exposure to traumatic 
events leads to PTSD in some individuals but not others. Approaches to the 
conceptualization of PTSD include conditioning theories, cognitive theories, schema 
theories, and emotional processing theories. These theories will be briefly summarized in 
the following paragraphs.  
In their conditioning theory, Keane, Zimering and Caddell (1985) apply Mowrer’s 
(1960) learning theory of fear and anxiety to explain PTSD. They hypothesize that PTSD 
is a result of a specific chain of events, beginning with the traumatic event; this model 
uses the principles of classical and instrumental conditioning to explain the developing 
pathway of PTSD. The traumatic event is thought to lead to a conditioning effect for a 
variety of trauma-related stimuli (e.g., environmental cues) that, through the process of 
classical conditioning, lead to intense anxiety. Through higher ordered conditioning 
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processes, anxiety responses can then generalize to other, non-trauma related stimuli 
(Keane et al., 1985). Symptoms such as re-experiencing are thought to be part of the 
natural recovery process but they can become chronic and therefore harmful, particularly 
when experienced spontaneously and for brief periods of time (Keane et al., 1985). The 
anger and irritability seen in war veterans with PTSD are explained by Keane et al. 
(1985) as being a result of military training that encourages the acquisition of these 
behaviors. Upon returning to civilian life, anger is maintained through both positive and 
negative reinforcement; social withdrawal and lack of social involvement are explained 
in the same manner: wartime events can be particularly intensive; in contrast, civilian 
activities become less interesting or arousing (Keane et al., 1985). 
Keane et al. (1985) use their theory to explain memory lapses for the traumatic 
event oftentimes seen in individuals with PTSD. First, the aversive nature of the trauma 
causes individuals to engage in avoidance of the trauma memories. Second, in men 
emotional expression is discouraged by society and therefore men, and particularly male 
war veterans, have fewer opportunities to discuss their trauma memories (Cahill & Foa, 
2007).  
Keane and Barlow proposed an etiological model of PTSD that builds upon 
conditioning theories (Barlow, 2002). The authors propose two vulnerabilities – 
psychological and biological – that can increase risk for PTSD. The psychological 
vulnerability includes a reduced sense of control, heightened anxious apprehension and 
cognitive biases toward threat anxiety that promote avoidance, intensify negative affect, 
and increase worry (Barlow, 2002).  The biological vulnerability is thought to be 
primarily a genetically inherited trait to experience heightened negative affective states 
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(Cahill & Foa, 2007). At the time of the trauma, true alarms trigger intense emotions that 
then can lead to learned alarms, which occur during nonthreatening situations that may 
resemble the original trauma in some aspect.  This can then lead to avoidance of a variety 
of situations and cues. Eventually this leads to a numbing of emotional response, which 
through the mediators of social support and coping style can lead to the development of 
PTSD (Keane, Marshall, & Taft, 2006).   
 Ehlers and Clark (2000) have proposed a cognitive model of PTSD that draws 
from prior social-cognitive theories in an attempt to explain why only a fraction of 
individuals exposed to traumatic events go on to develop chronic PTSD. Ehlers and Clark 
(2000) propose that individuals who process the traumatic event they experience in such 
a way that leads to a sense of continued, current threat are likely to develop PTSD. The 
authors go on to say that appraisals of the traumatic event and the level of integration of 
that event with other episodic memories are the key factors that result in a sense of 
current threat. Individuals who go on to develop PTSD tend to see the traumatic event as 
one with global, long-term negative effects and therefore appraise the event in a way that 
leads to the creation of a sense of ongoing internal or external current threat. Therefore, 
negative cognitions, lack of memory integration, and fractured, poorly elaborated trauma 
narratives are at the core of this cognitive theory (Cahill & Foa, 2007).  In addition, there 
tends to be a significant shift in the general belief structures of individuals with PTSD; 
this shift is thought to be a critical component in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD (Rothbaum, Resick, Meadows, & Foy, 2000). 
 Schema theories focus on the idea that a traumatic event can lead to a significant 
shift in an individual’s view of self, others and the world (Cahill & Foa, 2007). Traumatic 
29 
 
events are assumed to contrast with preexisting assumptions of the world and can result 
in a schematic shift that is generally in the direction of safety to threat (e.g., from 
believing the world is benign to believing the world is threatening). Specific schemas 
have been identified as being more relevant to the development of PTSD, including 
assumptions that the world is safe or benign, the self is worthy, and people are 
trustworthy (Epstein, 1991; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Traumatic events disrupt these pre-
held beliefs and require that individuals modify existing schemas, either through 
assimilation of the trauma with preexisting schemas, or through accommodation of the 
new experience (Cahill & Foa, 2007). In order to accomplish this, individuals must 
process trauma information (thought to occur through re-experiencing) and preexisting 
information in such as way that the two can co-exist or agree; this process can be 
hindered by the tendency to avoid distressing trauma memories, which can then maintain 
posttraumatic symptomatology (Horowitz, 1986).  Schema theorists generally agree that 
reexperiencing of trauma and avoidance of trauma memories are central to the 
development and maintenance of PTSD symptomatology (Cahill & Foa, 2007).  
 Emotion processing theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006) 
states that the development of PTSD is a result of pathological fear structures in memory 
which are activated when environmental information and structure information match and 
lead to spreading activation, resulting in anxiety (Cahill & Foa, 2007). The maladaptive 
fear structures seen in individuals with PTSD can result when “1) associations among 
stimulus elements do not accurately represent the world, 2) physiological and 
escape/avoidance responses are triggered by harmless stimuli, 3) excessive and easily 
triggered response elements interfere with adaptive behavior, and 4) harmless stimulus 
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and response elements are erroneously associated with threat meaning” (Cahill & Foa, 
2007, p. 62). Individuals with PTSD appear to have fear structures that are defined by a 
large number of harmless stimuli that are erroneously associated with threat meaning and 
trigger physiological responses (Cahill & Foa, 2007). This maladaptive fear structure can 
then lead to a view of the world as dangerous, the self as incompetent, and others as 
untrustworthy, resulting in reinforced symptoms of PTSD (Cahill & Foa, 2007). 
Essentially, PTSD can develop when preexisting knowledge about the self (e.g., 
competence vs. incompetence) and world (e.g., safe vs. dangerous) is either violated or 
reinforced (Cahill & Foa, 2007). Finally, emotional processing theory posits that a lack of 
adequate processing of the trauma memory through avoidance, numbing and withdrawal 
leads to the maintenance of PTSD (Cahill & Foa, 2007).  
 The theories described above focus on the potential causes of the formation of 
psychopathology following a traumatic event. It appears that the development of PTSD is 
dependent upon individual experience and interpretation of the trauma, individual schema 
structure both prior to and following the trauma event, cognitive appraisals of the event, 
learning, the individual’s processing (or lack of processing) of the event both internally 
and externally, and a variety of risk factors. The extant theories, however, provide little 
information regarding the nature of the symptoms of PTSD as they manifest in day-to-
day life. The next section will focus on the methods used to measure and better 
understand the manifestation of PTSD symptomatology.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Understanding and Assessing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Since its inclusion in the DSM-III (APA, 1980), many efforts have been made to 
develop measures to understand and assess trauma symptoms and PTSD in adults (Keane 
et al., 2007).  There are a number of ways in which researchers have attempted to 
understand the experience of PTSD, including personal accounts gathered through 
interviews, self-report measures (e.g., questionnaires), and structured clinical interviews. 
Personal Accounts of PTSD 
 Personal accounts have been used by members of many disciplines, including 
psychology, in an attempt to gain access to the details of individual experience. These 
accounts provide a personal narrative of an individual’s views, beliefs, expectations, etc. 
and are oftentimes generalized self-statements describing experience. Many personal 
accounts have been gathered from veterans across many wars and have been included in 
books and press articles.  For example, in their book, Haunted by Combat, Paulson and 
Krippner (2007) provided personal accounts of the experience of PTSD from veterans of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They described how the sense of extreme vigilance 
veterans developed while at war followed them home to the US and became intensified 
with time (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). This hypervigilance involved a sense of 
uneasiness, inner restlessness, physical symptoms, and a threat of a looming yet
diffuse danger (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). The looming sense of danger was oftentimes 
projected onto previously unremarkable others and objects, and at times became so 
intense and overwhelming that individuals became increasingly socially isolated; 
eventually situations and persons who were at one point neutral became a source of 
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anxiety and triggered the symptoms of PTSD (Paulson & Krippner, 2007). Other veterans 
experienced intense, frequent nightmares of the traumas they had encountered during the 
war. An active duty Marine officer, upon returning from Iraq explained:  
I am actually afraid to go to sleep at night. The nightmares are unbearable. My 
combat buddies died once in Iraq. But I have nightmares several times a week in 
which they are killed all over again. And I can still hear them screaming when I 
wake up.  (Paulson & Krippner, 2007, p. 26) 
Veterans described the difficult process of returning home from war. The initial 
relief of survival and returning home sometimes became overshadowed quickly by the 
memories, physical sensations and other factors of the war experience. Many veterans 
reported symptoms of restlessness, insomnia, and increased agitation upon returning to 
civilian life. Bob Page, a Chief Petty Officer in the United States Navy Reserves, and a 
veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom was diagnosed with PTSD shortly after his return 
from Iraq following the incident he describes below: 
I finally began to recognize that I was sleeping a couple of hours a night and that’s 
it. Every noise, I was up - looking around.  I was always checking the door locks.  I 
was always checking my kids to make sure that they were breathing, and then my 
wife; that she was okay. I was always out checking the cars.  I couldn’t sleep. So 
my son, finally one night, I was so tired and I couldn’t sleep and I was so frustrated; 
he came down the hallway crying and screaming – [this was] November.  So I went 
down the hall and I grabbed him by his arms and I picked him up, and he’s, you 
know, 2 years old and I’m…I’ve got him over my head and I’m giving him a little 
shake and I’m yelling, “Shut up!  Shut up!” and I’m screaming at my son. And I 
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just said, “Oh my god!”  And I took him back into his room and of course he’s 
screaming and my wife’s yelling, “Bob!  Bob! Take it easy!” And I hadn’t shaken 
him more than just a quick little shudder; sat him down on his bed and I sat down 
next to him, which was an infant bed-I shouldn’t say an infant-a toddler bed, which 
promptly broke because I’m too big for it.  And that made him even more upset but 
I began crying and I couldn’t believe that…I said, “Something’s wrong with me.  
This is my son. My son!  What am I doing?” (Page, n.d.). 
The day following this incident Page sought treatment for his symptoms and was 
diagnosed with PTSD.  
Other veterans with PTSD have described the difficulty they have experienced in 
reintegrating into civilian life upon returning from war. A Vietnam Veteran diagnosed 
with PTSD described his difficulty in forming relationships with women:  
How could I tell her about the horror I felt watching a dump truck taking the 
corpses of 17 of my friends to be embalmed? How could I tell her what I felt 
when I watched their blood drip and flow from the tailgate onto the ground? How 
could I tell her how deeply I hurt, of the agony I was in, and how gnawing my 
suffering was? How could I tell her that the pain and the guilt followed me like a 
beast tracking its prey? How could I tell her that the pain hounded me at night, 
during the day, and even while making love? What would she think of me if I told 
her? I feared that if any woman knew this about me, she would freak out, go into 
convulsions, vomit, and totally reject me for being such a disgusting human 
being. What was I to do? I did what seemed best: I drank and I drank and I drank. 
(Paulson & Krippner, 2007, p.29). 
34 
 
This veteran’s description poignantly describes the intensity of the guilt and shame that 
many individuals with PTSD report; as well as the harsh personal judgment that 
oftentimes prevents them from sharing their experience with those around them. It also 
highlights the potential pathway that leads to the social isolation and substance abuse 
often observed in veterans with PTSD.  
Of course, it is not just combat veterans with PTSD who express the guilt, shame 
and helplessness characteristic of this disorder. Sims and Sims (1998) explored the 
experience of 70 male and female police officers, 60 of whom were diagnosed with 
severe or moderate PTSD following a riot during a soccer game in Sheffield, England 
during which 95 people were killed. The police officers were on duty during the incident 
and were interviewed about their experience during and following the disaster. Many of 
the officers expressed feelings of fear and helplessness, “I’ve never felt as sick in my life, 
useless, helpless, desperate” (Sims & Sims, 1998, p. 100). Many expressed feelings of 
failure when reflecting upon the event at a later date, “We failed in our duty…I feel 
something for myself as well. I didn’t save anyone. I didn’t help anyone. I was useless. 
The bit of first aid I’d learned was useless” (p.103). Many of the officers reported 
persistent intrusive recollections of the day of the event, sometimes occurring so 
frequently as to disrupt daily functioning. These intrusive and spontaneous recollections 
included seeing faces compressed against a fence, dead bodies piled in a gymnasium, and 
smelling unpleasant odors associated with danger (Sims & Sims, 1998). One officer 
described the experience as, “[The memory of what happened] is like having a big screen 
in your head but at the top corner is a green body bag” (p. 104). However, 43 of the 70 
officers interviewed reported complete or partial amnesia for experiences during or 
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following the event, “I have no idea what we were doing on Sunday. The following week 
is a complete blank. I cannot remember anything” (p.105). More than half of the officers 
reported distressing nightmares of the event that in some cases persisted for many years. 
These dreams usually were specific to the part of the disaster that the officer had 
witnessed, “They were faceless and I was peering down at a body. I saw people pressed 
through the fence like a potato peeler” (p.105). Persistent feelings of guilt were common, 
as were behavioral changes following the event. Some of the officers were unable to 
speak of the event, or even to watch television or read newspapers for fear of being 
reminded (Sims & Sims, 2008). Other changes included decreased caring for others, “I 
didn’t want to go to work…I didn’t want to wear my uniform. I’ve been tougher toward 
others, not so caring” (p. 108); increased social isolation; and excessive alcohol intake, 
“I’ll go and pig into something when my wife’s not there. I drink to get oblivion, to stop 
my mind working…I feel people are looking at me and want to hurt me” (p. 109).  
 Personal accounts of the sudden shift in worldview forced upon veterans 
following initial exposure to the brutalities of war are striking. In his book, Achilles in 
Vietnam, Shay (1994) describes the experience of Vietnam veterans with PTSD during 
and after the war. Shay (1994) indicates that the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD do 
not adequately cover the “devastation of mental life after severe combat trauma” as the 
criteria do not account for deep-rooted changes in personality that may result from 
prolonged exposure to intense trauma (p. 169). Shay (1994) interviewed veterans 
regarding their perceived loss of innocence and the loss of trust in themselves, the world 
and the very reality in which they exist. One veteran with PTSD was quoted as saying,  
“Nothing is what it seems. That mountain there – maybe it wasn’t there yesterday, and it 
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won’t be there tomorrow. You get to the point where you’re not even sure it is a 
mountain” (Shay, 1994, p. 170). 
Shay (1994) describes soldiers who have entered what he refers to as “the berserk 
state.” The berserk state occurs when a soldier experiences a particularly intense and 
traumatic event, such as being trapped by the enemy, surviving certain death, or 
witnessing the death of a comrade. Soldiers in the berserk state exhibit uncontrollable 
rage and violence, and intense hypervigilance (Shay, 1994). For some soldiers, this 
berserk state is a component in the development of PTSD. For example, a soldier who 
witnessed the death of a close comrade “went berserk.” He described this state as an 
intense need for revenge coupled with violent outbursts. His berserk state began while at 
war, but did not dissipate when he returned home: 
 I carried this home with me. I lost all my friends, beat up my sister, went after my 
father. I mean, I just went after everybody and everything. Every three days I 
would totally explode, lose it for no reason at all. I’d be sitting there calm as could 
be, and this monster would come out of me with a fury that most people didn’t 
want to be around. So it wasn’t just over there. I brought it back with me. (Shay, 
1994, p.95) 
Many veterans bring the memory of their experiences back home with them, and 
many feel as though they do not have an outlet in which they can share these memories. 
One veteran with PTSD, of his experience with psychic pain and rage upon returning 
home said:  
I felt that since I was a Marine, I should not have any pain … this was hard 
because my combat veteran friends, as well as my family, advised me “not to 
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think about it,” “just be strong,” or “don’t let it bother you.” Yet I thought about 
my pain every minute of my waking day. I tried to be strong, but I felt so 
vulnerably weak, and it did bother me … I became increasingly alienated from 
myself. I split myself into essentially two beings – what I should be versus what I 
was. (Paulson & Krippner, 2007, p.142) 
Another veteran with PTSD describes the fear and anxiety he experienced on a regular 
basis, prior to receiving treatment for the disorder:  
I can remember my own experience of the road to recovery. I would go out to 
picnics and outings but find myself very uneasy. I would imagine that the North 
Vietnamese were behind the trees, stalking me. I would imagine that lightning 
storms were incoming rockets and mortar attacks and that exploding firecrackers 
were rifle shots aimed at me … This was very confusing for me. One part of me 
knew that nothing was wrong, but the other screamed “Under attack!” I would 
have periods when I could enjoy life without the fear of being killed, but they 
were always followed by a panic or anxiety period when I was not sure whether I 
was really in danger. (Paulson & Krippner, 2007, p. 144) 
Veterans and others who have experienced trauma and have gone on to develop 
PTSD appear to exist in a world that waivers between living in the present and reliving 
the trauma of the past. As one Iraq veteran with PTSD stated:  
In reality the war in Iraq is over for me, but emotionally the war will never end. 
There will be a sight or smell that will bring me back to the battlefield. There will 
be a picture or word that will bring me back to a conversation with [my fallen 
comrade]. (Odom, 2003)  
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Questionnaires 
 Questionnaires are used frequently to screen for and assess the symptoms of 
PTSD. The Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) was the first 
and remains one of the most widely used questionnaires for the assessment of 
psychological reactions to trauma. The IES was revised in 1997 (IES-R; Weiss & 
Marmar, 1997) to better match the description of PTSD in the DSM-IV. The scale 
consists of 22 items rated on Likert-type scales. It takes approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. Respondents are asked to think about the trauma they have experienced and 
then to rate “how distressed or bothered” they were during the past week by a list of 
symptoms such as emotional numbness (e.g., “My feelings about it were kind of numb”); 
hypervigilance (e.g., “I was jumpy and easily startled”); intrusive thoughts and images 
(e.g., “Pictures about it popped into my mind”), etc. Little psychometric information is 
available for the IES-R. Questions have been raised as to the validity of the original scale 
(IES), as it was developed before the diagnostic criteria were available in the DSM 
(Joseph, 2000). The revised IES parallels the DSM-IV more closely but some 
investigators consider some of the items limited in scope (Keane et al., 2007).  
The Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD (Keane, Caddell, & Taylor, 
1988) is a 35-item scale that is widely used to assess combat-related PTSD symptoms. 
Respondents are asked to rate the severity of each symptom “since the time of the event” 
on 5-point Likert-type scales. Questions on the scale assess symptoms of guilt (e.g., “I do 
not feel guilt over things I did in the military”); flashbacks (e.g., “Daydreams are very 
real and frightening”); nightmares (e.g., “I have nightmares of experiences in the military 
that really happened”); emotional numbness (e.g., “It feels as if I have no feelings”); 
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social isolation (e.g., “I enjoy the company of others”); suicidality (e.g., “Lately I have 
felt like killing myself”); etc. The Mississippi Scale yields a score of symptom severity as 
well as diagnostic information. It takes approximately 5-10 minutes to administer. The 
mean score on the Mississippi Scale obtained by individuals with PTSD is 130 (SD=18), 
and the mean score for non-PTSD individuals is 76 (SD=18; Keane et al., 1988). The 
Mississippi Scale has excellent psychometric properties (Keane et al., 2007). The 
Mississippi Scale has been shown to have high internal consistency (.94) and test-retest 
reliability (.97) over a 1-week time interval in Vietnam era veterans (Keane et al., 2007). 
The Mississippi scale has good sensitivity (.93) and specificity (.89) with a cutoff score 
of 107 (Keane et al., 2007). The Mississippi Scale yields similar results for veterans with 
PTSD with and without substance use disorders, indicating that the scale assesses PTSD 
symptoms and not effects of alcohol or drug use (McFall, Smith, Mackay, & Tarver, 
1990). Keane et al. (2007) indicate that the optimal cutoff threshold for a diagnosis of 
PTSD is 106.  
The PTSD Checklist for the DSM-IV (PCL; Weathers, Litz, Huska, & Keane, 
1994) is a widely used measure of PTSD developed by the National Center for PTSD. 
The PCL has three versions; the civilian version (PCL-C); the event specific version 
(PCL-S) and the military version (PCL-M). This 17-item self-report measure assesses the 
17 diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-IV. Respondents are asked to indicate on a 5-
point severity scale the extent to which they have been bothered in the past month by 
symptoms such as flashbacks (e.g., “Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts of images 
of a stressful military experience”); nightmares (e.g., “Repeated disturbing dreams of a 
stressful military experience”); hypervigilance (e.g., “Being super alert or watchful or on 
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guard”); avoidance (e.g., “Avoiding thinking about or talking about a stressful military 
experience or avoiding having feelings related to it”); and so on (Norris & Hamblen, 
2003). The PCL-M can be scored in two ways in order to yield either a continuous 
measure of symptom severity, or a dichotomous indicator of diagnostic status (Keane, 
Brief, Pratt, & Miller, 2007). Cutoff scores are provided by the authors, with a score of 
44 and above in the general population, and 50 and above in the military population 
considered to be PTSD positive. The PCL has been used in both research and clinical 
settings and takes approximately 5-10 minutes to administer (Keane et al., 2007). The 
PCL-M was originally validated in a sample of Persian Gulf and Vietnam War veterans 
and was found to have strong psychometric properties (Keane et al., 2007). The PCL-M 
has high internal consistency for the total scale, and each subscale (.97 and .92-.93, 
respectively; Norris & Hamblen, 2003).  The PCL-M has been shown to correlate highly 
with clinician-administered measures of PTSD (Norris & Hamblen, 2003). Test-retest 
reliability over a 2-3 day time interval is high (.96; Keane, et al., 2007). 
Structured Clinical Interviews 
Clinical interviews are frequently used in the assessment of PTSD, particularly in 
clinical research settings (Keane, Brief, Pratt & Miller, 2007). The interview method has 
the potential to overcome some of the methodological problems inherent in self-report 
assessments, as they are more thorough, allow for clarification of questions and 
responses, and give the sense of a more collaborative undertaking.  
The Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1990) is currently 
the most widely used interview for diagnosing PTSD. The CAPS has been used as the 
primary diagnostic tool in many empirical studies of PTSD; it has been used with a wide 
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variety of trauma-exposed populations (including combat veterans); and it has been 
translated into 12 languages (Keane et al., 2007). The CAPS is a flexible structured 
interview that assesses all the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria and symptoms of guilt and 
dissociation; the full interview takes approximately one hour but can be shorter when 
necessary (Keane et al., 2007). The CAPS provides structured prompts, explicit rating 
anchors and behavioral referents. The CAPS allows for ratings of the severity and 
frequency of symptoms, which when summed, create a severity score for each symptom 
(Keane et al., 2007). The CAPS has excellent psychometric properties. The interrater 
reliability over a 2-3 day interval is strong for symptom frequency, intensity and severity 
(.86 – .87; .86 – .92; and .88 – .91, respectively; Weathers, Ruscio, & Keane, 1999). Test-
retest reliability is high (.89 – 1.00), as is internal consistency across the 17 core 
symptom items in both research and clinical samples. The CAPS correlates highly with 
other measures of PTSD, including the Mississippi Scale (.91), the SCID (.89) and the 
PTSD Checklist (.94; Weathers et al., 1999). In a study by Hovens, overall agreement 
between a clinician-rated diagnosis and CAPS diagnosis was 79%; sensitivity was .74, 
while specificity was .84 (Hovens, Van der Ploeg, Klaarenbeek, & Bramsen, 1994). 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM – IV (SCID-IV; First, Spitzer, 
Williams, & Gibson, 2000) is a widely used method to assess psychological conditions 
on Axis I and Axis II of the DSM-IV. The interview is divided into specialized modules, 
and interviewers provide prompts and follow-up questions dependent upon the module in 
which they are working (Keane et al., 2007). Interviewee responses are coded on a 3-
point scale based on the interviewer’s evaluation. Due to the nature of the SCID, it is 
recommended for use by only clinicians and experienced interviewers. The PTSD-
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specific module of the SCID has shown sound psychometric properties. Interrater 
reliability is good (.68; Keane, et al., 1998), and convergent validity is also strong (.65; 
Keane et al, 1998). The SCID determines whether PTSD is “present” or “absent” based 
upon the individual’s “worst trauma experience” (Keane et al., 2007). Unfortunately, the 
SCID is limited in that it does not place significance upon the effects of traumatic 
experiences not considered by the patient as “the worst” (Keane et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the SCID does not include questions pertaining to the severity or frequency 
of symptomatology, nor does it allow for a dimensional view of PTSD (due to its 
dichotomous nature; Keane et al., 2007). 
The Structured Interview for PTSD (SIP; Davidson, Smith, & Kudler, 1989) is a 
19-item interview administered by appropriately trained individuals. The SIP includes 
items focusing on the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, and items regarding survivor and 
behavior guilt (Keane et al., 2007).  Interviewers rate individual responses on a Likert-
type scale, with probe questions included. The scale takes approximately 10-30 minutes 
to administer. The SIP showed good interrater reliability (.97 – .99) in a sample of 
combat veterans (Davidson et al., 1989). The SIP has shown good validity, and correlates 
with other measures of PTSD (.49 – .67; Davidson et al., 1989). Test-retest reliability 
over a 2-week period was good (.71).  
Methodological Issues in the Measurement of PTSD 
There are several methodological difficulties with a reliance on traditional 
measurement procedures such as questionnaires and clinical interviews, including 
memory biases and distortions, cognitive processing biases, individual and affective 
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factors and self-presentation bias. Generally, these traditional measures tend to use a 
global, retrospective approach when assessing experience.  
 Traditional self-report measures, such as questionnaires and clinical interviews, rely 
primarily on an individual’s beliefs about him/herself in general, as formed by accessible 
memory information. Therefore, a construct is measured accurately by self-report only to 
the extent that the individual has valid memory information available. However, accuracy 
issues arise when asking participants to make judgments about the nature and frequency 
of their cognitions (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006). This is further complicated by 
the potential for distortions in semantic memory. Robinson and Clore (2002) provided a 
review differentiating between emotion (episodic, contextual) and beliefs about emotion 
(semantic, conceptual) to highlight the effect of time on memory retrieval.  They found 
that contextual details of events can aid recall.  However, as time lapses, recall of 
contextual details declines which may cause random and systematic retrospective biases.  
Once details are lost, the memory of an emotion shifts from episodic memory to semantic 
memory.  As semantic memory takes over for an event, other retrospective biases may 
become involved, such as belief-consistent bias (e.g., the tendency to recall and report 
events consistent with one’s own beliefs). Because a key feature of posttraumatic stress 
disorder is a general numbing in overall responsiveness, and sometimes heightened 
agitation and anger, relying on semantic memory may be problematic.  
Responses to questionnaires may be distorted by multiple memory errors that 
occur during the encoding, storage, or retrieval stages (Tourangeau, 2000). During 
encoding, target information may not be adequately encoded due to interference from 
competing cognitive information or inattention, thereby reducing its likelihood to be 
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retrieved at a later time. Storage difficulties arise when already encoded information is 
distorted by incoming information or distorts already existing information, leading to 
self-report inaccuracies. 
In the storage stage of memory, difficulties may arise due to memory capacity and 
decay.  People have a limited amount of information that can be received, processed, and 
remembered.  Miller (1956) found that regardless of the element (e.g., digits, letters or 
words) people retained around seven plus or minus two elements of information in their 
short term working memory.  Since his study, other researchers have proposed retention 
levels of less than seven elements in short term memory (Cowan, 2001).  Factors 
affecting the ability to encode, store, and recall new information include rehearsal 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and lexical status of 
the content (Hulme, Roodenrys, & Brown, 1995).  If items are not rehearsed and 
accurately processed, they do not move from working memory to long-term memory. 
This can result in deficiencies when attempting to recall information. In addition, factors 
such as the primacy and recency effects influence storage.  The primacy effect involves 
information presented earlier in a series being more likely to be recalled than information 
presented later because the time available for rehearsal or processing of new material 
decreases as information continues to be presented. The recency effect involves 
information presented toward the end of a series being more likely to be recalled than 
information in the middle because less time has elapsed upon initial recall. 
 With regard to memory decay, studies have shown that people experience rapid 
loss of details following an event (Rubin & Wetzel, 1996). As the time between the event 
and the recall of the event increases, the accuracy of the recalled details deteriorates 
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(Bernard, Killworth, Kroenfeld, & Sailor, 1984). Tourangeau’s (2000) attempt at 
providing a mathematical formula related to retention of information as a function of time 
led to the conclusion that forgetting increases monotonically over time, but it occurs 
rapidly at first then slows down.  Additionally, Hurlburt (1984) concluded that when 
people rate their experiences after a delay, they tend to intensify their experiences by 
exaggerating their ratings of irritation, anger, vividness, and clarity. The evidence from 
this line of research indicates that the ability to recall information accurately decreases as 
a function of passed time.  Problems with memory decay are especially relevant with 
PTSD, as memories are often centered around one (or sometimes multiple) point in time 
– the traumatic event. In order to minimize errors associated with memory decay, 
researchers should attempt to obtain details of experiences as soon after a given event as 
possible. 
 Another problem with questionnaires relates to mood-congruent memory retrieval 
(Ellis & Moore, 1999). In general, individuals are better able to recall or retrieve 
information that is of the same affective tone as the mood they are currently experiencing 
(Blaney, 1986). Therefore, it may be easier to retrieve information about positive 
activities when in a positive mood and information about negative activities when in a 
negative mood. Thus, if individuals are distressed while completing a questionnaire, they 
are more likely to remember mood congruent items, more likely to forget mood 
incongruent items, and more likely to rate items relating to negative affect as frequent 
and severe.  
Procedural issues including demand characteristics, reactivity and ecological 
validity can also affect the accuracy of the information provided on self-report measures. 
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Demand characteristics consist of anything that may occur during an experimental 
situation that may give the participant cues as to what the researcher is looking for, or 
may elicit unnatural behaviors from the participants. Demand characteristics include 
things like evaluation apprehension, hypothesis guessing or suspiciousness, and so forth. 
The experimenter can unintentionally influence the participant’s responses with his/her 
conduct, types of questions, demeanor, and even appearance.  
Social desirability bias can be a problem for self-report measures as well.  Social 
desirability refers to situations in which the participant responds to a question in what 
they believe is a socially acceptable manner (Fisher, 1993).  Prior studies have found that 
social desirability can attenuate, inflate, or moderate statistical relationships (Zerbe & 
Paulhus, 1987); increase measurement error (Cote & Buckley, 1988); and affect variable 
means (Peterson & Kerin, 1981).  Thus demand characteristics and social desirability are 
important to consider when conducting research that involves self-reports.  
There are a variety of other methodological difficulties that are potentially 
problematic when using questionnaires. At the most basic level, questionnaires may not 
take into account literacy and language abilities, or the degree to which current levels of 
psychopathology and/or distress may interfere with comprehension and response style 
(Kessler, Wittchen, Abelson, & Zhao, 2000). Respondents may not understand questions 
due to individual comprehension difficulties or unclearly phrased questions. For example, 
the PTSD Checklist – Military Version (PCL-M; Weathers, Litz, Huska, & Keane, 1994) 
asks respondents to rate the extent to which they have been “Feeling very upset when 
something reminded you of a stressful military experience.” Interpretation is necessary 
when determining the meaning of “very upset,” which may vary greatly among 
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individuals. Other questions may be unclear, or ambiguous such as the following 
question, taken from the Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD (Keane, Caddell, & 
Taylor, 1988), “I fall asleep, stay asleep and awaken only when the alarm goes off.” This 
question might be interpreted as meaning that one can only fall asleep, stay asleep, and 
awaken when the alarm goes off.  
Finally, according to Schaeffer (2000), questions that are threatening to the 
individual are especially prone to self-presentation bias. Items that are perceived as 
threatening may evoke a sense of shame, guilt, or distress, such as the following question 
also drawn from the Mississippi Scale, “There have been times when I used alcohol (or 
other drugs) to help me sleep or to make me forget about the things that happened while I 
was in the service,” or “I have cried for no good reason.” The latter may be particularly 
threatening to male veterans due to the discouragement of expressed emotion in males in 
our society at large, and particularly in the military. Problems of self-presentation bias 
may be reduced through the use of anonymity or through the establishment of a trusting 
and collaborative working relationship.  
Other problems with questionnaires include respondents potentially neglecting to 
read instructions fully, not paying attention to time-specific references, or misinterpreting 
rating scales. This is particularly true when the nature of the rating scale shifts within a 
self-report questionnaire. For example, some questions on the Mississippi Scale are rated 
from 1 (never) to 5 (very much so), whereas others are rated from 1 (not at all true) to 5 
(extremely true) and yet others, 1 (never) to 5 (very frequently). The PCL-M asks 
respondents to indicate the extent to which they are bothered by the symptoms listed in 
the checklist, not the extent to which they experience the symptoms listed. This subtlety 
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may go unnoticed if the instructions are not read and clearly understood, and in most 
cases, the misinterpretation may go unnoticed by investigators. 
Another issue faced when using self-report questionnaires is that of ecological 
validity. In order for an experiment to possess ecological validity, the methods, materials, 
and setting must approximate the real-life situation (Brewer, 2000).  In general, achieving 
ecological validity is very difficult when using traditional experimental research methods. 
According to Hurlburt (1997), the traditional experiment will not be ecologically valid 
because it attempts to provide one condition that is identical across all participants. To 
maximize ecological validity, participants should be evaluated in their natural 
environments while engaging in their daily activities with as little disturbance as possible.  
Self-report questionnaires do not generally test people in their natural environments. 
Structured interviews, despite their collaborative and in-depth nature, have 
drawbacks as well. Self-presentation bias may be more present in clinical interviews than 
with questionnaires. The anonymity that is sometimes available with questionnaires is 
lost in clinical interviewing. Interviews rely on retrospective memories and are therefore 
subject to the effects of mood-congruent memory. Furthermore, the high degree of guilt 
and shame that many individuals, particularly veterans, report associated with their 
perceived “failure” during the traumatic event may interfere with the willingness to 
respond openly. Veterans may be reluctant to divulge symptoms that indicate PTSD due 
to stigma within the military. This stigma has been found to prevent the divulgence of 
mental health symptoms and to increase reluctance to seek treatment. Hoge et al. (2004) 
found that of the soldiers and Marines scoring above the cutoff for a psychological 
condition, over 60% reported that they would not consider seeking help. A common 
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reason for this was the fear of being “perceived as weak” (Hoge et al, 2004). Many 
veterans choose not to openly discuss their PTSD symptoms in fear of negatively 
affecting their careers (Hoge et al., 2004).  Nevertheless, structured interviews are a 
valuable method that, along with other methods that reduce measurement error and 
increase insight, can be useful in assessing PTSD. 
As reviewed above, current retrospective PTSD assessment methods rely 
primarily on questionnaire and clinical interview data. While the information yielded by 
these methods is necessary and valuable, it is also vulnerable to bias. As Keane and 
Barlow (2002) state regarding the various measures used to assess PTSD, “All are 
imperfect and require clinical judgment in their use.” Combat veterans with PTSD 
sometimes misrepresent their responses to traditional assessment measures. This 
misrepresentation can occur due to stigma and guilt but may also occur due to self-
presentation bias, memory errors, or cognitive processing errors. Furthermore, current 
assessments of PTSD are based upon a perceived understanding of the phenomenology of 
the disorder. However, few studies to date have systematically explored that 
phenomenology in such a way that provides a clear understanding of the daily experience 
of PTSD. Therefore, traditional assessment measures may be insufficient for gaining a 
clear understanding of PTSD phenomena.  
What information regarding the individual experience of PTSD does exist comes 
mostly from personal accounts provided by veterans in autobiographical literature. 
Although personal accounts about the experience of PTSD are a step toward 
understanding the disorder and provide valuable information, these personal accounts do 
not adequately or systematically delve into the phenomenology of the disorder. As 
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Paulson and Krippner (2007) report, some of the recollections provided by Vietnam and 
other veterans appear almost “mythological” in their details. The authors indicated that 
part of the reason for this is that audience expectations, emotional biases, retellings of the 
incident, and self-talk all contribute to a sort of confabulation process that can then color 
the true memory over time and lead to distortions in the recollection of the experience 
(Paulson & Krippner, 2007).  
Despite the wide range of measures available to assess the symptoms of PTSD, 
little systematic information is available about the individual experience of the disorder. 
A search of PsycINFO, the most widely used psychology research database, using the 
keywords “phenomenolog*,” “experiential*,” and “experience*” coupled with 
“posttraumatic stress disorder” reveals that only approximately 5% of the extant PTSD 
literature focuses on individual experiential phenomena of PTSD. Much of the literature 
that does exist on the phenomenology of the disorder tends to focus on the DSM-IV 
criteria, but does not reveal a great deal of information about the individual experience of 
PTSD (e.g., Tomb, 1994). For example, in their discussion of the current understanding 
of PTSD, Frueh, Elhai and Kaloupek (2004) warn that the field of psychology “[does] not 
understand the syndrome of PTSD as well as we need, in order to evaluate and diagnose 
as accurately and reliably as one might wish” (p.66). This is partially due to an only 
tentative understanding of the true phenomenology of PTSD (Frueh et al., 2004). For 
example, although it is clear that one common symptom of PTSD is emotional numbing, 
little is known about the nature of this emotional numbing – what does it consist of from 
individual to individual? Is the emotion present but unrecognized, or has the emotional 
world of the individual with PTSD become impoverished? Hypervigilance and 
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hyperarousal are also common symptoms of PTSD. Yet little is known about the 
individual experience of hypervigilance – is hypervigilance experienced differently 
among individuals? How does hypervigilance manifest itself in the day-to-day life of 
individuals with PTSD? It is possible that a better understanding of questions like these 
may inform existing theories of PTSD. In order to gain a clearer understanding of the 
phenomenology of posttraumatic stress disorder, a systematic and scientifically based 
introspective method must be applied; one that attempts to overcome the methodological 
shortcomings of retrospection, puts aside presuppositions and aims only to explore the 
daily experience of individuals with the disorder.  
Exploring Experience 
In an attempt to reduce the methodological errors associated with traditional 
measures (e.g., self-report) researchers have developed several alternative methods for 
exploring individual inner experience. Some of these methods focus on the reduction of 
the problems associated with retrospection while others attempt to increase ecological 
validity. These methods of examining inner experience include think-aloud (e.g., 
Davidson, Roins & Johnson, 1983; Yang, 2003), thought listing (e.g., Brock, 1967; 
Greenwald, 1968), and electronically cued checklists such as the Experience Sampling 
Method and Ecological Momentary Assessment (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Larsen, 1987; 
Shiffman & Stone, 1998). One particular method for exploring individual inner 
experience that appears to be well suited to the task of exploring the phenomenology of 
PTSD is Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993). DES will be 
used over other methods to examine the experience of PTSD in this study for several 
reasons.   
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 DES is a method developed for obtaining high-fidelity accounts of individual 
inner experience. The objective of DES is to describe the details of the experience at a 
given moment while minimizing the generalizations and pitfalls of other methods of 
exploring experience. Inner experience, for our purposes, refers to anything that is 
ongoing in an individual’s consciousness/awareness at a particular moment. This might 
include tickles, sounds, sights, thoughts, feelings, images, or whatever else is present in 
experience at any given moment. 
DES participants are provided with a device that emits a beep through an 
earphone at random intervals. Participants wear this ‘beeper’ in their natural environment 
as they go about their daily activities. Participants are instructed to pay attention to what 
is ongoing in their experience right at the moment of the beep. Participants jot down 
notes to help them recall their experience at the moment of the beep; specific instructions 
as to what to jot down are not given to avoid biasing the participant. Participants then 
repeat this procedure until they have collected six moments of their experience. Within 
24 hours of collecting six moments of experience, the investigator conducts an 
“expositional” interview with the participant.  
During the expositional interview, participant and investigator collaborate in an 
attempt to fully examine and understand each moment of that participant’s experience. 
The interview focuses on the participant’s experience by asking various versions of the 
question “What was ongoing in your experience in the moment before the beep disturbed 
your awareness?” The investigator attempts to suspend all presuppositions as to the 
nature of experience and aids the participant in doing likewise. The investigator does not 
assume she understands what the participant is conveying. Instead, the investigator 
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attempts to understand the participant’s experience through a series of questions and 
discussion. In order to effectively avoid contamination from pre-held beliefs, the 
investigator begins the interview by asking very open-beginninged questions (Hurlburt & 
Akhter, 2006). Throughout the course of the interview, the questions become more 
specific but do not coincide with any pre-set agenda.  
It is the duty of the investigator to ensure that the interview does not reach beyond 
the limits of the last moment before the beep disturbed the experience and that the 
conversation remains focused on that very narrow period of time. In addition to this, the 
interviewer must be very careful to avoid leading the participant in a particular direction. 
In other words, questions are not predetermined, nor are they leading. The interviewer 
(and participant alike) should be very careful to avoid being influenced by pre-held 
beliefs about the world and the nature of experience. In other words, the interviewer 
should bracket presuppositions and should not assume he/she understands the language or 
the meaning of the participant’s descriptions without detailed exploration.  
The investigator writes a description of what she takes the participant’s 
experience at the moment of the beep to have been.  Usually there is agreement between 
the investigator and participant, but that is not essential.  There are times when the 
participant and investigator disagree (for example, when the participant is not able to 
suspend presuppositions).  It is the investigator’s responsibility to consider the 
participant’s discrepant input but not blindly to be limited by it. These sample summaries 
can then be coded using the codebook developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999), can be 
coded for specific content, or both, or neither.  
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The period of experience sampling with each participant usually ranges in length 
from four to eight days, with about six sampled moments collected per day.  In total, 
approximately 24 to 48 sampled moments are typically obtained. The first day of 
sampling is typically considered a training day for participants and thus samples collected 
on the first day are generally discarded. Participants appear to be able to better report on 
and understand their inner experience following the first sampling day, and continue to 
improve upon successive sampling days (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt 2009). 
DES is an idiographic procedure that attempts to characterize one person’s 
experience. Therefore, when sampling is complete, an idiographic summary highlighting 
individual salient characteristics of inner experience is written for each participant. 
Salient characteristics include characteristics that are frequently present across samples of 
an individual’s inner experience. DES can also be used to examine the inner experiences 
of individuals who have similar externally observable characteristics (e.g., individuals 
with combat-related PTSD). When used in this manner, several individuals with a shared 
characteristic are sampled. Qualitative observations of individuals within each group are 
made, and qualitative observations of group similarities and differences are noted. This 
can allow for nomothetic characterizations of common experiences.  
 The primary difference between DES and other sampling methods is that DES 
asks participants to focus on whatever is ongoing in their awareness at the cued moment. 
In pursuit of this focus, DES uses open-beginninged and open-ended questions; it does 
not ask that participants note any chosen-in-advance aspect of their environment or 
experience. Therefore, the DES method allows not only for a reduction with the problems 
of memory bias and retrospection, and increased ecological validity, but it also provides 
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an unstructured, qualitative framework from which unanticipated phenomena can arise. 
Other experience sampling methods (e.g., electronically cued checklists) select in 
advance those aspects of awareness or experience, such as social or environmental 
context and activity, as the focus of investigation a priori.  In addition, some methods ask 
participants to report on these dimensions using a structured format.  DES is focused only 
on the participant’s inner experience as it naturally occurs to the participant, without the 
use of checklists or rating scales.  DES does not ask the participant to pay special 
attention to the environment or to physiological changes unless that is what the 
participant is paying attention to at the cued moment.  Additionally, DES provides 
qualitative descriptions rather than quantitative analyses, thereby providing a picture of 
individual experience (Hurlburt, 1997). 
DES may be able to address some of the methodological concerns relevant to 
understanding inner experience in a particularly comprehensive manner. Memory decay 
and the potentially biasing influence of situation- or mood-congruent memory are 
significantly reduced by the short interval between the event of interest and the 
examination of that event. DES targets episodic memory because it targets specific, 
clearly identified moments, thus reducing the likelihood of contamination of reports by 
semantic memory.  For example, when discussing personal accounts of PTSD above, the 
following quote from a veteran was included:  
…yet I thought about my pain every minute of my waking day. I tried to be 
strong, but I felt so vulnerably weak, and it did bother me … I became 
increasingly alienated from myself. I split myself into essentially two beings – 
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what I should be versus what I was (Paulson & Krippner, 2007, p.142, italics in 
original).  
This statement highlights the importance of carefully exploring experience that is 
ongoing at externally selected moments and the danger of relying upon semantic memory 
when assessing individual experience. Although it is possible that this veteran 
experienced pain during every moment of his waking day, it seems unlikely. And 
although it is possible that this veteran was intentionally exaggerating the frequency of 
thinking about his pain, this is unlikely as well. Instead, what may be possible is that this 
veteran was in fact experiencing a great deal of pain, so much so that in retrospect that 
pain is remembered as all consuming. However, by using the DES method to explore 
experience, we may be able to determine whether the veteran’s statement is in fact 
accurate (e.g., were all his sampled moments pain-focused?) or if he sometimes has non-
pain related experiences as well.  
Errors associated with memory capacity are reduced because DES is interested in 
only brief, externally selected moments of ongoing experience.  Participant reactivity is 
minimized because the method does not try to invoke processes that go beyond the 
capture and scope of the experience, and also allows the participant to report the 
experience without restrictions.  Reactivity is also likely to be diminished by the repeated 
nature of the sampling process spread across a number of days.  Ecological validity is 
maximized in the DES procedure because participants are sampled in their natural 
environments.  Demand characteristics are minimized by training DES interviewers to 
bracket their presuppositions and to ask open-beginninged, open-ended, unbiased 
questions. Additionally, DES participants are assured that there are no a priori 
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conceptions of right or wrong content and that they are co-investigators in the process of 
understanding their inner experience, thus reducing some of the pressures associated with 
being in an experimental situation. DES is a procedure that may be able to minimize 
errors associated with retrospective self-reports.  The DES method is primarily an 
exploratory method in which the objective is to obtain a faithful account of an 
individual’s inner experience. There is no other pre-determined task of the DES method. 
Although DES aims to obtain high-fidelity accounts of inner experience, and 
investigators are trained in the method, there is no guarantee that this aim will be met. 
DES strives to minimize the problems with retrospective forms of self-report, increasing 
the likelihood of gaining faithful, unbiased reports of inner experience. However, the 
effectiveness of the method also depends upon the skill and training of the investigator 
and how well they implement DES in any specific investigation. Ultimately, DES is only 
as good as the investigator using it in that instance.  
The Present Study 
 The present study employed Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to explore 
the inner experience of veterans with combat-related PTSD.  PTSD is essentially a 
disorder of inner experience and thus a clearer view of the actual experience of those 
suffering from PTSD may be valuable for the science and treatment of PTSD.  
The study involved two phases: screening and sampling.  During the screening 
phase, volunteers from within the UNLV community, as well as the community at large, 
were recruited via on-campus and community-wide advertisements.  Respondents were 
given a PTSD screening measure.  Seven participants who reported significant symptoms 
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of combat-related PTSD were asked to participate in the sampling phase of the study. 
During the sampling phase participants took part in DES for five to nine days.   
The data were examined as follows: the investigator reviewed the pristine 
experiences for each participant and described any salient characteristics or patterns of 
inner experience. The investigator then created a detailed, idiographic description for 
each participant, noting evident aspects of the form, content and nature of the moments of 
experience. The investigator then examined the extent to which there appeared 
differences or commonalities in the nature of the inner experience of the participants and 
the extent to which identified commonalities and differences corresponded with other 
characteristics of the individuals, such as severity of PTSD symptoms, depressive 
symptoms or anxiety symptoms.
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
This study proceeded in two phases; the screening phase and the sampling phase. 
The screening phase was used to identify and recruit participants. During the sampling 
phase, inner experience was explored.  
Screening Phase 
Participants. 
Twenty-three veterans from the UNLV campus and greater Las Vegas community 
completed the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist, Military Version (PCL-M; 
Weathers, Litz, Huska & Keane, 1994). Participants were recruited through the use of 
flyers and online advertisements during the Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 semesters.  
Screening continued until seven individuals qualified for the sampling phase of the study. 
Measures. 
The PTSD Checklist – Military Version for the DSM-IV (PCL-M; Weathers et 
al., 1994) is among the most widely used measures of PTSD. The PCL-M was developed 
by the National Center for PTSD specifically for use with military populations. This 17-
item self-report measure assesses the 17 diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-IV 
(Norris & Hamblen, 2003). 
Respondents are asked to indicate how frequently they have been bothered by 
each symptom (e.g., hypervigilance, nightmares, flashbacks, avoidance, social isolation, 
etc.) in the past month on a 5-point severity scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) with higher scores indicating greater symptom severity. Examples of items 
include “Feeling very upset when something reminded you of a stressful military 
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experience,” “Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy” and “Trouble 
remembering important parts of a stressful memory experience.” The PCL-M can be 
scored in two ways in order to yield either a continuous measure of symptom severity, or 
a dichotomous indicator of diagnostic status (Keane, Brief, Pratt, & Miller, 2007). Cutoff 
scores are provided by Weathers et al. (1994) with a score of 44 and above in the general 
population, and 50 and above in the military population, considered to be PTSD positive. 
The PCL-M has been used in both research and clinical settings and takes approximately 
5-10 minutes to administer (Keane et al., 2007). The PCL-M was originally validated in a 
sample of Persian Gulf and Vietnam War veterans and was found to have strong 
psychometric properties (Keane et al., 2007). The PCL-M has high internal consistency 
for the total scale and each subscale (.97 and .92-.93, respectively; Norris & Hamblen, 
2003).  The PCL-M has been shown to correlate highly with clinician-administered 
measures of PTSD (Norris & Hamblen, 2003). Test-retest reliability over a 2-3 day time 
interval is high (.96; Keane, et al., 2007).  
 A demographic questionnaire was used to collect information concerning 
participant name, address, phone number, age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status and 
education level. The demographic questionnaire also included questions regarding the 
dates of military deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan and whether or not the respondent 
saw active combat while deployed to a combat zone.  
Procedure. 
The investigator posted University IRB-approved flyers with study information 
throughout the UNLV campus. Various military organizations were contacted, including 
the UNLV Student Veterans Organization, the Army Reserves and the Las Vegas 
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Veterans Administration, who agreed to distribute information regarding this study to 
their constituents. Recruitment flyers were also mailed electronically through the UNLV 
Today email system. The investigator provided information to interested parties over the 
telephone, and arranged individual meetings with potential participants during the Fall 
2009 and Spring 2010 semesters.  
Volunteers completed the screening battery (PTSD Checklist – Military Version, 
and demographic form) in the Experience Sampling Lab at UNLV, which took 
approximately 15 minutes. Prior to completing the measures, informed consent was 
explained and obtained. All participants who completed the screening phase were 
provided with a list of community resources in the event they wished to seek counseling 
services for possible PTSD symptoms or other psychological symptoms. The screening 
measures were then collected and scored while the participant waited. Participants with a 
qualifying score on the PCL-M (50 or greater) were then invited to participate in the 
sampling phase of the study. Participants who did not have a qualifying score on the 
PCL-M were debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Sampling Phase 
Participants.  
 Of the 23 participants screened, eight had scores above the cut-off for PTSD (50) 
on the PCL-M. All eight were invited to participate in this phase of the study and all eight 
agreed to do so. All were veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. However, one 
participant dropped out of the study following the first sampling day citing a busy 
schedule; he is not included in this report. Of the remaining seven participants who 
completed the study, six were veterans of the Iraq war, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
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and two were veterans of the Afghanistan war, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); it 
should be noted that one participant deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
demographic information for participants from this phase of the study is included in 
Table 1. The mean age of the sample was 26 years. Each participant in this phase 
received $10 for every expositional interview.   
Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Sample (N=7) 
 
 Participants 
Characteristic n % 
Sex   
   Female 0 0 
   Male 7 100 
War   
Iraq  6 86 
Afghanistan  2 28 
Ethnicity   
African American  0 0 
Pacific Islander 1 14 
Caucasian 4 57 
Hispanic 2 29 
 
Measures. 
 The Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) is currently the most widely used measure for assessing the severity of depression. 
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure for use with individuals over 13 years of age. 
The BDI-II takes approximately 10 minutes to administer. The BDI-II uses DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria to assess for depressive symptoms over the preceding 2 weeks. 
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Symptom intensity is measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 0-3; higher scores 
indicate more severe symptoms. Scores falling in the 0-13 range indicate little to no 
depression; scores in the 14-19 range indicate mild depression; scores in the 20-28 range 
indicate moderate depression and scores in the 29-63 range indicate severe depression. 
Overall the BDI-II has been shown to have excellent test-retest reliability over a period of 
seven days (.93; Beck et al., 1996) and excellent internal consistency (.93; Dozois, 
Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) is a measure of anxiety 
that is widely used in both clinical and research settings. The BAI is a 21-item self-report 
measure for use with individuals over 17 years of age. The BAI takes approximately 10 
minutes to administer. The BAI assesses for anxiety symptoms over the preceding week. 
Symptom intensity is assessed on a 4-point scale with higher scores indicating higher 
subjective levels of anxiety. The BAI total scores range from 0 to 63, with scores above 
26 indicating severe anxiety, scores in the 16-25 range indicating moderate anxiety, 
scores in the 8-15 range indicating mild anxiety, and scores in the 0-7 range indicating 
minimal anxiety. The items measured on the BAI include anxiety-related physical 
sensations such as numbness and shakiness and affective anxiety-related experiences 
including fear and inability to relax. The BAI has excellent psychometric properties 
including .92 internal consistency and .75 test-retest reliability over a period of seven 
days (Steer & Beck, 1997).  
Apparatus. 
 In order to sample random moments of inner experience, this study employed a 
pocket-sized beeping device developed by Hurlburt. The beeper is a rectangular device 
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that generates a 700-Hz tone at random intervals. The time at which a beep occurs is 
random with a mean duration between signals of 30 minutes and a range of 0 to 60 
minutes. The beep is delivered by an earphone that is used to provide a signal with rapid 
rise time and one that does not disturb the external environment. The volume of the beep 
is adjustable to accommodate different situations and ambient noise levels. Participants 
terminate the beep and reset the beeper by pressing a button on the top of the beeper. 
Participants in this study were provided with an earpiece and a pocket-sized notebook in 
which to write notes about their experience at the moment of the beep.   
Procedure. 
Participants from the screening phase who qualified for the sampling phase of the 
study were asked to participate in the sampling phase of the study. Individuals who 
agreed to participate in the sampling phase were provided with an initial introductory 
session during which informed consent for the sampling phase of the study was obtained, 
confidentiality was explained, the BDI-II and the BAI were completed, and participants 
were advised that they could discontinue participation in the study at any point and for 
any reason with no penalty.  
The nature of the DES method and procedure were then explained in detail to the 
participants. Participants were shown the operation of the beeper device, how to turn the 
beeper on and off, how to adjust the volume of the beep, and how to reset the beeper. 
Participants were provided with a small notebook and instructed to jot down notes about 
their experience at the moment of the beep.  
In DES, the participant is considered a partner or co-investigator and is 
encouraged to be open and honest about his inner experience. In addition, the participant 
 65 
is given the right to refuse discussion of any sensitive material of his choosing and the 
investigator explicitly agrees to respect the participant’s privacy at all times. If the 
participant does not wish to discuss any aspect of his experience, the participant is asked 
to indicate explicitly that this is the case and the discussion of the entire experience is 
omitted. The participants in this study were made aware of their co-investigator status 
and their right to privacy. 
Participants were asked to collect six consecutive samples of inner experience 
during a block of time of their choosing, usually about three hours. The moment of the 
beep was explained to the participants as the last fraction of a second before their inner 
experience was disturbed by the beep. Participants were not provided with detailed 
instructions regarding what to jot down or what to pay attention to at the moment of the 
beep; this was left up to the discretion of each participant, in order to gain the purest 
account of the unique inner experience possible. In order to maintain keep the 
participant’s focus on the experience and not on what he wrote about the experience, the 
particulars of what the participants wrote in their notebooks were never seen by the 
investigator unless the participant explicitly asked to share this information. 
An hour-long “expositional interview” was then scheduled to take place within 24 
hours of each sampling day. This was done in order to reduce the decay of the memories 
of the moments of experience.  During these expositional interviews, the investigator and 
the participant discussed the six sampled moments in great detail with the aim of reaching 
a shared understanding of the participant’s inner experience at each moment. These 
interviews all took place in the Experience Sampling Lab and were videotaped with the 
participant’s consent. Only one participant did not consent to videotaping, and was 
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instead audio-taped. The investigator conducted all of the interviews with the 
participation of Dr. Heavey, Dr. Hurlburt, or usually, both. During the expositional 
interview the investigators and participant discussed each sampled moment until the 
investigators each, singly, believed that the point of diminishing returns had been reached 
in the deepening of the apprehension of the sampled experience. This investigator took 
extensive notes during each discussion and following the interview wrote a summary of 
each moment of experience. All sample summaries were then thoroughly discussed and 
examined by both Dr. Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt as part of the faithful apprehension 
process.  
The process of collecting six moments of inner experience and meeting within 24 
hours for an expositional interview was repeated for a total of five to nine sessions per 
participant. A breakdown of the number of expositional interviews and moments of 
experience collected per participant is provided in Table 2. After the DES process was 
completed for each participant, the investigator conducted a thorough exit interview with 
each participant. During this exit interview, the participant was asked questions regarding 
the nature of the traumatic event(s) experienced, and was given the opportunity to share 
other relevant information and to ask questions. Finally, following the completion of 
sampling with all participants a series of meetings were conducted by this investigator 
and Drs. Heavey and Hurlburt. During these meetings, the sample summaries were used 
to awaken, as much as possible, the original pristine experience of participants. When it 
was felt necessary, original videotapes were reviewed in order to enliven the 
reconstruction of the original pristine experience. The goal of these meetings was the 
emergence of salient characteristics across samples in order to obtain a “big picture” view 
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of each participant, and thus each sample summary was used as a tool toward that end. At 
times, an individual sample may have been left incompletely understood or conflictingly 
understood; at other times older samples were revisited in light of an emerging salience 
that was not grasped at the time of the original discussion. Throughout these meetings we 
raised alternatives, raised questions, disagreed, debated and so forth. Ultimately, we 
strove to say something, individually and collectively, about the emerging salient 
characteristics of our participants’ experiences.  
 Following the above-described discussions, the investigator developed a final 
description of the nature of each individual’s inner experience, highlighting prominent 
characteristics and conveying as well as possible the true nature of each individual’s 
experience.  The investigator then examined the extent to which there existed similarities 
or differences in the nature of the inner experience of the participants and the extent to 
which any identified similarities or differences corresponded with any identifiable 
characteristic of the individuals, for example, with severity of reported depressive or 
anxiety symptoms. Finally, the investigator compared each participant’s qualitative 
results to his or her results on the PCL-M questionnaire in order to determine whether 
there existed any patterns or correlations between scores on the PCL-M and patterns of 
inner experience. 
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Table 2 
Number of Expositional Interviews & Samples Collected 
 
 Sampling Information 
Participants Expositional Interviews Samples Collected 
Jacob 7 33 (39) 
Brandon 5 25 (29) 
Louis 6 28 (34) 
Andrew 7 32 (38) 
Peter 9 42 (45) 
Geoff 6 27 (31) 
Mark 8  41 (46)  
Note: Numbers indicate total samples collected after discarding training samples from 
Day 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate the total number of samples collected with the 
inclusion of training samples from Day 1.  
 
Sample Characteristics. 
The seven participants who started and completed the second phase of the study 
were assessed for the possibility of comorbid depression and anxiety using the Beck 
Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993).  
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Table 3 
 
Assessment Results for PCL-M, BDI-II and BAI (raw scores)  
 
Participant PCL-M BDI-II BAI 
Jacob 62 17 12 
Brandon 56 21 6 
Louis 59 12 3 
Andrew 53 15 13 
Peter 43 23 13 
Geoff 79 26 20 
Mark 60 11 11 
Mean 58.86 17.86 11.14 
S.D. 10.88 5.67 5.46 
Note. PCL-M = PTSD Checklist – Military Version; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory-II; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory. 
 
Table 3 presents the PCL-M, BDI-II and BAI raw scores along with the means 
and standard deviations for each measure for individuals who participated in the second 
(sampling) phase of the study. The PCL-M is widely used in clinical practice as a 
screening tool for PTSD symptoms. The BDI-II and BAI are among the most widely used 
instruments for assessing depressive and anxiety symptoms in clinical practice. In 
examining Table 3, the PCL-M scores range from 43 to 79 across participants (M = 
58.86, SD = 10.88). The cutoff score determined by the developers of the PCL-M is 50, 
with scores above this cutoff indicating significant PTSD symptoms. All participants in 
the study with the exception of one met this cutoff score. This indicates that 86% of the 
participants met criteria for PTSD according to this screening tool.  One participant 
(Peter) obtained a score below the cutoff suggested by the authors of this measure. 
However, he was included in this study as he described significant PTSD symptoms that 
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had been ongoing for an extended period of time. He reported that because his symptoms 
were ongoing for such an extended period of time, he had almost “habituated” to his 
symptoms to the extent that although still distressing, he’d become used to the level of 
distress.  
The BDI-II scores ranged from 11 to 26 across participants (M = 17.86, SD = 
5.67). Of the seven participants in the present study, two (28%; Mark and Louis) 
endorsed symptoms consistent with minimal comorbid depression; two (28%; Jacob and 
Andrew) endorsed symptoms consistent with mild comorbid depression; three (43%; 
Brandon, Peter and Geoff) endorsed symptoms consistent with moderate comorbid 
depression; and none of the participants endorsed symptoms consistent with severe levels 
of depression as measured by the BDI-II. Thus, there was wide variability in the relative 
presence of comorbid depressive symptoms across participants, with 57% of the 
participants endorsing only minimal to mild levels of depression and 43% endorsing 
moderate levels of depression. Despite the heterogeneity of comorbid depressive 
symptoms among these seven participants, we did not detect substantial differences in 
DES results among participants with minimal/mild versus moderate levels of comorbid 
depression. 
The BAI scores ranged from 3 to 20 across participants (M = 11.14, SD = 5.46). 
Of the seven participants in the present study, two (28%; Brandon and Louis) endorsed 
symptoms consistent with minimal comorbid anxiety; four (57%; Jacob, Andrew, Peter 
and Mark) endorsed symptoms consistent with mild comorbid anxiety; one (14%; Geoff) 
endorsed symptoms consistent with moderate comorbid anxiety; and none of the 
participants endorsed symptoms consistent with severe levels of comorbid anxiety as 
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measured by the BAI. Thus, there was less variability in the relative presence of 
comorbid anxiety symptoms across participants, with 86% of the participants endorsing 
only minimal to mild levels of anxiety and 14% (one participant) endorsing moderate 
levels of anxiety. We did not detect differences in DES results among participants with 
minimal/mild versus moderate levels of comorbid anxiety. 
In summary, Table 3 demonstrates there was a range of comorbid depression and 
anxiety across participants as measured by the BDI-II and BAI, with the majority of 
participants reporting minimal to mild depressive and anxiety symptoms. Despite this 
range of comorbid symptomatology, there were no significant differences in individual 
DES results between those with low versus high comorbid depressive or anxious 
symptoms. This is consistent with the extant literature regarding PTSD, in which 
heterogeneity in the frequency of comorbid depression and anxiety (and other psychiatric 
disorders including substance abuse) is the norm.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Idiographic Description of Jacob’s Experience 
 The following sections discuss the data on two levels: idiographically, or per 
individual subject, and collectively, or across all participants. Chapters 4 through 10 are 
idiographic descriptions of each individual participant’s inner experience as discovered 
by DES, and Chapter 11 describes the patterns and salient characteristics of inner 
experience discovered across all seven participants. The chapters are presented in 
chronological order, in other words, we sampled with Jacob first, therefore, his chapter is 
presented first; we sampled with Brandon second and his chapter is presented second, and 
so on. This and the next six chapters will illustrate the nature of inner experience in each 
of the seven sampling phase participants. After these seven individual chapters, Chapter 
11 will provide the results of the study by summarizing the commonalities and 
differences in experience across participants. Chapter 11 will also provide a discussion of 
results and implications for future research. 
 Jacob was a 27 year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us during November 
and December 2009. Jacob met the criteria for significant PTSD symptomatology on the 
PCL-M and considered himself to have symptoms of PTSD following his deployment to 
Afghanistan. Jacob also received a diagnosis of PTSD from a local health clinic in the 
past year. Jacob was not in treatment for PTSD at the time of sampling. Jacob was in the 
Marine Crops for a total of five years and was deployed to Afghanistan once for nine 
months, from late 2005 to early 2006.  Jacob described seeing many of his friends die 
while in Afghanistan, leading him to ultimately to decide to leave the military. He 
reported that his time in Afghanistan lead him to learn to “become emotionless.” He said 
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that if he let himself experience emotion, he would not have been able to handle the 
things he saw there. Jacob said that this lack of emotionality continues currently in his 
personal relationships and throughout his current life. However, Jacob went on to say that 
he has also noticed that he has become an increasingly angry person and tends to lose his 
temper more frequently than prior to his Afghanistan deployment; he said that at times he 
gets so angry “that I want to hurt people.” Jacob reported to us that it was his personal 
belief that his entire experience in Afghanistan, and not just one event, lead to his PTSD 
symptoms.  
Jacob collected a total of 39 samples over seven sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. Samples collected on his 
first sampling day were considered training samples and will not be discussed in-depth 
unless they aid in clarifying explanations of subsequent samples. After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 33 samples. 
 As shown in Table 4, a salient phenomenon in Jacob’s inner experience was 
unsymbolized thinking with eight of Jacob’s 33 samples (24%) involving unsymbolized 
thinking. Jacob also experienced inner seeing in eight of his 33 samples (24%). Five of 
his 33 samples (15%) involved sensory awareness. In five of his 33 samples (15%) Jacob 
was simply engaged in a task with little in his awareness – this phenomenon is termed 
just doing. Three of Jacob’s 33 samples (9%) involved instances of “concentrated doing.” 
Jacob experienced direct feelings in one sample (3%) and he did not experience inner 
speaking in any of the samples collected.  
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Table 4 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Jacob (33 samples) 
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 8 24 
Inner Seeing 8 24 
Sensory 
Awareness 5 15 
Just Doing 5 15  
Concentrated 
Doing 3 9 
Feeling  1 3 
Amusement 2 6 
Inner Speaking 0 0 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
Unsymbolized thinking.  
Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of thinking a clear and specific thought 
without accompanying words, images, or any other symbols (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). 
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in eight of Jacob’s 33 samples (24%).  The following 
are two examples of unsymbolized thinking, one taken from early on in sampling and the 
other toward the end of sampling. 
Sample 2.1: Jacob had just said the word “treat” to his dog who had responded by 
becoming excited. At the moment of the beep Jacob is wondering whether his dog 
really understands him or whether the dog’s reaction is habit. Jacob does not 
experience words, images, or any other symbols as part of this wondering. 
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Sample 6.5: He was on the computer, reading the names of dentists on his 
insurance provider’s website. At the moment of the beep, he is both reading the 
name, “Nancy Nguyen” and wondering why so many of the dentists have 
Vietnamese last names, and why there are so many Vietnamese dentists. This 
wondering has no characteristics (no words, images).  Mostly he is wondering 
why there are so many Vietnamese dentists; the reading is pretty close to just 
happening on autopilot. 
In both these samples Jacob was confident that the wondering was a directly experienced 
thought even though there were no words or other symbols.  The thought content was 
clear and differentiated. These samples are representative of the unsymbolized thoughts 
Jacob described over the course of sampling, and similar to unsymbolized thoughts 
described by other participants.  
Inner seeing. 
 Similarly to his reports of unsymbolized thought, Jacob reported inner seeing with 
relative consistency throughout the course of sampling (e.g., one to two reports per 
sampling day on days two through seven). Inner seeing is the experience of seeing 
something that is known to be not actually present (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). Jacob 
reported inner seeing in eight of his 33 samples (24%). Two of his inner seeings were 
heavily tied to emotion and appeared somehow to represent emotion that was not directly 
experienced. These two instances of inner seeing (Sample 4.4 and Sample 6.1) will be 
discussed later, in the feelings subsection.  The remaining six instances of inner seeing 
are all compelling from various standpoints, including complex inner seeing, sensorily-
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focused inner seeing, and imageless seeing. In the following inner seeing, Jacob’s 
awareness was sensorily focused: 
Sample 7.4: Jacob was on the phone with his uncle, who had just asked Jacob 
how to get from the South Point hotel to the Las Vegas airport. At the moment of 
the beep Jacob is innerly seeing the South Point hotel and the intersection in front 
of it, from the perspective of diagonally across the street, looking up at the hotel.  
He innerly sees the intersection, the hotel, and an empty parking lot, but mostly he 
is drawn to the goldness of the innerly seen hotel’s windows. 
Note that Jacob is drawn particularly to the innerly seen goldness of the windows even 
though his task, figuring out directions from the hotel to the airport, has nothing at all to 
do with the goldness.  Also, in retrospect, Jacob was surprised that he had been seeing an 
empty parking lot, where in his real experience that parking lot was always occupied with 
cars.  This surprise was not part of his experience at the moment of the beep. 
Sample 3.4: At the moment of the beep Jacob is hoping that it is not going to be 
breezy the next night when he is working outside. This hoping is innerly seeing 
three palm trees as if he were standing on the roof of the parking garage where he 
works. The palm trees are swaying to the left from a strong breeze coming from 
the right.  
Note that in this sample, Jacob’s hoping is somehow represented by innerly seeing palm 
trees swaying in the wind. The inner seeing and the hoping are apparently one thing (but 
see sample 6.4, discussed in the sensory awareness subsection below). 
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One of Jacob’s eight inner seeing samples involved the experience of seeing 
without the simultaneous experience of the thing seen. Hurlburt and Heavey (1999) 
called this phenomenon “imageless seeing.” 
Sample 6.3: At the moment of the beep Jacob is innerly seeing money and a ring, 
except that the money and the ring themselves are not being seen. That is, Jacob is 
confident that he is innerly seeing and that the inner seeing is of money and a 
ring, but equally confident that the money and ring themselves are not innerly 
experienced at the moment of the beep.  
The timing of one inner seeing seemed to us to be noteworthy.  
Sample 5.4: He was texting his best friend about the UFC fight between Jon 
Jones and Matt Hamil, which had taken place the previous night. At the moment 
of the beep, he innerly sees Jones “12 to 6” elbowing Hamil in the face. He sees 
Jones’ back and right side from a slight right angle, sitting on top of Hamil who is 
lying on his back.  He sees Jones’ elbow come straight down and hit Hamil in the 
face. He apparently sees this just as he had seen it on TV.  At the same time he is 
texting his friend regarding the “12 to 6” elbow assault on Hamil, but this is not in 
his awareness at the moment. 
It seemed to Jacob that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing the match as a 
continuous unfolding stream from beginning to end, just as he had seen it on TV; that is, 
it seemed to Jacob that the beep just happened to catch the elbow assault. However, if 
that was indeed so, it seems quite coincidental that he just happens to be seeing the elbow 
assault and texting about the elbow assault at the same time.  We don’t know how this 
occurs; perhaps his seeing was slowed down but the slowness not recognized; perhaps 
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this scene was being repeated several or many times but the fact of the repetition was not 
recognized; perhaps the scene was really frozen but included the intimation of temporal 
unfolding. This was the only one of Jacob’s samples where we recognized this type of 
coordination of the timing of two events.  
The inner seeing described below was unusual in its level of detail, and interesting 
in that it paralleled Jacob’s actual actions at the moment while adding a certain level of 
surrealism.  
Sample 2.2: Jacob was walking toward the refrigerator to get a glass of fresh 
orange juice. At the moment of the beep Jacob is innerly seeing himself from a 
third-person perspective from his right, opening the refrigerator door with his left 
hand and reaching into the refrigerator with his right hand. The refrigerator is 
“see-through” as though its walls are made of glass. He is innerly seeing himself 
reaching all the way into the back of the refrigerator with his hand come out the 
back of the refrigerator into an orange orchard. Another hand is reaching out of a 
tree towards Jacob’s hand, handing him a clear glass full of orange juice.  
Jacob noted during our interview that he had wanted a glass of orange juice and had 
decided to go to the kitchen to get one when the beep went off.  This and other examples 
indicated that when Jacob created inner seeings they were often rich visual 
representations of what he was thinking about at the time.  
The experience of emotion.  
 A feeling is an emotional experience, including sadness, happiness, humor, 
anxiety, joy, fear, nervousness, anger, embarrassment, and so on (Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2002). Jacob reported one instance of directly experienced feeling, presented below:  
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Sample 3.3: Jacob was walking his dog in the park in his neighborhood. His dog 
had just pooped and he had picked it up and was throwing it away. At the beep he 
was looking at a pile of dog poop on the grass, wondering why people don’t pick 
up their dog’s poop. This wondering was occurring without any words or images. 
He was also feeling moderately irritated. The irritation did not have any location, 
sensations or other experiential details.  
In the above sample, Jacob was feeling irritated. Jacob was unable to provide additional 
information regarding his feeling of irritation beyond the simple one-worded descriptor.  
In another sample, Jacob had the experience of the absence of feeling:   
Sample 3.2: Jacob was at home watching a football game with his roommate. The 
Cowboys had just scored a touchdown to get ahead in the game and Jacob had 
just given his roommate a hard high-five as part of a ritual they perform after each 
Cowboys touchdown. At the moment of the beep he is feeling a pleasant lack of 
tension throughout his body. The lack of tension is spread evenly and diffusely 
throughout his body, possibly including his head. 
In this sample Jacob called something a feeling that was apparently not felt. He reported 
that his experience was one of feeling (feeling a lack of tension), however, this 
experience was certainly different from most feeling reports from other participants, 
which include the presence of experience and not the absence of any experience as Jacob 
described. The feeling of “lack of tension” described by Jacob may be representative of 
Jacob’s lack of integration of feeling experience; he was able to recognize a component 
of a feeling (the lack of tension component), but was unable to integrate the other feeling 
components skillfully 
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The following instance of inner seeing was apparently heavily tied to ongoing 
emotion without feeling:  
Sample 6.1: Jacob was on the computer, looking at the UFC website and reading 
a Twitter posted by Diego Sanchez that read, “Bringing the storm from San Diego 
to Memphis.” This quote reminded Jacob of the arrogant, cocky nature of Diego 
Sanchez. At the moment of the beep Jacob innerly sees Diego Sanchez doing his 
post-fight commentary/interview. He sees Sanchez from the chest up, facing 
forward, speaking into a microphone, however there is no sound as part of or 
accompanying this seeing. He is focused on Sanchez’s face, on his “little, 
arrogant smile” in particular.  Whereas he clearly is critical of Sanchez, he does 
not feel critical at the moment of the beep. 
This sample illustrates ongoing emotional experience without feeling. During the 
expositional interview, every time Jacob mentioned Sanchez his face and shoulders 
screwed up in evidently powerful disgust; furthermore, Jacob repeatedly said he was 
disgusted or otherwise extremely negatively disposed towards Sanchez’s arrogance. 
However, despite focusing on the arrogance of Sanchez’s “little cocky smile,” Jacob was 
insistent that he was not experiencing dislike, disgust, or any feeling at the moment of the 
beep. It is likely that Jacob was indeed disgusted at the moment of the beep, but that 
disgust was his state, and not experienced as a feeling. In other words, it is possible that 
emotion was present and ongoing but outside of experience. We see the presence of 
outside-of-experience or ongoing emotion without directly experienced feeling again in 
the following sample.   
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Sample 4.3: Jacob had been watching football on TV and a commercial for the 
Marines had come on. As he watched, the commercial tell the story of young men 
who had enlisted in the Marines, gone through boot camp, and then to the Silent 
Drill Team, a chill had overcome him—a wave of goosebumps had suddenly 
tingled across the surface of his entire body, head to toe. The chill was not of 
coldness, but was a good feeling. He was much more aware of the tingly 
goosebumpiness than of the commercial, though he was still paying attention to 
the commercial. 
In this sample, we understood Jacob’s experience to be primarily of tingly goosebumps. 
It is a fact of the universe that Jacob is proud of his own Marine service, proud of having 
done what the men in the commercial had done.  We accept as fact that the goosebumps 
were related to the pride: he metaphorically referred to this good feeling as a sense of 
pride, like “standing up tall” or “being 10 feet tall.”  What is unclear here is whether he 
experienced goosebumps (a sensory experience), which he, on reflection, could say were 
part of pride; or whether he experienced pride (a feeling), which on reflection he could 
say manifested itself in part by the goosebumps.  This is a close call, depending on the 
understanding and interpretation of the details of what Jacob said during the interview, 
but our best understanding is the former: the goosebumps were immediately experienced 
as a bodily sensation that were later interpreted as being pride. Another example of state 
versus experience is provided below:  
Sample 4.4: He had installed the new version of iTunes on his computer and it 
was not working. He had clicked four times on the place where his music was 
supposed to be, but it kept telling him it was not there. At the moment of the beep 
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he intensely wants to break his computer. He innerly sees himself throw his 
computer, a laptop, out the window near where he is sitting. From a first-person 
perspective he sees his right arm draw back with his computer in his hand and 
then throw the computer like a Frisbee through one of the three small kitchen 
windows in front of him. He sees the window shatter as the computer goes 
through it. He is confident that even though the inner seeing expresses the desire 
to break the computer, he also has, apart from the inner seeing, a strong urge to 
break the computer. It is impossible for him to put this break-the-computer urge 
into words other than to say it is clearly apprehended as ongoing at the moment of 
the beep, and that it exists in parallel with the inner seeing. [He noted that he often 
has the desire to break something when he is angry and that he has a sense that if 
he does break something, he feels better, though this was not in his awareness at 
the moment of the beep]. 
Notably, there was no experienced feeling of anger or frustration at the moment of this 
beep. It appeared unquestionable that Jacob was in fact in an emotional state of intense 
anger/frustration – he even says that he was angry and when he is angry he wants to 
break things; however this anger/frustration was not directly present to Jacob at the 
moment of the beep. The urge to break the computer, and the inner seeing of himself 
break the computer, appeared somehow to be experiences that were related to an ongoing 
but outside-of-experience emotion of anger/frustration. Again, in this example, as in the 
goosebumps example, Jacob’s emotional state (e.g., pride, anger, disgust) was ongoing, 
without the direct and integrated apprehension of the feelings associated with the state. In 
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other words, the emotion, though ongoing, was not fully experienced by Jacob at the 
moment of the beep.  
Although we have indicated that samples collected on the first day of sampling 
are considered unreliable, we feel that a discussion of Jacob’s emotion-sample is 
important. Specifically, the fact that Jacob showed the ability and desire to describe in 
detail an instance of emotional experience indicates that he was not lacking the verbal 
ability to do so.  In other words, the infrequency of his reports of clear feeling experience 
discussed above are not necessarily attributable to a deficit in his ability to describe 
emotional experiences, as evidenced by this sample from the first sampling day: 
Sample 1.3: Jacob was at the park, taking his dog for a walk. His dog was not on 
a leash and was running around with another dog that was not on a leash. The two 
dogs had just run up to a man whose dogs were on a leash, and a second or so 
before the beep the man had angrily and arrogantly said, as if to no one but 
obviously aimed at Jacob, “People should really keep their fucking dogs on a 
leash!!” At the moment of the beep anger explodes through Jacob’s body, an 
intense heat that instantaneously spreads throughout his entire body—trunk, arms, 
legs, head, everywhere. The heat is intense, like being outside in the Las Vegas 
desert sun, but the heat is mostly inside his body, not particularly on the surface. 
(This heat occurs instantly and reaches full intensity immediately, and causes 
Jacob to break out in a sweat, but none of that is in his experience at the moment 
of the beep.) Jacob also feels his heart racing. At the same time, he is seeing the 
man, head-to-toe, but instead of seeing the fully detailed man (as he had been 
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seeing him before the incident), he is seeing only the outline of the man, as if the 
man existed as “a target” standing in front of him. 
What can be drawn from this report of feeling is that Jacob has the vocabulary and 
willingness to describe feelings. Jacob was able to articulately use words that described 
the experience of rage. Whether he actually experienced rage at the moment of the beep, 
or whether he was in a state of ongoing rage that was not directly experienced is unclear. 
However, the fact that Jacob had the vocabulary to clearly describe feelings greatly 
decreases the likelihood that his infrequency of clear feeling experience or the sparseness 
of detail in feeling samples as sampling progressed was simply a result of an inability or 
unwillingness to report feelings.  
The experience of emotion was for Jacob a complex phenomenon. Jacob straddled 
a space between “lack of directly experienced feelings” and “presence of directly 
experienced feelings” albeit his feelings were particularly unskilled or simplistic in 
manner. What we have learned in our course of sampling with Jacob is that we cannot 
definitively state that he did or did not have feeling experience. We can however describe 
his feeling experience as less skilled than what we have seen in other individuals, with 
messier, blurrier boundaries between ongoing emotional states and the experiential 
aspects of those ongoing emotions.  
There are a number of possibilities for why this may be. For example, in sample 
3.3 (presented above) perhaps Jacob was unable to elaborate because did not have the 
right words to describe the feeling of irritation; perhaps he knew what irritation felt like, 
but just did not have the vocabulary to transmit that information to us. This explanation is 
highly unlikely, as we have already seen that Jacob clearly has feeling vocabulary. 
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Another explanation is that Jacob was in fact feeling irritation, but that his level of 
“feeling” skill is low – he was able to apprehend that a feeling was present, but was 
unable to integrate the components of the feeling to such a degree that he experienced a 
“full-fledged” feeling. Instead, he experienced something he labeled as irritation, but was 
unskilled at experiencing that irritation. Jacob also appeared to have emotional states 
without corresponding feelings, lending more evidence to the theory that he may be an 
unskilled “feeler” with little integration among the various components of his emotions. 
It is also possible that as Jacob became better able to tell the difference between general 
state-of-being and directly apprehended experience over the course of sampling, he 
discovered that there was little or no feeling experience to report. 
What is at stake here is the understanding of Jacob’s emotional processes and how 
(or if) they are felt.  This again brings us back to Jacob’s level of “skill” at experiencing 
and feeling emotional processes. We begin with the belief that feeling is a skill; like all 
skills, some people are more proficient, some less.  On this view, proficiency in feeling 
requires the coordination or integration of disparate elements (heart rate, stomach 
contractions, hair on the back of the neck, pupilary dilation, erection of the skin’s 
papillae, and so on) while also determining which are and which are not relevant to any 
particular feeling.  In a person who is highly skilled at feeling proud, for example (see 
sample 4.3) the first hint of the papillae erection, along with the slight stomach 
contraction, along with the slight straightening of the body, and so on, would be 
immediately felt as the appearance of pride.  Someone who is less skilled at feeling proud 
might not quickly integrate those disparate events, and instead might experience the 
goosebumps, failing to note the corresponding stomach contraction and straightening, and 
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so on.  On retrospection, with the luxury of time to integrate and interpret, individuals of 
either skill level would recognize that the goosebumps were a part of pride.  So the 
question is, was Jacob’s experience consonant with the immediate at-the-moment-of-the-
beep experience of pride, or consonant with the immediate at-the-moment-of-the-beep 
experience of goosebumps?  That determination is based on the interpretation of the 
entire interview, what was said and not said, how it was said, what was asked and not 
asked, and so on.  Our best judgment, made with due skepticism, was that Jacob was 
experiencing goosebumps, not necessarily pride, at the moment of the beep.  
We accept that Jacob may have had a way of describing the goosebumps that led 
us inadvertently to this conclusion—that is, that he felt proud at the moment of the beep, 
but for whatever reason stressed the goosebumpiness.  We tried to tease those options 
apart, but we accept we might be mistaken. 
This understanding applies also to Jacob’s focus on Sanchez’s cocky smile in 
sample 6.1: that focus seemed to have been a part of or was triggered by an ongoing but 
not experienced emotion (disgust), but that emotion itself was outside of experience.  
Finally, two of Jacob’s 33 samples (6%) involved what we have termed 
amusement or laughter: 
Sample 7.2: Jacob was holding the dog’s leash, getting ready to take the dog out 
on a walk. At the moment of the beep Jacob is watching his dog jump up and 
down in anticipation of going outside. There is amusement that is associated with 
seeing his dog jump up and down. It is unclear, however, whether that amusement 
is in Jacob’s awareness at the moment of the beep or whether he became aware of 
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the amusement after the beep, when assessing what was happening at the moment 
of the beep.  
Sample 7.6: Jacob was watching The Office with his roommate. Michael, a 
character on the show, had just said, “Football is like rock and roll, basketball is 
like jazz.” Jacob found this a funny and stupid thing to say. At the moment of the 
beep Jacob is laughing. His laughing has a “[Michael’s]-an-idiot” quality to it, but 
Jacob is not aware of this at the moment of the beep.  
In the two above samples Jacob did not describe the amusement as a feeling, nor 
did he describe it as a thought. Instead, he said that he was simply laughing and amused. 
This difficulty with describing the experience of laughter/amusement is encountered 
repeatedly with other participants in this study and other DES studies.  
Sensory awareness.  
 Jacob experienced sensory awareness in five of his 33 samples (15%). A sensory 
awareness is a sensory or perceptual experience (itch, hotness, pressure, visual taking-in, 
hearing) that is itself a primary theme or focus for the subject. Sensory awareness may be 
bodily (itch, tingle, pain, pressure, hotness, coldness, shiver, stiffness, etc.) or external 
(noting the color of a flower, smelling gasoline, taking in the characteristics of a sunrise, 
hearing the scratching of the cat at the door, etc.; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002; Hurlburt, 
Heavey, & Bensaheb, 2009). Jacob’s sensory awarenesses were varied, with two 
instances focused on taste, one instance focused on the visual characteristics of what he 
was seeing and one instance with multiple sensory aspects (visual and textural). In one 
instance, Jacob’s sensory awareness was bodily, the goosebumps sample (4.3) described 
in the feelings subsection above. In two of his sensory awareness experiences Jacob was 
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tasting something he was eating. In the first of these two taste experiences (sample 3.5), 
Jacob was eating Spam and tasting the salty, ham-like taste of Spam and simultaneously 
wondering to himself what was in Spam (an unsymbolized thought). In his second taste 
experience Jacob was tasting the pizza in his mouth (sample 5.3). Both these examples 
are straightforward instances of sensory awareness. Jacob’s third instance of sensory 
awareness was somewhat more complex.  
Sample 6.4: Jacob was in the bathroom looking in the mirror. At the moment of 
the beep he is looking at the shape of a chip in a tooth in the bottom row of his 
teeth. His way of looking at this tooth somehow represents to him that he should 
go to the dentist.   
Jacob referred to this as a “visual thought” but was adamant that there was no separable 
cognitive experience (e.g., no inner speaking, no unsymbolized thinking, etc.). This 
instance appeared to be more complex than a straightforward, purely sensorily-focused 
moment of experience. Instead, there appeared to be an embedded recognition (the need 
to go to the dentist) accompanying the sensory awareness (looking at the shape of the 
chip in the tooth). Because we only encountered this phenomenon in one sample, we are 
unable to say anything definitive about it, other than it is interesting to note as it is 
outside the realm of garden-variety sensory awareness. This sample is reminiscent of 
sample 3.4 described above in the inner seeing subsection. In that sample, Jacob’s inner 
seeing consisted of swaying palm trees which somehow represented hope that it would 
not be breezy the next night.  
 Another instance of sensory awareness included two separate but possibly related 
experiences of sensory awareness, and is referred to as a multiple awareness. In general, 
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multiple awarenesses consist of two or more separate, mostly unrelated processes 
ongoing simultaneously (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). 
Sample 7.1: Jacob was doing the dishes and his hands were submerged in warm, 
soapy water. At the moment of the beep Jacob feels the sensation of the warm 
dishwater on his hands and the texture of the sponge in his hand. He is also seeing 
the bubbles in the water.  
This is an example of the weakest form of multiple awareness. In general multiple 
awarenesses include the simultaneous presence of one or more separate experiences 
occurring within the same modality (e.g., sensorily, thought, etc.) at the moment of the 
beep. In this example Jacob is focused on both the textural sensations of the water and the 
sponge, and separately, visually on the bubbles forming in the water. These are two 
distinct experiences of sensory awareness that are occurring simultaneously but are tied 
together by a common thread (the process of doing the dishes).   
 Jacob had one additional sensory awareness sample which has been presented and 
discussed above (Sample 7.4). 
Just doing. 
 In five of his 33 samples (15%), Jacob was simply engaged in a task, without any 
accompanying inner experience. Two of these instances were described earlier. Other 
examples of Jacob’s “just doing” include reading and chasing his dog.  
Concentrated doing. 
 Jacob experienced the phenomenon we have termed concentrated doing in three 
of his 33 samples (9%). Concentrated doing involves an intensely focused, attentive 
concentration on apparently minute or small aspects of his environment. Concentrated 
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doing differs from simply ‘doing’ in that concentrated doing involves a higher level of 
attention and focus, almost a ‘zeroing in’ on the specific task at hand, as opposed to 
simply doing a task without particular attention being paid.  
Sample 3.1: Jacob was at home painting his toenails while waiting for a football 
game to start. At the beep he is concentrating on what he is doing by visually 
focusing on what he is painting and being careful not to get paint on anything but 
his toenail. His being careful is not a separate thought process; he is carefully 
painting including paying attention to what he is seeing. He is seeing his hand 
from just above his knuckles down to where he is holding the paint brush in his 
fingers and he is seeing his right big toe from just above the joint to the end. He is 
not seeing anything else nor is he aware of anything else in his surroundings.  
Jacob was painting his toenails in a careful, attentive way; his attentional resources were 
zeroed in on the careful painting of the toenails, to the exclusion of other aspects of his 
environment. There were no thoughts or other cognitive or bodily aspects of his 
experience – he was very carefully, concentratedly painting his toenail, being careful to 
put the paint only where he wanted it to be. He was not mindlessly painting, nor was he 
on auto-pilot. 
Sample 5.2: He was sitting at his house waxing the underside of his snowboard, 
which involves melting wax onto the snowboard, and then smoothing the wax out 
when it is at the right consistency. He was holding the wax up to a hot iron, 
melting it onto his snowboard. The wax was dripping from the hot iron down onto 
his snowboard. At the moment of the beep he is paying attention both to the wax 
as it melts next to the iron and to the wax that has dripped onto the board. He is 
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paying close or rapt or concentrated attention to the consistency/appearance of the 
wax as it relates to the “spreadableness” of the wax (so that it is not lumpy, too 
watery or too cold).  
In this example Jacob was waxing his snowboard and paying attention both to the wax as 
it was melting next to the iron and to the wax that had dripped onto the board.  He was 
paying rapt attention to the consistency of the wax as it related to the ‘spreadableness’ of 
the wax (so that it was not too lumpy nor too watery). In this example, had Jacob simply 
been focused on the appearance of the wax, we would have called this a sensory 
awareness. Had he just been thinking about the spreadableness of the wax, we might have 
called it an unsymbolized thought. Had he just been waxing his snowboard without much 
attention to it we would have called it “just doing.” However, Jacob was concentrated on 
the appearance of the wax as it related to the spreadableness of the wax. His way of 
going about the task was carefully attentive and purposeful.  
Jacob’s final instance of concentrated doing involved the typing of a VIN number 
on a computer screen.  
Sample 6.2: He was on the computer, looking up new insurance for his 
motorcycle on Geico’s website. At the moment of the beep he is typing his VIN 
number into an empty cell on the screen. He is very carefully concentrating on the 
numbers and letters of his VIN number on the screen as he is typing them in, in 
order to type them correctly. Also present in his experience, although to a much 
lesser degree, are the Geico gecko at the top right corner of the screen, and the 
other blank cells that he has yet to fill out.  
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Again, Jacob was raptly focused on the task of typing each individual number – the level 
of attention or concentration on this task, as seen with the tasks mentioned above, was 
significantly heightened as compared to instances in which Jacob was “just” engaged in a 
task. For example, sample 5.1 caught Jacob as he was taking off his work clothes. At the 
moment of the beep, Jacob was simply removing his pants, almost automatically, without 
paying particular attention to the task in which he was engaged. Similarly, sample 2.6 
caught Jacob as he was reading words on a TV screen. At the moment of the beep Jacob 
was simply reading, not paying particular attention to any aspect of the task, or the task 
itself. Both the ‘just doing’ and the ‘concentrated doing’ involve doing, or going about a 
task; concentrated doing involves a higher level of attention and focus on the task itself, 
or on some aspect of the task as it relates to the overall task. 
Inner speaking.  
As mentioned previously, Jacob did not experience inner speaking in any of his 
samples. Previous DES studies have found inner speaking with a frequency of 
approximately 25% across participants (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Inner speaking is a 
form of experience that involves the production of clearly spoken words, oftentimes just 
as they would be spoken out loud, only with no sound.  
Discussion 
 About half of Jacob’s samples contained unsymbolized thinking (24%) or inner 
seeing (24%). Inner speaking was absent, and well-integrated feelings were rare in 
Jacob’s samples. In the realm of feelings, it appeared that Jacob did undergo emotions but 
that they were unclear, such that only pieces or parts of an ongoing emotional process 
were present to and experienced by Jacob at any given moment.  Though these emotions 
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were represented by aspects of his ongoing experience, such as visualizing himself 
throwing his computer when he was frustrated with it, the emotions did not appear to be 
directly felt, or were felt in ‘bits and pieces’ but not as integrated wholes. It is possible to 
theorize one step further based upon the data. If emotion was to be viewed as a skill that 
one acquires or does not acquire over time, it is possible that Jacob’s emotion-skill is 
underdeveloped and he is thereby unable to clearly differentiate emotion-experience from 
other experience. Alternately it is possible that Jacob was not experiencing standard 
emotion (e.g., anger, disgust, etc.) at any of the sampled moments. It is possible that he 
was simply experiencing a bodily sensation (e.g., chill) or a thought (e.g., Sanchez’s 
cocky, arrogant smile) independent of any existing emotion. Then, upon further reflection 
perhaps Jacob was able to come to the conclusion that the chills, for example “must 
have” represented pride. It is difficult to tease apart the two possibilities (e.g., whether 
Jacob is unsophisticated at emotion-experience or whether Jacob simply does not have 
emotion experience) without further sampling with Jacob. However, both these 
possibilities are viable. In both cases, it can be said that Jacob’s experience of feeling (or 
lack there of) is complex and unlike standard reports of feeling experience. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Idiographic Description of Brandon’s Experience 
 Brandon was a 28 year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us during 
November and December 2009. Brandon was a member of the Air Force, deployed to 
Iraq for 12 months, from late 2007 to late 2008. His Military Occupational Specialty 
involved interrogation analysis operations. Brandon described his deployment to Iraq as 
generally stressful, punctuated by periods of hypervigilance, boredom, anger and 
frustration as a result of his various experiences. Brandon shared with us that those 
emotions, especially the anger and frustration, increased across time and lingered upon 
returning from Iraq. He described symptoms of disturbed sleep and increased anger for 
which he finally sought medical attention and was started on a course of SSRI 
antidepressant medication. Brandon met the criteria for significant PTSD 
symptomatology on the PCL-M. Brandon approached the task of sampling in a 
particularly disciplined manner and was very punctual to all expositional interviews. 
When discussing his samples he was very specific, detailed and articulate.  
Brandon collected a total of 29 samples over five sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 25 samples.  Please refer to 
Table 5 for a breakdown of the frequency of phenomena experienced by Brandon over 
four sampling days. 
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Table 5 
 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Brandon (25 samples)  
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 2 8 
Inner Seeing 10 40 
Sensory 
Awareness 9 36 
Flashback 2 8 
Concentrated 
Doing 2 8 
Feeling  0 0 
Vigilance 2 8 
Inner Hearing 2 8 
Worded 
Thinking 1 4 
Inner Speaking 0 0 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
As mentioned previously, Brandon appeared to be a particularly disciplined DES 
participant. He was very precise in his descriptions and chose his words with great care. 
At times, Brandon’s high degree of precision tended toward concreteness and rigidity. 
Brandon’s inner experience was similar to his external presentation – very precise, 
orderly and specific. 
 Brandon’s reports of inner experience changed rather substantially following the 
first day of sampling. On the first day, Brandon reported two instances of feeling (pride 
and a combination of vigilance and boredom). These were the only feeling experiences 
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Brandon reported. After the first day of sampling his inner experience consisted of 
primarily inner seeing and sensory awareness. In fact, over half of his total reported 
instances of sensory awareness (5 of 9, or 55%) occurred on the second day of sampling. 
Fifty percent (5 of 10) of his inner seeing samples also occurred on the second day of 
sampling. On the final day of sampling there were two flashbacks, as well as two samples 
that appeared to represent the focused, thoughtful doing of an activity, but were 
ultimately difficult for Brandon to describe and difficult for us to apprehend.  
The Prominence of Inner Seeing and Sensory Awareness 
Inner seeing. 
 Forty percent of Brandon’s samples involved inner seeing. Brandon’s inner seeing 
samples were often complex and highly detailed.  
Sample 3.6: Brandon was at work discussing with a coworker the oddness of 
duck-billed platypuses and how they don’t really fit into any category. At the 
moment of the beep Brandon is innerly seeing God standing at a workbench, 
putting together a duck-billed platypus. Brandon is seeing God about 2-3 yards 
away and slightly to the right. Brandon is seeing God standing at his workbench, 
which is a “standard” workbench with four legs. God is human-like in form, an 
older man [in his 60s or 70s] with a long white beard, long white hair, and a long 
white robe.  The pieces of the platypus are laid out in front of God, on his 
workbench. The head of the platypus is in God’s left hand, and the “furry kiwi” 
body of the platypus in his right, and he is assembling these two pieces. The tail 
and 2 legs of the platypus are lying on God’s workbench. Brandon hears God 
chuckle to himself as he’s assembling the platypus, chuckling in a self-amused, 
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inside joke kind of way; his chuckle sounds like an older man’s voice, but is not 
familiar to Brandon. The coworker is speaking, and Brandon is tracking it, but it 
occupies only a minor part of his awareness. 
In addition to the creative nature of Brandon’s inner seeing of God creating the platypus, 
the perspective of his seeing of God was also unique and precise.  During our sampling 
interview Brandon had a particularly difficult time describing his perspective of God. 
Instead of saying that God was ahead of him and to his right in relation to where Brandon 
was in the interview room, Brandon let the seen God occupy the center of the described 
space and therefore had to move himself around to the side of the interview room in order 
to achieve the perspective of how he had seen God at the moment of the beep. It is almost 
as if the seen God were fixed with respect to the interview room, and that placing God at 
any other location didn’t “feel” or appear correct for Brandon.  
The complexity of Brandon’s inner seeing is again illustrated in the following 
sample. Of note in this sample is the hyper-clarity that Brandon describes:  
Sample 4.2: Brandon was reaching for a pair of scissors as part of the task of 
making a leather belt buckle. The reaching for the scissors was happening on 
autopilot, not part of his experience at the moment of the beep. At the moment of 
the beep Brandon is innerly seeing an expanded or zoomed-in version of the way 
he is going to stitch the buckle he is planning on making. He is seeing the buckle, 
with its holes arranged in an arch and the lacing (the leather string) woven in and 
out of each hole.  The lacing is loosely woven through each hole, an exaggeration 
of the way it appears before it has been tightened, so that he can clearly see the 
pattern that he must make to execute this stitching. [Brandon has never used this 
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particular stitch pattern.  Prior to the beep he had looked in a book at a 
picture/diagram of how to execute this particular pattern.  Now, at the moment of 
the beep, he is innerly seeing how that pattern is applied to the particular belt he is 
making].  The inner seeing is similar in structure to the book’s picture—a 
zoomed-in or expanded view of a loose stitching, but the innerly seen leather of 
the buckle is a tan-brown color and the lacing is a dark brown color, rather than 
black and white as in the book, and the innerly seen holes are arranged in an arch 
rather than straight as in the book. This seeing is clear, like a snapshot, and is 
located in front of Brandon, someplace “above the horizon”; that is, he is innerly 
looking up at the imaginary buckle, while is actual eyes are aimed down at the 
scissors.  
Brandon noted that this seeing was more clear and trustworthy than the actual picture of 
the buckle in the physical book or any seeing in reality. Brandon reported that because 
this inner seeing was his own creation, it was more trustworthy and clear than reality. 
Also evident in this sample is the unusual location in space of Brandon’s inner seeing. 
The seeing is located “above the horizon” requiring that Brandon innerly “look up” at the 
belt while simultaneously looking down at the “real life” picture of the belt in the book he 
is using.  
We see this unusual location-in-space phenomenon again in a similar sample: 
Sample 3.3: Brandon was sitting down, reading a book of leather tooling patterns, 
trying to find a pattern for the belt he was making. He was looking at a leaf 
pattern for tooling. At the moment of the beep Brandon is innerly seeing the belt 
he is currently making, as if he had tooled the leaf pattern repeatedly along the 
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entire belt.  He sees the belt stretched out in front of him, and slightly above him, 
such that he is looking up to see it [he’s not actually looking up, but his ‘inner 
eyes’ are looking up]. The place where the buckle should go is on his left 
[however there is no buckle, only the hole and 2 snaps where the buckle will go].  
He does not see the entire left end of the belt; there is an additional hole and two 
snaps, but they are “faded into irrelevance.” The leaf tooling pattern repeats, and 
runs across the length of the belt, from the right of where the buckle should be, 
and has a 1/8 inch border along the top and bottom of the length of the belt, where 
there is no tooling pattern. At the same time, Brandon is physically looking down 
at the book in front of him, but this is not as salient in his awareness as his inner 
seeing (about a 70-30 attentional split).  
In another sample, Brandon stated that he experienced surprise at the content of 
his inner seeing. This is unusual in that the inner seeing was Brandon’s own creation, yet 
he was surprised at what he innerly saw, as though the inner seeing was somehow out of 
his control despite it being “his.”  
Sample 5.1: Brandon was reading the instructions on a box of leather dye. At the 
moment of the beep Brandon is innerly seeing black, leather shoes. He is seeing 
the shoes directly in front of him and at eye level; the toes of the shoes are pointed 
to the left. The shoes are side-by-side and he is seeing them from a profile view, 
such that he can see most of the left side of the left shoe, and only bits and pieces 
of the right shoe. This seeing is clear, but not as clear as “real life seeing” – about 
80-85% as clear as real life. Brandon is also aware of reading the instructions on 
the leather dye box, but this awareness is much less salient than the seeing (about 
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30% versus 70%). The leather dye in the box that he is reading is red, and 
Brandon is a bit surprised that he is innerly seeing black shoes. 
The four samples discussed above highlight the complex nature of Brandon’s inner 
experience. Not only are these inner seeings unusually detailed, they are also directly tied 
to or representative of the task in which he is engaged. For example, when he is seeing 
the stitching pattern that he is about to undertake, we get a sense of Brandon as both a 
craftsman with careful attention to detail and process and a strong visual thinker. These 
inner seeings also illustrate the precision we see globally with Brandon – in his self-
presentation, his choice of words and speaking style and his inner experience.  
Sensory awareness. 
 Brandon’s inner experience was also highly sensory, with 9 of his 25 samples 
(36%) involving sensory awareness. Brandon’s sensory awareness ranged from simple 
instances of bodily sensations to more complex, differentiated instances of sensation. Of 
these complex instances, two involved sensory awareness in imagination.  
Sample 3.5: Brandon was eating a banana, his eyes aimed at the yellow peel of 
the banana. As he was eating/seeing the banana, Brandon was trying to imagine 
what the color yellow tastes like. At the moment of the beep Brandon is tasting 
the color yellow. He is experiencing a vivid, imagined taste, one that is much 
more vivid than the taste of the actual banana in his mouth. This taste, however, 
does not seem to be the ‘right’ taste in that it does not taste the way yellow 
‘should’ taste. The shade of yellow Brandon is unsuccessfully attempting to taste 
is a bright, sunshine yellow, different from the yellow of the banana and the 
banana peel. The yellow taste Brandon is actually tasting is slightly more sweet 
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than sour, more salty than not, and really, really very light and airy [lighter than 
whipped cream], but difficult to capture with words, and not the yellow he is 
trying to taste. Although Brandon is chewing an actual, unimagined banana at the 
time of beep, he is fully engrossed in his imagined tasting, and is not tasting the 
real banana. 
This sample is compelling from several perspectives. First, Brandon’s attempt to taste 
color is highly unusual and involves a mixing of the senses – using the sense of taste to 
apprehend something that is, we assume, usually apprehended visually. Second, 
Brandon’s attempt to taste color in imagination is successful in that he is in fact tasting 
“yellow” – a very specific, yet difficult to describe shade of yellow. Third, and perhaps 
most compelling however, is that he has failed to taste the yellow he desired to taste.  
Brandon apparently had a preconceived belief of what “bright, sunshine yellow” should 
taste like, and is unable to conjure that taste, despite his efforts.  
In another instance Brandon is having a multi-sensory experience in imagination:  
Sample 4.5: Brandon was telling his wife he would be late for dinner but would 
definitely be home for dinner, but that is happening mostly or completely outside 
of awareness. At the moment of the beep Brandon is innerly smelling, tasting and 
seeing a “He Man” casserole. [This is a family recipe Brandon has had before – 
made of ground beef, cheese, potatoes and cream of ‘something’]. Most 
prominently, he is smelling the casserole – the smell is a mixture of the 
ingredients, and is true to the smell of the ‘real-life’ casserole. He is also tasting 
the casserole, but to a lesser degree. He is innerly seeing the casserole sitting atop 
the dinner table, but the seeing is the least salient part of his experience. This 
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seeing is in front of Brandon, and slightly to his left. Brandon is also speaking at 
the moment of the beep but this is not in his awareness. 
In the above sample Brandon is almost completely absorbed in the imagined sensory 
aspects of the casserole; again we see the extent to which Brandon’s sensory experiences 
are prominent, differentiated and complex.  
In another sample, Brandon was experiencing two separate sensations 
simultaneously:  
Sample 2.3: Brandon was drinking chocolate-flavored Starbucks coffee. At the 
moment of the beep he is tasting the bitterness of the coffee and the sweetness of 
the chocolate. He may have also been noticing the heat of the liquid, but was less 
confident of that.  
In this sample Brandon was extremely specific: he was not merely tasting the chocolate-
flavored coffee but had instead zeroed in on the bitterness and on the sweetness (and 
possibly on the hotness); two (possibly three) separate aspects of one sensorial 
experience.  
The remaining six instances of sensory awareness that Brandon described 
continue to be rich in detail, combining complex bodily sensations with carefully 
constructed inner seeings. They again make us aware of Brandon as both precise and 
craftsman like in his construction of inner experience and his ability to attune himself to 
his bodily sensations. The samples, described below, involved instances of bodily sensory 
awareness, such as feeling muscular tension (sample 2.8 and 2.7), as well as external 
sensory awareness (sample 2.2 and 4.1). 
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Sample 2.8: Brandon was at physical therapy doing a standing stretch, bending at 
the waist reaching toward the floor.  At the moment of the beep he was feeling the 
stretch in his hamstrings at the base of his thighs, feeling it in both legs but the left 
leg was a little looser.  At the same time he was innerly seeing his hands on the 
floor next to his feet, viewed from his own first person, as if he could complete 
the stretch that he was now attempting but unable to finish.  That is, he was seeing 
himself from his own eyes, as he would like to be.  This seeing was clear, in 
color, and accurate in detail (if he could attain that posture).  The stretch and the 
inner seeing were pretty much 50/50 in his experience. 
Sample 2.7: Brandon was at work, beginning the outline of an English paper on 
the Boy Scouts that he was working on.  At the moment of the beep he is writing 
“BSA” [meaning Boy Scouts of America], but the writing itself and its meaning 
are not present to him; instead, he is feeling the tension in his right forearm, in the 
inside from just below his elbow to just above his wrist.  [He says he holds the 
pencil too tight.]  At the same time he is innerly seeing his Eagle Scout patch, as 
if he is in high school wearing his Boy Scout uniform looking down at the left 
side of his chest.  That is, he sees the patch accurately as if viewed obliquely from 
above.  He sees a bit of the tan uniform around the patch; the rest of the uniform 
fades into irrelevance.  More of his experience is on the tension than on the seeing 
(70/30). 
Sample 3.4: Brandon was running up the stairs to attend to his son who was 
crying. He was halfway up the stairs. At the moment of the beep Brandon is 
aware of his physical alignment in space – of not falling over. He is paying 
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attention to the physicality of balancing as he is running up the stairs. He was also 
aware of tension in his legs and back, but this awareness may have occurred after 
the beep. 
Sample 4.1: Brandon was stitching with string the leather of a knife sheath he 
was making for his father-in-law. He had just tied a knot in the stitching string 
and was pulling the knot tight. At the moment of the beep Brandon is aware of the 
sensation of the stitching string ‘biting’ into the outside of his left pinky finger.   
Other Phenomena 
Vigilance. 
Brandon experienced instances of vigilance on the first and second sampling days. 
Because one occurred on the first, training day of sampling, it will not be discussed. The 
second instance is presented below:  
Sample 2.2: Brandon was driving on Interstate 15 [his wife took the notes], 
making a curve. At the moment of the beep he is seeing everything in his visual 
field that is outside his windshield: cars, roadway, signs, and so on.  All these 
things are seen with equal attention and clarity—he is “paying attention to 
everything.”  The cars on the other side of the freeway divider are seen as well, 
but without quite so much intensity.  Things inside the car—instruments, his wife, 
etc., are not part of his visual seeing.  At the same time he is noticing the feel of 
the steering wheel against his hand—the hardness of it, the place where the spoke 
of the wheel and the rim of the wheel come against his hand.  Most of his 
attention is on the visual display (70/30). 
Flashbacks. 
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 Brandon had two instances of multi-sensorial inner experience, or flashbacks, 
which occurred on the fifth day of sampling. Brandon described his flashbacks as “more 
clear” than reality and all consuming. His flashbacks are described below: 
Sample 5.2: Brandon was on the computer, reading the description of an EMT 
course. At the moment of the beep Brandon is reliving an event. He is in Iraq, 
going through combat lifesaver course training. He is experiencing this as though 
it is happening right now, at the moment of the beep. He is seeing his buddy, the 
simulated casualty, lying down. Brandon is seeing and feeling his right hand 
clamped on his buddy’s artery, and his [Brandon’s] left hand holding the 
catheter/needle which Brandon is about to push into his buddy’s artery. He is also 
hearing the sound of helicopters around him [and possibly (he’s not sure) seeing 
and hearing the sound of other people engaged in a similar exercise], and smelling 
the distinctive smell of that area [the area in which the actual training took place]. 
However these aspects are less relevant than the seeing of his buddy’s artery and 
the catheter. This reliving is hyper-real – it is more relevant, sharper somehow, 
and more in focus than the real-life training had been, as if the “relevance control 
knob, which usually goes from one to ten, has been turned up to twelve.” 
Sample 5.5: Brandon was in his car, and his wife was driving. They had just 
passed a truck with a bumper sticker that read “Dezzert Assault.” At the moment 
of the beep Brandon is reliving a live-fire exercise during combat skills training. 
He is experiencing this as though it is happening right now, at the moment of the 
beep. He is sitting in the gunnery of a Humvee – with his body sticking up 
through a hole in the top of the Humvee, and he is holding his M4 weapon against 
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his left shoulder. He is looking out ahead of him, seeing both what is in his line of 
sight [what is in front of where he is pointing his weapon] as well as his 
surroundings. He is seeing what is in his line of sight with his left eye [he shoots 
left handed]– the target he has just shot at, and his surroundings with his right eye 
– the hill in front of him, the curving road ahead.  At the same time Brandon is 
feeling the recoil of the M4 against his left shoulder, hearing the sound of the 
Humvee’s engine and the sound of the tires on the road. He also smells the grass. 
All this is understood to be an accurate reliving of the original event with two 
exceptions: first, the grass he is smelling at the moment of the beep is 
distinctively different from the actual grass he was smelling during the combat 
training; the “relived” grass smells stronger, fresher like fresh-cut grass. Second, 
the entire reliving (sights, sounds, smells, sensations) is hyper-real – more intense 
and sharper than the actual training. At the moment of the beep the experience is a 
reliving; a second later, when responding to the beep, he recognizes the grass 
smell as being stronger and the whole event as being hyper-clear. 
In both these samples, Brandon described a “hyper-clear” or “hyper-real quality” to the 
flashback. It appears that his flashbacks somehow hold a sharpness and intensity that 
“real life” lacks. Further, Brandon’s experience is particularly precise and detailed. An 
illustration of this is his experience of the smell of grass (sample 5.5); he indicates that 
this “imagined” grass smell is distinctly different from the actual grass – stronger, 
fresher, apparently more intense. The detailed precision of Brandon’s flashback is 
reminiscent of his other experiential phenomena. Interestingly, Brandon did not describe, 
nor did he endorse his flashbacks as being particularly distressing to him or directly 
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related to any trauma. His flashbacks, though related to his military experiences were 
rather benign in nature. 
Concentrated doing. 
The following sample is an example of concentrated doing:  
Sample 4.3: Brandon was working on the lacing of the belt. He was pulling the 
lacing through each hole and tightening the lacing while doing so, making sure 
the lacing was not twisted. At the moment of the beep Brandon is looking at the 
lacing with the purpose of ensuring that the lacing lays flat on the leather. This 
ensuring-it-lays-flat intention is explicitly present in Brandon’s experience at the 
moment of the beep; that is, it is not merely that he is trying to get it flat, but 
rather that he directly apprehends this trying-to-get-it-flatness.  The trying-to-get-
it-flatness is a part of the looking, and is not a separate thought process.  
In this sample, Brandon was far more involved in the task of lacing than simply looking 
at the lace – he was focused on the lace with the intent to ensure the lace laid flat, did not 
twist or turn. His looking was careful, concentrated and purposeful. In another instance of 
concentrated doing, Brandon was carefully, concentratedly running up the stairs toward 
his crying child, paying attention to the physicality of his balance. This sample has been 
discussed above but will be presented again here:  
Sample 3.4: Brandon was running up the stairs to attend to his son who was 
crying. He was halfway up the stairs. At the moment of the beep Brandon is 
aware of his physical alignment in space – of not falling over. He is paying 
attention to the physicality of balancing as he is running up the stairs. He was also 
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aware of tension in his legs and back, but this awareness may have occurred after 
the beep. 
Two of Brandon’s samples, both occurring on the final sampling day, involved 
complex experiential processes that were difficult for Brandon to describe and for us to 
comprehend. Although these experiences appear to be in the realm of concentrated doing, 
they do not clearly fit within that phenomenological category.   
Sample 5.3: Brandon was at Target with his wife. She was trying on a dress and 
had asked Brandon his opinion of how she looked in the dress. At the moment of 
the beep Brandon is looking at her with approval. This approval is somehow a 
part of the looking, and does not exist separately from the looking. In his looking, 
he is directly apprehending this approvingness. His looking is more than just 
looking with approval but less than looking with a separate “approval” thought.  
Sample 5.6: Brandon was plugging the Christmas tree lights into the socket. At 
the moment of the beep Brandon is seeing the socket and the plug part of the 
lights, with the intention of plugging the plug into the socket. The intention is tied 
into the seeing, and can’t be pulled apart – as Brandon described, they are tied 
together in the way the three-layered toothpaste is tied together and can not be 
separated without making a mess.  
We worked hard on trying to apprehend these two experiences, but without resolution.  
As best we could tell, these samples involved a kind of “intentional” looking process, 
possibly a phenomenon common to Brandon’s inner experience but complex enough that 
he had some difficulty in apprehending and clearly describing the phenomenon in the 
amount of time we were able to sample with him.  
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The remainder of Brandon’s samples involved unsymbolized thinking (samples 
2.5 and 3.7; 8%), and inner hearing (sample 4.4 and 4.6; 8%). Brandon had one sample 
that involved worded thinking (sample 5.4). Finally, Brandon had no instances of feeling 
or inner speaking in any of his 25 samples. 
Discussion 
As mentioned previously, Brandon appeared to be a particularly disciplined DES 
participant – he was very precise in his descriptions and chose his words just so; at times, 
Brandon’s level of preciseness appeared somewhat concrete and rigid. Brandon’s inner 
experience was similar to his external presentation – very precise, orderly and specific. In 
some ways, Brandon’s inner experience might be characterized as stubbornly concrete, 
even in more abstract moments such as when he is attempting to “taste the color yellow” 
(sample 3.5).  
Brandon’s reports of inner experience changed rather substantially following the 
first day of sampling. On the first day, Brandon reported two instances of feeling (pride 
and a combination of vigilance and boredom). Interestingly, these were the only feeling 
experiences Brandon reported. As sampling progressed, his inner experience consisted of 
primarily very precise and complex inner seeing and sensory awareness; phenomena he 
did not report until the second day of sampling. In fact, over half of his total reported 
instances of sensory awareness (5 of 9, or 55%) occurred on the second day of sampling. 
Fifty percent (5 of 10) of his inner seeing samples also occurred on the second day of 
sampling.  
Brandon’s inner experience was strikingly precise and detailed. He was almost 
craftsman-like in his ability to construct complex inner seeings that often accompanied 
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ongoing thought processes or tasks in which he was engaged. Brandon also was rather 
skilled in noticing or focusing on his bodily sensations and muscle movements. He also 
exhibited several instances where he was focused on imaginarily created sensations 
(tasting yellow, but not quite the “right” yellow and smelling grass that was more 
“grassy” somehow than the original, actual grass).  The precise nature of his inner 
experience paralleled Brandon’s external presentation and his use of language.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Idiographic Description of Louis’ Experience 
 Louis was a 23 year-old Pacific Islander male who sampled with us during 
February and March 2010. Louis met criteria for significant PTSD symptomatology on 
the PCL-M and considered himself to have symptoms of PTSD following his two 
deployments to Afghanistan in January, 2007, and again in January, 2009. He described 
feeling increasingly irritable and easily frustrated since his deployment. Louis was not in 
treatment for PTSD at the time of sampling. Louis was a Medic and Air/Ground 
technician attached to the Marine Corps during his deployments. He described feeling 
“my life was always in danger” both during training exercises and also while in 
Afghanistan, though he was hesitant to discuss the specifics of these experiences, stating, 
“compared to what a lot of my friends went through, I feel really lucky because my 
experiences weren’t that bad.” He described himself as having, to some extent, 
aftereffects from his military experiences, although he also discussed his inner strength 
and his ability to overcome some of his stressful experiences using this inner strength. 
Louis endorsed mild depressive symptoms including decreased concentration, 
discouragement about the future, self-criticalness changes in sleep, but shared that these 
symptoms do not significantly interfere with his day-to-day functioning. 
Louis collected a total of 34 samples over 6 sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 28 samples.   
 The most salient phenomenon in Louis’s inner experience was inner seeing. As 
shown in Table 6 at the end of this chapter, 9 of Louis’s 28 samples (32%) involved inner 
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seeing. Six of his 28 (21%) samples involved inner speaking, five (18%) involved 
feelings and four (14%) involved sensory awareness. Louis also had instances of inner 
hearing (7%), unsymbolized thinking (3%), laughter/amusement (3%), concentrated 
doing (3%), and just doing (10%).  
Table 6 
 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Louis (28 samples)  
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 1 3 
Inner Seeing 9 32 
Sensory 
Awareness 4 14 
Concentrated 
Doing 1 3 
Inner Hearing 2 7 
Feeling  5 18 
Just Doing 3 10 
Amusement 1 3 
Inner Speaking 6 21 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
Inner Seeing 
 Inner seeing was the most frequent of Louis’s experiences, and also the most 
complex. Louis reported two particularly unusual instances of inner seeing, which we 
termed “unformed” inner seeings:  
 113 
Sample 2.2: Louis was on the phone with his friend, Joe. Joe had been describing 
his evening, that he and his friends were drunk, that their designated driver had 
ditched them, and that they were now walking down the street, still drunk. At the 
moment of the beep Louis trying to form an image of Joe’s location. Louis is 
having what he calls a “thought blur” which consists of a not-fully-formed image 
of his friend Joe walking down a street. In this image, Joe is clear, and in motion, 
walking from Louis’s left to Louis’s right. There are trees in this seeing/image, 
however, they are less clear than Joe is, but not completely unformed or blurry 
either. The remainder of the scene is much more blurry, dark, unformed. It is as if 
this image is being built by Louis; the more information Joe gives him about 
where he is, the more pieces of Louis’s blurry image get “filled in.” Louis’s 
attention is also equally directed toward what Joe is saying; he is listening to Joe’s 
description of where Joe is. 
In the above sample, Louis indicated that the image was like a half-assembled puzzle, 
with pieces missing. He said that the more information he gathered about Joe’s location, 
the more pieces of the image-puzzle would be filled in. He was also clear that the 
“missing pieces” of the image were not represented by “holes” or “gaps” in the image, 
but were instead just not there yet, not fully formed. 
Sample 6.6: Louis was looking at himself in the mirror and had noticed a stain on 
his sweater. At the moment of the beep Louis is trying to figure out how that stain 
got there. He is innerly seeing himself from the neck down to the waist, wearing 
the sweater and moving about – the sweater is not stained. The “rest” of the 
seeing has not formed –Louis is trying to trying to figure out how the stain got on 
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the sweater which involved trying to fill in the inner seeing with the details of 
when he had last worn the sweater.  
Our understanding of this experience changed quite substantially about half way through 
the interview.  What is written above is the final understanding; during the first half we 
understood Louis to be saying that there was a trying to see but that there was no actual 
inner seeing at the moment of the beep.  There are two explanations: (a) his apprehension 
of the experience changed during the interview; and (b) what he meant by “not seeing” 
during the first part of the interview meant that he was not seeing the interesting part of 
the scene—the part that would identify where he had worn the sweater. 
 What is particularly interesting about both of the above samples is that Louis 
started out in both by saying he was not seeing anything, but eventually came to the view 
that he was seeing something clearly, but that the thing he was seeing was not what he 
was interested in so he verbalized that as “not seeing anything.” In both interviews it took 
a long time to get to a description of a clearly seen detail, leading us to be unsure about 
what Louis’s true experience actually was. There are two likely alternatives: “(a) the 
sweater (and Joe in 2.2) was clearly seen at the moment of the beep but was not reported 
because Louis’s interest was elsewhere (in the where he wore the sweater in 6.6, and 
where Joe was in 2.2); and (b) the sweater (or Joe in 2.2) was not present at the moment 
of the beep, but Louis built over the course of the somewhat lengthy interview a false 
memory of having been seeing the sweater at the moment of the beep (or of having been 
seeing Joe in 2.2). We were unable to disentangle these two alternative explanations.   
 Louis had a number of multimodal inner seeing experiences throughout the course 
of sampling:  
 115 
Sample 4.1: Louis was lying in bed with his eyes closed trying to relax. At the 
moment of the beep he is innerly seeing/hearing Quinn, a character from the TV 
show “Glee,” sing “Smile,” a song from the show. He is seeing/hearing Quinn 
singing “sad words goodbye” along with the accompanying melody, and is more 
focused on the hearing aspect of this experience than the seeing aspect. He is 
seeing Quinn from straight ahead, from the waist up, wearing a red and white 
cheerleader’s outfit (which she wears on the show), with the center of his 
attention on her mouth as she sings. He sees her in motion, singing the song. This 
seeing does not appear to have a specific location in space, but Louis seems to be 
looking forward at her.  
Sample 5.4: Louis was driving and looking at the mountains. At the moment of 
the beep he is looking at the mountains and remembering his platoon; he is 
experiencing a series of inner seeings of himself and his platoon hiking. Some of 
these inner seeings are memories of events he experienced with his platoon during 
training in California and others are not. During our interview Louis was unsure 
exactly which of these inner seeings was at the moment of the beep. Examples of 
these include the following: 1) Louis and three other guys from his platoon are 
hiking and have run out of water. Louis sees one of the guys is asking him for 
water. The guys are wearing Kevlar and helmets but their faces are undefined, 
blurry. 2) Louis and his platoon members are getting ready to scale a mountain; 
they are in the prone position.  
Sample 5.6: Louis was thinking about an interaction he’d had with a guy 
yesterday, and was replaying the interaction over in his head, obsessing about 
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what he wishes he would have said at the time. At the moment of the beep Louis 
is mentally replaying the interaction; he innerly sees himself speaking with the 
guy. He sees himself from the third person perspective; he sees the back of his 
head and the guy’s face as well, as though he is seeing through his own head. 
Louis is talking to the guy, saying what he wishes he had said at the time. Louis 
also feels irritated/mad/disappointed in himself at the moment of the beep. (Louis 
did not want to disclose what he was innerly saying at the beep nor did he want to 
disclose the subject matter of the conversation).  
Sample 6.5: Louis was in his closet looking for something to wear, but the clothes 
at which his eyes are aimed are not in his experience at the moment of the beep. 
At the moment of the beep Louis hears himself say, “Hey, I missed you” to a 
friend, Joe.  Louis innerly sees Joe’s face and spiky hair from a first person 
perspective as if he is sitting in the class he has with his friend and turning to his 
right toward his friend, who is turned looking at him.  They are looking into each 
other’s eyes. Louis sees Joe’s spiked hair clearly, and sees the table at which they 
are sitting clearly, but Joe’s face is not differentiated.  Louis knows it is Joe, but 
he cannot see the features.  In particular, Louis cannot discern the emotional 
expression, if any, on Joe’s face. Louis does not experience emotion, despite the 
apparent emotional situation of the inner seeing. 
Inner seeing can range from rather simplistic, such as a still image, to rather complex, 
much like the above samples. All four are animated and include “scenes” with sound and 
motion and indicate rather skilled inner seeing ability. Sample 5.4 highlights the skilled 
nature of Louis’s inner seeings; he is able to leave blurry what is undefined (the faces of 
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his platoon members) and to clarify what is defined. We see another example of Louis’s 
skilled inner seeing in the following sample:  
Sample 4.4: Louis was driving and hearing a Rhianna song on the radio. At the 
moment of the beep he hears the Rhianna song and innerly sees a close-up of 
Rhianna’s face and particularly her Mohawk hair. The background is black behind 
her. He sees Rhianna sing the song that he hears on the radio, as if he were 
watching a music video. He is also paying attention to the physical sensation of 
his jaw opening as he is yawning, but this is less central to his experience. 
In this sample he has created an inner seeing synchronized to the external hearing; it is 
important to note that he is not simply hearing Rhianna sing as a part of his inner seeing, 
but instead has created a “visual track” to go with the “audio track” he hears on the radio. 
We again see the level of skill in Louis’s inner seeing in the following samples:   
Sample 4.2: Louis was lying in his bed with his eyes closed trying to relax and to 
clear his mind.  A bit before the beep he was actively trying to clear his mind. At 
the moment of the beep this active trying to clear his mind has been replaced by 
what is apparently the fruit of the trying: he innerly sees a dark, three-dimensional 
void that is spreading, pushing off to the sides his previous thoughts. These 
thoughts are represented by very bright, white light around the right and left edges 
of the expanding darkness. The spreading, expanding void is a ragged square, the 
edges of which are not straight but are jagged as the void pushes the thoughts 
away.  
Sample 3.4: Louis had been driving to his brother’s house and had passed a 
woman walking down the street. He had then passed her again when leaving his 
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brother’s house a short while later. At the moment of the beep he is toying with 
the idea of picking this woman up. He is experiencing a series of inner seeings 
that represent   ‘what if’ questions related to whether or not he should offer the 
woman a ride.  These inner seeings include innerly seeing the woman sitting next 
to him in the passenger seat of the car seen as if standing in front of the car 
looking in through the windshield. The woman is more in focus in the image.  
This inner seeing is associated with wondering what would happen if he picked 
her up.  Another inner seeing involves seeing himself walking into class late.  
From a first-person perspective he sees his classmates are turning backward 
looking at him, and the teacher standing in front of the class is giving him a stern 
look. This inner seeing represents whether or not he would be late to class if he 
gave the woman a ride.  Because he was driving at the moment of the beep, Louis 
was unable to immediately record his experience at the moment of the beep and 
was therefore unable to pinpoint which of these series of questions and inner 
seeing combinations was present right at the beep. 
Sample 3.4 is particularly interesting in that Louis has “paired” inner seeings with his 
unsymbolized thoughts as opposed to simply having an unsymbolized thought. It is likely 
that because Louis is so skilled at inner seeing, he tends to “think” visually more easily 
and more often than others who are less skilled at this phenomenon.  
Inner Speaking 
 Though inner speaking was Louis’s second most frequent experiential 
phenomenon, it is clear that he is a rather unskilled producer of inner speaking, 
particularly when compared to his high level of skill in inner seeing. The majority of 
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Louis’s instances of inner speaking involved repetitious, short and isolated sentence 
fragments while the remainder simply involved speaking that accompanied reading.  
Sample 2.4: Louis had just noticed that he did not have his sampling notebook, 
and was searching through his backpack for it. He was repeating the phrase, 
“Where did I fucking put that shit” to himself over and over. At the moment of 
the beep he is saying to himself, “where did I fucking put that shit” and is feeling 
condescending about the notebook not being there. 
Sample 3.1: While driving Louis was trying to remember his dog’s vaccination 
appointment by innerly saying the words “March first” to himself repeatedly. At 
the moment of the beep he is on his second iteration of innerly saying the words 
“March [beep] first.” He is innerly saying “March first” to himself, in his normal 
speaking voice, with a flat tone.  
Sample 4.5: Louis was cleaning the trunk of his car because his dog had “shit in 
the trunk.” At the moment of the beep Louis is innerly screaming, “I hate this 
fucking shit!” He is irate/angry/pissed off.  The inner screaming is loud and 
intense, but not at 100% of his possible intensity. Besides the yelling, his anger is 
manifested as a heat expanding in his chest and radiating out to his hands, which 
are shaking. His physical anger is less centrally in his awareness than the inner 
yelling. 
Sample 5.1: Louis was leaning down, and his dog was licking his face. At the 
moment of the beep Louis is innerly saying, “awww kisses” in his own voice, 
only high-pitched and more feminine. He is also feeling the wetness of his dog’s 
saliva on his right cheek.  
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Sample 2.1: Louis was sitting on his bed with his laptop in his lap, reading an 
email. At the moment of the beep he is reading the subject line of the email – 
‘Sender: [company name].’ As he is reading this he is saying it to himself in his 
normal voice. He is also aware of himself and his dog in space. This awareness is 
not visual or mental, but is a knowledge of his own location/existence in space in 
relation to the other items in the room. 
Sample 5.5: Louis was reading a text message on his cell phone. At the moment 
of the beep he is innerly reading the text message to himself in his own, 
nondistinct voice, “It’s Holly’s birthday today.” He is also innerly seeing Holly’s 
face smiling brightly. 
Feelings 
 Louis’s emotion-skill does not appear to be at the same level as his inner-seeing-
skill, though he does appear to have possible instances of well-integrated emotion 
experience (e.g., sample 4.5 and 5.2). He had a total of five feeling experiences 
throughout the course of sampling; all five involved negatively valenced feeling (e.g., 
irritation, condescension, impatience, anger).  
Sample 2.3: Louis was driving in his car, and had just seen a man with long, 
black hair hugging a girl. At the moment of the beep Louis is having a 
condescending/irritable reaction [Louis indicated that both these words accurately 
reflect his reaction] to the man’s hair. This reaction is more mental and does not 
involve any words or other characteristics. [Louis reported that the condescending 
reaction can be captured by the phrase “pshhh, look at this guy” but that this 
thought was not actually present to him at the moment of the beep]. 
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Sample 2.4: Louis had just noticed that he did not have his sampling notebook, 
and was searching through his backpack for it. He was repeating the phrase, 
“Where did I fucking put that shit” to himself over and over. At the moment of 
the beep he is saying to himself, “where did I fucking put that shit” and is feeling 
condescending about the notebook not being there. 
Sample 4.3: Louis was in the car, waiting to make a right turn at a red light. At 
the moment of the beep he is watching the cars coming toward him from his left. 
He is impatiently/eagerly awaiting a hole in the traffic, but this is less centrally in 
his awareness than the watching of the cars. 
Sample 5.2: At the moment of the beep Louis is staring intently into his dog’s 
eyes, holding his dog tightly by the snout and is saying in a harsh voice, “When I 
say no I mean no [beep], OK Hailey?” Louis is feeling irritated, and is 
aggressively handling of the dog’s snout. In staring at the dog, Louis is trying to 
communicate with her telepathically; trying to impose his thoughts on her.  
Additional Phenomena 
Louis had one instance of concentrated doing, which also involved sensory 
awareness and inner hearing. Louis is carefully ladling stew from a pot into a bowl, 
focusing on not spilling the stew:  
Sample 5.3: Louis was using a ladle to scoop beef stew from the pot into a bowl. 
At the moment of the beep he is paying attention to what he is doing, trying not to 
spill the stew. He also smells the beef stew, which smells good. There is a 
segment of a Bon Jovi song playing over and over in his head (this segment is the 
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only part of the song he knows), and at the moment of the beep he is hearing the 
music and lyrics, “halfway there, oh oh, living on a prayer.”  
 The remainder of Louis’ samples were relatively straight-forward and are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Discussion 
Louis had three phenomena that he experienced at higher rates than other 
phenomena: inner seeing, inner speaking and feeling. Louis’ inner seeing experiences 
were rather skilled as compared with his inner speaking and feeling experiences. It seems 
Louis was able to create inner seeing experiences in such a way that he was able to, for 
example, leave undefined or blurry or “blank” aspects of images that were uninteresting 
or unimportant to him, and clarify or define more important aspects. In stark contrast, 
Louis’ inner speaking was simplistic, probably at the lower end of the inner speaking 
“skill spectrum.” Louis’ feeling experiences included both well-integrated emotion (e.g., 
anger) as well as slightly more diffuse, undefined feeling experiences (e.g., 
condescension). It is possible that feeling is a developing skill for Louis, one that is not 
quite as developed as his inner seeing ability, but more developed than his inner 
speaking. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Idiographic Description of Andrew’s Experience 
 Andrew was a 23 year-old American Indian male who sampled with us during 
February and March 2010. Andrew met criteria for significant PTSD symptomatology on 
the PCL-M and considered himself to have symptoms of PTSD following his 6-month 
deployment to Iraq in 2009. Andrew was not in treatment for PTSD at the time of 
sampling. Andrew was a member of the Army Reserves and was activated and deployed 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He described the majority of his duties as involving civil 
affairs, though he was involved in a number of firefights. He described a love for the 
military and deployment, and hoped to reenlist and redeploy once he completed his 
academic obligations. Andrew described himself as changed upon returning from his 
deployment, relating that he values closeness with others less than he used to, avoids 
people, avoids crowds and no longer goes out with his friends as he used to. He described 
himself as moody with outbursts of anger that “I’m able to control. I can fake being calm 
when other people are around, I know how to mask it.” He described some history of 
insomnia, but shared with us that since starting sampling, his sleep improved, as did his 
psychological distress. He told us that he liked the anonymous nature of sampling, that he 
could come share anything with us without having any judgment or having to explain 
himself, something he was unable to do currently with others in his life, such as friends 
and family.   
Andrew collected a total of 38 samples over 7 sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 32 samples.  The most salient 
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phenomenon in Andrew’s inner experience was feeling. As shown in Table, 25 of 
Andrew’s 32 samples (78%) involved feeling. Andrew experienced sensory awareness in 
9 of his 32 samples (28%). Three of his samples involved unsymbolized thinking (9%), 
one (3%) involved concentrated doing and one (3%) involved vigilance. Andrew 
experienced two each (6%) of the following: inner seeing, inner speaking and 
laughter/amusement.  
Table 7 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Andrew (32 samples) 
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 3 9 
Inner Seeing 2 6 
Sensory 
Awareness 9 28 
Vigilance 1 3 
Concentrated 
Doing 1 3 
Feeling  25 78 
Amusement 2 6 
Inner Speaking 2 6 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
Feeling 
 The majority of Andrew’s samples involved feeling experience. Andrew’s feeling 
experiences were often unlike the “typical” feeling experiences reported by participants 
in other DES studies.   
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Sample 2.1: Andrew was sitting at the DMV waiting for his number to be called. 
At the moment of the beep Andrew is feeling anonymous, like he’s just a number, 
or just one of many. This feeling is a comfortable, familiar one. He is also looking 
at the numbers on the number display board.  
Sample 2.2: Andrew was at the DMV having a conversation with an older man. 
The man was describing his wartime experiences to Andrew. At the moment of 
the beep Andrew was relating to this man; there was a feeling of connection/bond 
with this man. The connection was a result of having a shared experience of war, 
although this was not in Andrew’s awareness at the moment of the beep. 
Sample 2.5: Andrew was lying in his bed listening to music. At the moment of 
the beep Andrew is paying attention to the meaning of the lyrics of the song –“no 
one’s going to hold me back” – and feeling unstoppable. This unstoppable feeling 
was a mental feeling of relating to the song lyrics and feeling unstoppable as a 
result.  
In the above three samples, Andrew felt anonymous, connected and unstoppable, 
respectively. These adjectives are not typically what others call feelings, and were 
difficult for Andrew to describe. It seems that Andrew experienced a broader array of 
feelings than those that are considered more prototypical, such as anger, sadness and 
happiness (though he did also experience those types of feelings), or that he used the term 
“feeling” in a broader sense than is typical.  These types of experiences (e.g., anonymous, 
connected and unstoppable) highlight the difficulty in determining the boundaries of 
feelings.  As best we could understand, Andrew considered these experiences instances of 
feelings rather than cognitive/thinking experiences or some other type of experience.   
 126 
 Andrew’s feeling experiences, though plentiful, were sometimes disjointed and 
lacking integration. In these instances, his feelings were not coalesced into one coherent 
experience, but rather encompassed what appeared to be scattered “pieces” of feeling 
experience. For example:  
Sample 4.2: Andrew was walking to class. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
experiencing the coolness of the breeze on his arm, contrasted against the heat of 
the sun. The coolness is on the surface of his skin, but also just below the surface; 
it feels pleasant. Andrew is also feeling better/happier, brought on by arm 
coolness, the nice weather and the familiarity of the song that he is listening to on 
his iPod. Although he believes the iPod music is affecting his mood, the music 
itself is not central to his experience.  
Sample 4.4: Andrew was at home, and had received a job offer about 10 minutes 
prior to the beep. At the moment of the beep, Andrew is happy and has a sense of 
accomplishment. Andrew feels physically lighter in his whole body, as though a 
physical weight has been lifted from his shoulders, and has somehow a mental 
sigh of relief, as if he is mentally saying “Yes!” but in fact is not saying anything, 
mentally or otherwise.  Much less salient is a slight nervousness about having 
been out of retail work for some time.  
In the initial example it was unclear whether the “happier” feeling was actually 
experienced, is a pervasive but not experienced mood, or is merely a general 
characterization of the pleasantness of the individual (arm, weather, iPod) experiences. In 
the latter sample it was unclear the extent of felt emotion. It was as though the lightness 
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of his body and the mental “Yes!” were pieces or ingredients of feeling, but were not 
actually integrated into a cohesive feeling.  
Sample 3.2: Andrew had just finished speaking on the phone with his 
grandmother. At the moment of the beep he is feeling that he failed his family 
members who are in another city.  The feeling of failure is specific to his family 
members in this other city and does not include his family members in Las Vegas.  
He also feels detachment. His heart feels like it is being squeezed in someone’s 
hand.  This is a medium level of pressure, like a firm handshake all around his 
heart.  
Sample 3.3: Andrew had just been with his mother and was now driving in his 
car, leaving his mother. At the moment of the beep Andrew is seeing a still image 
of his mother’s face. His mother is looking directly at him and he sees that she is 
sad though he cannot see the details of her face.  He can see that she is not crying 
or frowning. Andrew is feeling a sense of responsibility toward his mother, mixed 
with a little sadness; this feels like a heaviness pushing down on his shoulders. 
Andrew’s eyes also feel a little warm/humid, like they are about to get watery. 
Andrew was aware of the world around him (the noises, the other cars, etc.) but 
also felt like he was invisible, like was not fully present in the world around him. 
This sense of being invisible was only peripherally in his awareness at the 
moment of the beep. 
Andrew calls “failure,” “detachment” and “responsibility” feelings, though these may 
well not be emotional experiences as others use the term. Again in these samples we see 
emotion that is not well integrated, that is not fully coherent; the squeeze in the heart 
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seems somehow separate from the detached/failure feeling, but is also related. It is as 
though Andrew experienced this heart-squeeze and at some point determined that it was a 
part of an emotion experience, though at what point, if any, he was able to connect the 
heart-squeeze as a part of the actual emotion is unclear. This is also true of the 
“warm/humid” eyes he describes – it is as though his experience is not integrated to a 
point that he can draw the conclusion that the warmness of his eyes may be related to the 
sadness he feels, and may represent the experience of “tearing up.”  
Then again, it may be that Andrew simply has an unusual way of speaking about 
the otherwise typical experience of feeling sad and tearing up. However, it is unlikely that 
this is the case, as Andrew does evidence the ability to clearly and coherently talk about 
and experience emotion, as seen in the following sample:  
Sample 7.1: Andrew was walking around his house after getting off the phone 
with a loan officer who had given him bad news regarding his loan. At the 
moment of the beep Andrew is furious, betrayed, which manifests itself in part as 
directly experienced warmth throughout his body, most intensely in his chest and 
ears.  As part of or parallel to this rage, Andrew wants to punch something: he 
feels a surge of energy in his arms, which he feels as trembling (although he 
doubts that they were physically trembling) and tickling, particularly his biceps 
and palms, as if he is physically restraining himself from punching. Andrew 
reports that the rage has been building over the past 5 or 10 minutes since getting 
off the phone. The fury/betrayal/rage is understood to be the result of the loan-
officer conversation, but Andrew does not experience his rage as being aimed at 
the loan-officer—it is experienced as pure, objectless rage. 
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In the sample above, Andrew experiences what appears to be a fully integrated and 
intense emotion experience, and describes it as such to us during the interview. His 
emotion experience (fury) consists of experiential bodily aspects that appear to be well 
integrated with the mental or cognitive aspects of the rage, resulting in an intensive, 
holistic rage experience. This sample illustrates that Andrew is able to experience 
emotions that are better integrated, but that often his emotion-experience appears 
unintegrated, suggesting perhaps that the “skill” of experiencing emotions is not well 
developed.  
Andrew appeared to have emotion experiences that were more intense but still 
somehow unusual and disintegrated, such as in the two samples presented below:  
Sample 3.5: Andrew was on his way to Claim Jumper.  His ex-girlfriend is 
driving, taking him out to dinner at his favorite restaurant. At the moment of the 
beep Andrew is eager, energized about going to Claim Jumper.  His body surges 
with excitement, primarily experienced as a surge of energy or adrenaline that 
starts in the region of his heart and branches out through his chest toward his 
shoulders, feeling like several (maybe 3 to 5) marble-sized ball-bearings rolling 
through his veins toward his shoulders. His right leg bounces up and down as he 
rapidly taps his foot—he’s more aware of the bouncing of his hand on his knee 
than he is of the foot itself.  The bouncing-hand-on-leg experience is not as 
central to him as the chest rush.  It is unclear whether the “going to Claim 
Jumper” is actually present as part of his excitement at the beep, or whether it is 
simply excitement brought on by the going to Claim Jumper.   
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Sample 7.5: Andrew was lying on the couch. At the moment of the beep Andrew 
is feeling consumed by anger/annoyance and is at the same time noticing how 
consumed he is by anger/annoyance. The majority (he calls it 75%) of his 
experience is taken up by the noticing of how consumed he is by anger (by 
comparison to the consumed-by-anger itself, 25%). This “consumed by anger” is 
like a cloudiness that is surrounding him, or encasing him.  That is, his seeing 
(and perhaps his other senses) is cloudy, unclear. 
In both samples above Andrew is clearly experiencing emotion (excitement and anger, 
respectively), yet neither emotion appears well-integrated. Sample 7.5 is unusual in that 
Andrew is experiencing anger while also noticing himself as experiencing anger. In other 
words this sample is one of meta-awareness. Overall, the majority of Andrew’s feeling 
experiences were similar to the samples presented earlier that consisted of vague, 
somewhat difficult to apprehend descriptions of feeling components that were not well 
integrated and sometime lacked a sense of cohesiveness. Though Andrew had a high 
frequency of what he called “feeling” (78%), his feelings were not typical, to say the 
least. 
Sensory Awareness 
 Andrew had several sensory awareness experiences scattered throughout the 
course of sampling, a number of which have been presented in the “Feelings” section 
above. Overall, nine of Andrew samples (28%) contained sensory awareness.  Many of 
Andrew’s sensory awareness experiences occurred at the same time as he was 
experiencing other phenomena (e.g., feelings). Some of his sensory awareness samples 
are presented below:  
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Sample 5.1: Andrew was sitting on the couch with his shoes off, after a long day 
at work. At the moment of the beep Andrew’s feet are aching all over and he feels 
a dull, round jabbing pain in the bottom middle of his foot, in the meaty part 
between the heel and the balls of his feet. The jabbing is approximately 1.5 inches 
in diameter, like a dull rod pushing up into the area where the arches of his feet 
should be.  (He has flat feet.)  His is also feeling heat release out of his feet into 
the cool air.  His feet had been hot and steamy from having shoes on all day; he is 
feeling this heat escape his feet.  At the same time Andrew is feeling relaxed all 
over his body, but this is very minimally in his experience (about 5%).  
 The following are additional examples of Andrew’s typical sensory awareness:  
Sample 5.2: Andrew was sitting on the couch and slowly drinking a beer. At the 
moment of the beep Andrew is feeling the carbonation of the beer on the inside of 
his mouth. The carbonation feels like light stinging sensations all over his mouth; 
the stinging is very mildly aversive. Andrew also tastes the limey-ness of the lime 
beer, which he likes, and he is generally thinking the beer tastes good. This 
thinking does not have any characteristics (words, images, etc) but is somehow 
present at the moment of the beep.  
Sample 5.3: Andrew was sitting on the couch. At the moment of the beep he is 
moving his hands on the couch and feeling the coolness of the fabric on his hands. 
He also feels his body (not including arms and hands) melting or sinking into the 
couch. He is also having a mental process about being relaxed, something like, 
“I’m so relaxed” only there are no actual words present.  
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The following sample is an example of sensory awareness as well as Andrew’s 
only sample involving concentrated doing. As can been seen, Andrew was not simply 
enjoying a sandwich, but was instead purposefully focused on the sandwich.  
Sample 7.3: Andrew was eating his favorite Subway sandwich, a spicy Italian 
with chipotle sauce. At the moment of the beep Andrew tastes the sandwich, 
particularly the chipotle sauce and the pepperoni, and the taste is good, pleasant. 
He is effortfully concentrating on the sandwich, trying not to let his mind wander 
to other things (particularly the loan situation of sample 7.1). There is a small 
lingering sense of annoyance still present.  
A number of Andrew’s sensory awareness samples were related to the experience 
of heat and coolness on his body, or within the environment (e.g., paying attention to the 
heat radiating from his feet, or the coolness of fabric on his hands, coolness of breeze on 
his arm).  He has few instances of sensory awareness involving other senses, for example, 
he had no visual sensory awareness samples, and just one taste-related sample.  
Additional phenomena. 
 Andrew experienced what we termed vigilance in one of his samples. 
Sample 3.6: Andrew was at Claim Jumper. At the moment of the beep he is 
feeling happy about being at Claim Jumper. This happiness has no accompanying 
characteristics or sensations; he is just happy. At the same time, much less central 
in his experience, he is uneasy or vigilant.  He hears/sees in an undifferentiated 
way the noise and activity of the restaurant and feels as if someone there is 
watching him, feels distressed because he doesn’t know who, feels his body tense 
and stiffen as he monitors the surroundings. 
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This sample is unusual in that in involves two seemingly contradictory states, happiness 
and uneasiness.  Although the simultaneous existence of seemingly contradictory states is 
not unprecedented, it is consistent with the speculation that Andrew’s feelings may 
sometimes be not well integrated.   
Andrew also experienced other common phenomena of inner experience, but each 
at low a frequency.  He experienced inner speaking in two samples (6%), inner seeing in 
two samples (6%), and unsymbolized thinking in three samples (9%).  These phenomena 
were generally fairly typical except for the low frequency with which he experienced 
them.  Andrew also experienced laughter/amusement in two samples (6%).  Were we to 
count laughter/amusement as part of the feeling category, it would even further elevate 
Andrew’s unusually high frequency of samples containing feelings.   
Discussion 
What stood out in Andrew’s sampling was the very high frequency of moments 
containing what he referred to as “feelings” but that were rather unusual or atypical 
feeling experiences. When Andrew experienced feelings, there at times seemed to be a 
lack of integration of the various components of the experience, particularly for milder 
feeling experiences. He was better able to integrate intense emotion experiences, 
particularly those related to anger, as highlighted on the final sampling day. Ultimately, it 
may be that feeling is a developing skill for Andrew, one that he has not yet mastered.  
Additionally, he had quite low frequencies of other common phenomena of inner 
experience (inner speaking, inner seeing and unsymbolized thinking) except for sensory 
awareness, occurring in approximately one quarter of his samples, which is not unusual.   
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CHAPTER 8 
Idiographic Description of Peter’s Experience 
 Peter was a 25 year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us during March and 
April 2010. Peter was deployed to Iraq for a total of 28 months as a part of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom on two separate assignments with the Army as a gunner; he experienced 
active combat on several occasions and incurred a number of injuries as a result. Several 
fellow soldiers were killed during his deployment, including a close friend. Peter 
endorsed symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder on the self-report questionnaires but 
indicated that he had been taking a course of medications to help with his PTSD 
symptoms. On a measure of PTSD symptomatology Peter obtained a score that was seven 
points below our established cut-off for participation; however because of Peter’s self-
reported PTSD symptomatology and his endorsement of significant symptoms in the 
prior month, he was included in this study.  
Peter collected a total of 45 samples over 9 sampling days and attended an expositional 
interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. Samples collected on Peter’s first 
through fourth day of sampling were considered training samples due to the apparent 
difficulty Peter had with the task of apprehending and/or conveying his inner experience. 
However, these samples will be discussed as they contribute to an overall understanding 
of the progression of Peter’s sampling across time. Please see Table 8 for frequencies of 
inner experience phenomena for Peter. 
 
 
 
 135 
Table 8 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Peter (45 samples) 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 
1 2 
Inner Seeing 6 13 
Sensory 
Awareness 
20 43 
Concentrated 
Doing 
0 0 
Just Doing 1 2 
Feeling  0 0 
Inner Speaking 2 4 
Pain-Related 5 10 
Vigilance  1 2 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
 Peter was a particularly eager DES participant.  He seemed quite pleased with his 
ability to cope with PTSD symptoms and thought he could teach others to cope as well as 
he does.  He appeared to enter the DES process with many preconceived notions of what 
DES might entail. For example, prior to starting the DES process, Peter asked that we 
review his videotapes with him and comment on his body posture, facial reactions to 
questions, and so forth in the belief that if he had a better idea of the process of his 
experience, he may be even more effective in helping others cope with PTSD as he 
himself had done. Peter expressed many strong beliefs about the nature of his experience, 
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especially regarding his high degree of vigilance, his nearly constant tendency to scan his 
environment rapidly for information about those around him and signs of danger, and his 
constant, intense physical pain.  
 Our initial day of sampling with Peter was very difficult; it was impossible for us 
to ascertain whether Peter’s reports were of actual experience or whether they were 
contaminated by his presuppositions. Peter continued to struggle with the sampling 
process, and we with our ability to tease apart what of his reports were experiential 
phenomena and what might have been presuppositions, for the first three or four 
sampling days. We have included sampling days 1, 2, 3 and 4 in our discussions, as they 
are important in developing a full understanding of Peter. In this chapter we will first 
discuss how Peter’s reports of his experience changed over time and then we will discuss 
his experience based on his reports during his later days of sampling when we were more 
confident that he was describing his actual experience rather than his presuppositions 
about his experience. 
Sampling over Time  
As mentioned previously, Peter entered the sampling process with very strong 
convictions about the nature of his inner experience. Although many people hold strong 
presuppositions about their inner experience, Peter was more vocal than most about his 
beliefs. On the first sampling day, Peter apparently did not understand the concept of the 
moment of the beep (as is the case with many participants), but also seemed deeply 
committed to his beliefs about his inner experience, particularly the belief that he was 
always vigilantly surveying his environment and the belief that he constantly experienced 
chronic, bodily pain. The first sample of the first sampling day and the third sample from 
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the second sampling day illustrate Peter’s pain beliefs. It should be noted that experiences 
from the first day of sampling were difficult for us to apprehend and even more difficult 
to believe. Therefore, though we have presented some of these samples below as 
coherent, straight-forward instances of experience, it should be clear that we did not (and 
do not currently) take these instances to be believable or clear:  
Sample 1.1: At the moment of the beep Peter is concentrating on the pain in his 
right knee (60% concentration) and his lower back (40% concentration). The pain 
in his knee has flared up to a peak and then remained constant, and feels like very 
intense pressure pushing from the back of his kneecap directly outwards. The pain 
in his back is a dull pain like someone is carefully, slowly pushing a pin up 
through the middle of the bottom vertebra and up into the next 2 vertebrae.  Peter 
is also looking at his son who is standing in front of him.  He is in a daze, spaced 
out, and is searching within himself for some emotion, and finding no emotion – 
like he is a shell.  The searching for emotion is said to be an active doing, trying 
unsuccessfully to find emotion.  
Sample 2.3: At the moment of the beep Peter is focusing on creating of physical 
pain all over his body, from the top of his head to the bottom of his feet and from 
the surface of his body down to his bones. That is, he is not merely feeling the 
intense pain all over his body; he is focused on creating it and experiencing it.  
 The following samples, both taken from the first day of sampling highlight Peter’s 
beliefs regarding his “constant vigilance.” 
Sample 1.2: Peter was walking through the casino at the Luxor.  His eyes are 
aimed at a security guard in front of him, but Peter is not experiencing him. At the 
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moment of the beep Peter is paying attention to the people all around him. 
Specifically, he is looking at the mirror reflection of the 13 people behind him. 
The mirror is a thin mirror about 3 inches wide located on a pillar 45 degrees off 
to Peter’s right. Peter is looking at the reflection of the people in this mirror with 
his peripheral vision (his eyes are pointed forward), and is seeing 13 people 
reflected in the mirror.  He is paying attention to the details of each person he is 
seeing in the reflection. This was understood to be a direct seeing of the reflection 
of these people.  [Hurlburt said it seemed to violate the geometry of optics, but 
that did not sway Peter’s conviction that he was actually seeing the reflection of 
13 people]. At the same time he is having the thought that he hates people 
walking behind him; this thought is in his direct experience but does not include 
words or images. At the same time Peter is innerly seeing the badge of the 
security officer who is standing in front of him. He is seeing the gold badge with 
black lettering that reads “J.D. Minnesota.” He is seeing the badge about a foot 
out in front of him and to the upper left. The seeing of the badge is less clear than 
the actual seeing of the reflection of the people in the mirror.  Peter was also 
aware of the 6 people off to his left and the about 20 people in front of him. 
In the above sample, Peter meant the numbers 13 and 6 to be taken literally—that is not 
approximately 13.  But he was not entirely consistent: 6 became 7 in a subsequent telling.  
We observed, following this sampling meeting, that Peter seemed powerfully attached to 
the notion of being hypervigilant, and it was difficult or impossible to know whether that 
notion influenced what he took to be perception or whether his perception was in fact as 
complex as he described. We see this difficult-to-distinguish phenomenon again below: 
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Sample 1.5: Peter was sitting in the corner booth of a restaurant at the Orleans, 
rapidly surveying each individual person in his environment, one at a time, from 
close right to far left. At the moment of the beep Peter is looking at a guy dressed 
in all black and wearing a Raider’s shirt, black shoes with a blue stripe, with a 
scar on his face and an earring in his right ear.  This man is about 30-40 feet 
away, at Peter’s 10 o’clock. He is paying most attention to the guy’s facial 
expression, trying to determine whether the guy is a “go/green checkmark/good” 
or a “no-go/red X/bad.” Peter is enraged, his fists clenching, jaw clenching so 
hard that he worried (after the beep) he might shatter his teeth, but this rage is not 
in his awareness at the moment of the beep.  He wants to fight, is in the kind of 
mood where he will pick a fight with someone (anyone), wants to break the arm 
of the guy in the black shirt, but none of that is directly in his experience at the 
moment of the beep. 
Peter’s presuppositions may very well have been accurate; our aim, as with all 
participants, was to help Peter bracket those presuppositions.  For example, if vigilance 
was a part of his experience at the moment of some beep, we wanted to hear about it, but 
if not, not. Furthermore, Peter appeared, until at least the second day of sampling, to have 
a very limited view of what “counted as” experiential phenomena. A discussion of the 
concept of ‘experience’ and the moment of the beep appeared to clarify Peter’s 
understanding of the DES process. During the third day of sampling Peter appeared to 
have a better sense of the process, and though we still had difficulty keeping Peter 
focused on the moment of the beep and not on his general beliefs about himself, the 
struggle was somewhat reduced. It is also on this sampling day that Peter reported 
 140 
phenomena a) that did not necessarily adhere to his presuppositions as closely as previous 
reports and b) that he continued to report, quite believably, for the rest of our sampling 
meetings (see below for a discussion of these and other phenomena).  
The fourth day of sampling marked somewhat of a transformation in the sampling 
process. On this day, Peter reported a flashback: 
Sample 4.2: At the moment of the beep, Peter is having a flashback of a scene 
from Iraq. He is in his Humvee, gloved hands on his 50-caliber rifle, seeing in full 
3-D color his friend Jay being blown up by an IED [improvised explosive device]. 
He sees the top left part of Jay’s head being blown up and to the left, his right arm 
flying off to the right, his left arm being flung to the left, spurts of blood 
everywhere. Peter feels the grip of his 50-caliber rifle, smells the gunpowder and 
the chlorine from the explosive, tastes the grit. This is a multi-sensory experience 
but there is no sound. [Peter reported that as far as he can tell, he did not hear 
anything in ‘real-life’ at the time of the actual explosion that killed his friend in 
Iraq. He was unsure why he heard no sound]. 
Peter’s retelling of this flashback experience appeared particularly difficult and painful. 
He took several lengthy pauses afterwards to compose himself. Peter indicated that 
speaking about the flashback in such detail was difficult and out-of-the-ordinary, but also 
relieving.   
It appeared that Peter had become progressively better able to apprehend his 
experience across the first four sampling days, as evidenced by his vivid and believable 
report of his flashback (in beep 4.2), including a focus on the sensory aspects of the 
experience.  The following expositional interview day (day 5) was markedly different – 
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Peter’s reports of moments of the beep were much clearer and less diluted with 
generalities about experience, and our discussions with him were much easier to navigate. 
Peter appeared much calmer. He reported to us that the process of sampling was 
decreasing his levels of inner chaos and helping him become “more organized” mentally 
and behaviorally.  
We are unsure precisely why the transformation around days 4 and 5 occurred. It 
is possible that Peter, being given the opportunity to discuss the sensory aspects of his 
awareness in-depth, without judgment, was better able to capture, apprehend and describe 
his momentary experience. It is also possible that having the opportunity to describe the 
flashback of his friend’s death in an in-depth, detailed manner without being judged or 
asked to emote regarding the experience may have somehow been freeing to Peter. The 
discussion of the flashback may have assured him that we would accept him regardless of 
what material he brought to the table, and that he could openly be himself and report on 
his true experiences while meeting with us; that our only expectation of him was to 
access his momentary inner experience.  It is also possible that the shift had nothing to do 
with the report of the flashback and was instead the result of the iterative training he 
received in apprehending his experience at the moment of the beep.   
Sensory Awareness 
The most prominent example of the change in the reports and nature of Peter’s 
inner experience over time was the increase in the frequency of sensory awareness. 
Peter’s reported experience became increasingly sensory-focused after sampling day 4, 
with 60% (18 out of 30) of his samples on days 5 through 9 involving sensory aspects, as 
opposed to only 19% (3 out of 16) of his samples collected on days 1 through 4; this is a 
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3-fold increase in sensory awareness. Peter’s sensory awareness samples included both 
bodily and external examples. His sensory awareness ranged in complexity from rather 
simple and straightforward to sophisticated and complex. Examples of Peter’s more 
straightforward sensory experiences are as follows:  
Sample 5.3: Peter was watching a boiling pot of thick stew. At the moment of the 
beep Peter is completely absorbed in a bubble that is about to break through the 
surface in the thick, red liquid of the stew (external sensory awareness). 
Sample 6.1: Peter was lying in bed, cheek-to-cheek with his son. At the moment 
of the beep Peter is absorbed in the cold, smooth feeling of his son’s cheek on his 
own cheek (bodily sensory awareness). 
Sample 7.3: Peter was cleaning his Colt-45 revolver and doing function checks. 
At the moment of the beep Peter feels the roughness of the hammer on the meaty 
part of his thumb. He is completely absorbed in the roughness of the hammer, 
which feels like pressing his thumb on rough sandpaper (bodily sensory 
awareness).  
 Some of Peter’s sensory awareness samples were less typical and more complex 
than those described above.  
Sample 6.3: Peter was staring at a piece of paper and was spacing out. At the 
moment of the beep Peter is noticing the blurriness of his vision and is actively, 
mentally trying to refocus his eyes. He is also feeling the muscles around the 
outer edges of both eyeballs straining, but this is less central in his experience. 
Sample 6.3 is a bodily sensory awareness but was unusual in that Peter felt the muscles in 
his eyes as they were straining to refocus. Most people, for example, do not notice the 
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focus of their eyes—eye focusing typically takes place automatically, ahead of 
experience, so to speak.  By contrast, Peter is actively engaged in the doing of the 
focusing; he is paying attention to the muscles around his eyeballs, a rare phenomenon 
(R.T. Hurlburt, personal communication, 2010). Sample 6.6 is another sensory awareness 
example that is representative of Peter’s unusual sensory experience. 
Sample 6.6: At the moment of the beep Peter is completely absorbed in the 
imaginary smelling and tasting of sulfur. The smell is so strong it includes a 
sensation of burning along the inside of both nostrils. (Peter noted that the smell 
and taste of sulfur were very, very strong, as though coming from a sulfur pit, 
however, there was no sulfur or sulfur pit in his environment). 
In sample 6.6, Peter smelled sulfur that did not exist within his environment. The ‘smell’ 
was so intense that he experienced it as burning the inside of his nostrils. In this sample 
we see a very unusual bodily sensory experience. We see this type of imagined or 
manipulated sensory experience in two other instances involving the visual system.  
Sample 7.4: Peter was ironing his white chef’s jacket, and had just placed the iron 
off to the side. At the moment of the beep his eyes are fixed on the jacket, which 
is not directly in his experience.  Instead, he is completely absorbed (his word was 
“stuck”) in infinite, very bright, illuminated whiteness. This whiteness is much 
brighter than the whiteness of the chef’s jacket; it is as bright as looking into a 
headlight and is all around him in an unbounded, uniform fashion. 
Peter was of the impression that the whiteness experienced in Sample 7.4 had arisen from 
the whiteness of the chef’s jacket, but the jacket and the arising of the whiteness were not 
experienced at the moment of the beep.  Instead, he was simply absorbed in whiteness. 
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Sample 7.6: Peter‘s eyes were fixed on his Xbox, but the Xbox was not in his 
experience at the moment of the beep.  Instead, at the moment of the beep, Peter 
sees a flash of intense, imagined redness. The redness is a solid, intense, fire 
engine red located only in the spot in which he is looking. 
Both sample 7.4 and 7.6 involve a visual absorption in intense color that is not actually 
immediately present in his real environment. In sample 5.2, Peter described a parallel 
auditory phenomenon: 
Sample 5.2: Peter was looking at an old black and white wall clock across the 
room. At the moment of the beep he is seeing the second hand snap from twenty-
two seconds to twenty-three seconds. He is focused on the movement of the 
second hand; he is not concerned with the time. In synch with the snap of the 
series of six-degree snap, snap, snap of the second hand, he innerly hears a sharp, 
metallic click, click, click sound, something like the sound he thinks the second 
hand might be making were he able to hear it. The metallic clicking is somehow 
present to him with each snap of the second hand, but it is not actually heard in 
the real world. (The sound is something like two knives being clicked together or 
the sound an M16 trigger makes when being tested). 
In this sample Peter was hearing in the absence of sound. Again, this appears to involve a 
manipulation of his sensory experience in such a way that he had created the experience 
of an appropriate clock-ticking sound in the absence of one. In another example of 
unusual sensory awareness, Peter is consumed by an almost-painful ringing in his ears.  
Sample 9.1: Peter was experiencing a completely consuming and loud ringing in 
his ears for at least several seconds. This ringing was so loud that he either did not 
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hear or did not cognitively register that the beep was going off until after the 
ringing in his ears stopped. At the approximate moment of the beep Peter is 
completely consumed by the ringing in his ears. The ringing is intensely loud, 
clear, pure and high-pitched; approximately a 5000 Hz tone [as roughly 
approximated using Audacity to create sine waves; 3520 seemed too low, 7040 
seemed too high]. It is in his ears and inside his head. The sound is almost painful 
and is accompanied by or creates a strong pressure pushing from inside his head 
outwards in all directions.  
 As previously discussed, Peter’s sensory awareness experiences increase 3-fold 
following sampling day 4. A parallel decrease in other phenomena is noted in the days 
following sampling day 4. This was a dramatic change in his reports of the content of his 
inner experience.  Given that the frequent reports of sensory awareness came after he 
became better able to report on his experience at the moment of the beep and that these 
changes were not anticipated by him nor were they consistent with his presuppositions 
about his experience, it does appear that sensory awareness is a major component of 
Peter’s inner experience.  The increase in the frequency of his reports of sensory 
awareness were also accompanied by Peter saying that the process of sampling had been 
very helpful to him.   
Pain 
Peter’s reports of the experience of pain also changed fairly dramatically over 
time.  Five of Peter’s 46 samples (10%) involved pain-related experience, but four of 
these samples came during Peter’s first four days of sampling and only one came during 
days five through nine of sampling. As mentioned previously, upon starting the sampling 
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process, Peter described pain as being central to his daily experience; he stated several 
times that he experienced pain on an almost constant basis. However, over 9 days of 
sampling, Peter had only one “in pain” experience, which occurred during the first day of 
sampling. It is possible that as sampling progressed, Peter became less attached to this 
aspect of his self-concept (“I’m always in pain”), resulting in an absence of pain-related 
samples. 
The Doing of Pain 
However, Peter reported that he not only experienced pain on a constant basis, but 
also, separately, that he created pain in his body in an attempt to counteract the naturally 
occurring pain. In other words, he stated he was able to create bodily pain despite the fact 
that there was not any immediate, physical cause of pain. Peter stated that he created pain 
in order to counteract or reduce his existing pain. Focusing on the creation of pain, 
according to Peter, reduced the impact of the pain already ongoing in his body. In other 
words, Peter said he used this pain-creation as a coping mechanism.  
He described a very complex and sophisticated process by which he created pain. 
This process began with creating pain in an area of his body contralateral to the area of 
already-existing pain and then “spread” his created pain evenly throughout the rest of his 
body in a generally ordered manner – working upward or downward until he had created 
pain everywhere. He reported that he was unable to specifically create a certain type of 
pain (e.g., aching, stabbing, sharp, dull, etc.); that part of the pain-creation was out of his 
control. As is clear, Peter had spent a great deal of time considering his pain and the 
process of pain creation; he appeared particularly attached to his pain concepts.  
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Interestingly, Peter experienced the phenomenon of pain-creation in four samples, 
three of which occurred during the first four days of sampling. Two of Peter’s four pain-
creation samples are presented below so that the reader can gain a better understanding of 
his “pain-creation” descriptions. Because we encountered Peter’s pain-creation even on 
the final day of sampling, it is possible that Peter did in fact have an accurate view of his 
tendency to engage in this act (more accurate than his belief of “always” being in 
physical pain). 
Sample 4.1: At the moment of the beep Peter is producing pain in his left 
shoulder. He has just started this process and doesn’t feel any pain yet. He has 
excluded the rest of the world and is entirely concentrating on a specific, thin area 
about the diameter of a pen in the soft part of his shoulder, just below the bony 
part. 
Sample 9.2: Peter was creating pain throughout his body. Just prior to the beep 
Peter was focused on creating pain in his right thigh. At the moment of the beep 
Peter is feeling pain he created that feels like a charley horse in his right thigh [the 
pain was not intended to feel like a charley horse specifically, but it ended up 
randomly feeling this way]. At the same time Peter innerly sees the top of his own 
thigh in front of him, laid out horizontally. The thigh is fuzzy, black and white, a 
2D outline that includes veins, arteries, bones, but no skin. Peter is trying to see 
the inside middle of his thigh.  
Inner Seeing – Visual Violence and the Absence of Emotion 
 Six of Peter’s samples (13%) involved inner seeing; of these six samples, four 
occurred after the fourth sampling day.  There were two unusual features of Peter’s inner 
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seeing that were present in five out of the six samples of inner seeing.  The first was the 
presence of graphically violent content.  The second was a complete lack of any feeling, 
despite the seemingly emotion-laden content of the inner seeings. Here are those five 
instances of inner seeing: 
Sample 3.2: Peter was in class. At the moment of the beep Peter is innerly seeing 
himself strangling Carl. Peter is clearly seeing himself and Carl, head to toe, from 
a third-person perspective, the seen-Peter on the left and Carl on the right.  They 
(Seen Peter and Carl) are both wearing their white culinary school uniforms and 
standing in their culinary school classroom.  Real Peter sees tan walls and tables 
and chairs around them (apparently an accurate recreation of the actual classroom 
except that there are no people in the imaginary classroom other than Seen Peter 
and Carl, and there are many other students in the real classroom). Real Peter sees 
Seen Peter’s hands around Carl’s neck; the veins in Seen Peter’s hands and arms 
are pulsating. Carl is dead as a result of the strangling. Seen Peter is staring into 
Carl’s eyes, and this is Real Peter’s focus. Seen Peter is feeling sad, confused, 
angry, all at once, which Real Peter can tell by Seen Peter’s facial expression, but 
Real Peter is not experiencing any emotion. At the same time, Real Peter hears the 
dull buzz of voices in the room; these voices sound like they’re coming from 
behind him. 
Sample 5.6: At the moment of the beep Peter is innerly seeing himself pulling the 
skin off of a woman’s face. He is seeing this from the first person perspective; his 
right hand is reaching out in front of him, and is holding the woman’s face, 
pulling the skin away from the face. The skin is stretched out tightly and is about 
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to rip. He can see her eyes pointed upwards because of the angle of the pulled 
skin.  He is seeing only his hand and the woman’s face and head – she has long, 
curly blond hair. There is no background. 
Sample 7.1: Peter was sitting in the dark, at home. At the moment of the beep he 
innerly sees himself stab someone in the side of the face. He sees his hand moving 
from the right to the left holding a knife horizontally, stabbing the face from the 
side. He sees his hand, the knife hilt and blade and the tip of the blade piercing the 
skin of the cheek. The face he is stabbing is blurry and unclear, except for the spot 
being stabbed, which is clear. He knows this face to be the face of the “enemy.”  
Sample 8.1: Peter was sitting at home on his couch, and was purposefully 
fantasizing about harming his ex-wife. At the moment of the beep Peter innerly 
sees his ex-wife lying on a stainless-steel countertop; she is nude and the top 3 
layers of her skin have been peeled off by him, leaving a uniformly red tinge to 
her body from head to toe. Peter sees himself standing over her body and pouring 
liquid sodium-iodide onto her body – the beep occurs when the liquid is pouring 
out of its container but has not yet hit her body (it is in midstream). Peter sees, 
from a perspective slightly above and looking obliquely down, the right side of 
his own body from head to toe, standing over his ex-wife who is seen lying on a 
stainless steel table, her feet pointed toward where he is viewing the scene from. 
Her head is obscured by his body. To the center of this seeing is the pouring of the 
liquid onto her body, but Peter also sees details of the room, including windowed 
walls, knives and other tools used for skinning his ex-wife and an IV hooked into 
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her arm.  The ex-wife is alive; the object of this imaginary skinning and pouring is 
to inflict a maximum amount of pain—salt into open wounds, head to toe. 
Sample 8.5: Peter was at an auto-shop and a mechanic named Ryan was talking 
to him about car-parts. At the moment of the beep Peter innerly sees himself, from 
a first person perspective, punching Ryan in the face. Peter is most focused on the 
ripples in Ryan’s facial skin, created by the impact of the punch. The ripples are 
moving outward from the site of impact, from the cheek area toward the temple, 
and each ripple is distinct and markedly slowed down in time, such that it takes 
about two seconds for the ripples to travel from the point of impact to the ear (an 
event that would happen in real life in a fraction of a second).  However the 
rippling motion does not seem slowed down to Peter. Peter also sees his forearm 
and fist, and Ryan’s body from about the chest up, although Ryan’s body is non-
descript and blurry.  Thus Peter sees himself hit Ryan in the face and sees the 
resulting skin ripples, all in one seeing that seems quite natural.  But on closer 
examination, the hitting takes place at the usual pace whereas the ripples are 
dramatically slowed, even though all seems quite natural and not time altered. 
The first striking aspect of all of these samples is their violent nature. All five samples 
involve particularly violent acts towards others. Peter’s descriptions all involve a great 
deal of detail regarding the violent acts with a focus on the physical damage being 
inflicted. Of further interest is the fact that in all five samples the violence is being 
perpetrated by Peter, and he is imagining either hurting, killing or torturing the 
individuals involved. The vividness of these inner seeing is also consistent with the 
sensory focus present in many of Peter’s other samples.  
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The second striking aspect of the above samples is the seeming lack of directly 
experienced feeling in the presence of apparently on-going emotion, specifically, some 
form of anger. For example, in sample 8.5 Peter said that his intention in this seeing was 
to see the skin ripples: “I wonder what the ripples would look like if I hit Ryan in the 
face?” When asked whether he was angry, Peter said no; it was as if a scientist were 
interested in the rippling phenomena.  However, subsequent interview revealed that 
before the beep Ryan had indeed said something that had annoyed Peter. So it seems 
reasonable to understand this as viewed from the omniscient perspective as follows: Ryan 
annoyed Peter.  Rather than experience the anger or even annoyance emotion directly, 
Peter innerly saw something related to anger.  But the distancing from the anger was 
double in this seeing: Not only did he innerly see rather than directly feel the anger, but 
the inner seeing was estranged from the anger itself: He did not see himself as angrily 
hitting Ryan, he saw himself as scientifically hitting Ryan.   
That is similar to other of his inner seeings. In sample 8.1 Peter was innerly 
seeing himself torture his ex-wife in a very science-like and precisely imagined way; 
again when asked whether he was angry, Peter said no and again, following subsequent 
interviewing, Peter verbalized intense dislike for, even hatred toward, his ex-wife. In 
sample 7.1 Peter was innerly seeing himself stab a face that represented to him “the 
enemy.” In this sample, like the others, Peter said that he was not angry, but was simply 
fantasizing the act of stabbing the enemy. However, at other times Peter had expressed 
his anger toward those who had inflicted harm upon him and his fellow soldiers in 
combat, presumably those others were “the enemy” represented in Peter’s inner seeing. 
The remaining two samples appear to encapsulate the same phenomenon, although we 
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did not at the time question Peter regarding whether he’d ever had feelings (positive or 
negative) for the blond woman in sample 5.6, or Carl in sample 3.2. As far as we can 
understand, three (and likely all five) of Peter’s inner seeing samples involve violently 
acting out anger toward other individuals without the direct experience of any emotion.  
Peter described his inner seeings as usually purposeful fantasies for which he 
would sometimes set aside time during the day. His fantasies involved extremely precise, 
detailed and graphic depictions of violence with no associated experience of emotion. It 
is possible that Peter’s violent inner images are a tool he uses, either consciously or 
unconsciously, to distance himself from the experience of negative emotions. Consistent 
with this possibility is the absence of any reports of directly experienced emotion in 
Peter’s samples. Peter reported no feelings (positive or negative) throughout the course of 
sampling, suggesting he may have learned to use his fantasies or inner seeings to remove 
himself from or as a substitute for feeling experiences. 
Peter reported one additional inner seeing experience that did not fit the patterns 
of the inner seeings described above.  
Sample 2.2: Peter was sitting on the couch doing nothing in particular. At the 
moment of the beep Peter is innerly himself sitting on the couch. He is seeing 
himself from a perspective behind and slightly above and to the left.  He sees only 
lines, a curved solid, sketched line representing the left side of his face, another 
curved line representing the right side of the back of his head, and another curved 
line representing his left ear. He is seeing some straight lines that represent the 
walls and floor and couch.  Thus he sees only outlines—he does not see what is in 
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between the outlines—as if he is seeing a pencil or charcoal sketch.  Everything 
he’s seeing looks as though it is sketched with a charcoal pencil.  
This example of inner seeing seems to be somehow related to Peter’s focus on sensory 
experiences and his frequent purposeful alteration of these sensory experiences.  Here he 
is not simply seeing himself as he is but instead he is seeing a stylized or abstracted, 
sketched version of himself.  It is as if he effortfully, perhaps unconsciously or 
automatically, altered what might otherwise be an inner seeing of himself as he existed at 
that moment.   
Additional Phenomena  
Inner speaking. 
 Peter had inner speaking in only two of his 39 (5%) samples. He reported possible 
inner speaking in a third sample, but was very unsure whether he was speaking out loud 
or speaking innerly at the moment of the beep. Unlike his highly detailed inner seeings, 
Peter’s inner speaking was somewhat underdeveloped.  
Sample 5.4: Peter was at home, trying to find his sunglasses. At the moment of 
the beep Peter is innerly saying “glasses” over and over again [“glasses, glasses, 
glasses….”] and is in shape-recognition mode, looking for the shape of his 
glasses. He is taking in his surroundings, from periphery to periphery, and sees 
everything in his surroundings simultaneously. He knows what he is looking for 
and has a sense that his glasses will jump out at him when he sees them, but this is 
not clearly in his experience. 
Sample 8.2: Peter was wondering about what type of lawyer he needed. At the 
moment of the beep Peter is innerly saying the word ‘lawyer’ in a flat tone of 
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voice. He was engaged in wondering about what type of lawyer he needs, but that 
wondering was not in his awareness at the beep.   
In both these examples, Peter’s inner speaking is somewhat rudimentary, consisting of 
just one word each time. His experience is not of typical inner speaking but something 
less sophisticated. In another sample, Peter is experiencing what seems to be particularly 
underdeveloped inner speaking, bordering on wordless speaking or unsymbolized 
thinking, but not quite either of those. 
Sample 8.4: Peter was working on his car getting ready to tighten a bolt with a 
ratchet. At the moment of the beep he is thinking, “lefty loosey, righty tighty.” 
This thought does not involve clear words or images but is unfolding over time 
such that the beep occurs at the pause between ‘loosey’ and ‘righty’ as if the 
thinking has some kind of rhythm or temporality even though it does not have 
words.  
These underdeveloped or rudimentary instances of inner speaking stand in stark contrast 
to Peter’s instances of detailed inner seeing and his moments of vivid sensory experience.  
These moments of inner speaking were also quite rare.  Thus inner speaking does not 
seem to be a central part of Peter’s inner experience.   
Visual vigilance. 
 Peter also reported four instances of what we have termed “vigilance.” Two of his 
four vigilance samples occurred on the first day of sampling and again, closely paralleled 
the descriptions Peter had given of himself prior to the start of sampling. In addition to 
describing to us his chronic pain, Peter also shared that he is an extremely hypervigilant 
individual. He described a tendency to “see everything at once” and to be able to take in 
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his surroundings quickly and efficiently in order to assess the level of safety of his 
environment; he said that he developed this skill in the military and it continued into 
civilian life. On the first sampling day Peter described two very detailed instances of 
vigilance, the first being a more “visual” form of vigilance.  
Sample 1.2: Peter was walking through the casino at the Luxor.  His eyes were 
aimed at a security guard in front of him, but Peter was not experiencing him. At 
the moment of the beep Peter is paying attention to the people all around him. 
Specifically, he is looking at the mirror reflection of the 13 people behind him. 
The mirror is a thin mirror about 3 inches wide located on a pillar 45 degrees off 
to Peter’s right. Peter is looking at the reflection of the people in this mirror with 
his peripheral vision (his eyes are pointed forward), and is seeing 13 people 
reflected in the mirror.  He is paying attention to the details of each person he is 
seeing in the reflection. This was understood to be a direct seeing of the reflection 
of these people.  [When it was pointed out to Peter that what he was seeing 
seemed to violate the geometry of optics, Peter’s conviction that he was actually 
seeing the reflection of 13 people was not swayed]. At the same time he is having 
the thought that he hates people walking behind him; this thought is in his direct 
experience but does not include words or images. At the same time Peter is 
innerly seeing the badge of the security officer who is standing in front of him. He 
is seeing the gold badge with black lettering that reads “J.D. Minnesota.” He is 
seeing the badge about a foot out in front of him and to the upper left. The seeing 
of the badge is less clear than the actual seeing of the reflection of the people in 
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the mirror.  Peter is also aware of the 6 people off to his left and the about 20 
people in front of him. 
In this sample, Peter meant the numbers 13 and 6 to be taken literally—that is not 
approximately 13.  But he was not entirely consistent: 6 became 7 in a subsequent telling, 
and 13 became 15.  Peter appeared powerfully attached to the notion of being 
hypervigilant, and in-line with his firmly held belief, even when inconsistencies or 
impossibilities of what he was describing were pointed out, he was somewhat resistant. 
Peter reported two more instance of this “vigilance” on the fifth and seventh days of 
sampling. However, although the phenomenon was the same, it appeared that the 
vigilance was “toned down” at least in Peter’s description, in comparison to his 
description in sample 1.2.  
Sample 5.4: Peter was at home, trying to find his sunglasses. At the moment of 
the beep Peter is innerly saying “glasses” over and over again [“glasses, glasses, 
glasses….”] and is in shape-recognition mode, looking for the shape of his 
glasses. He is taking in his surroundings, from periphery to periphery, and sees 
everything in his surroundings simultaneously. He knows what he is looking for 
and has a sense that his glasses will jump out at him when he sees them, but this is 
not clearly in his experience. 
Sample 7.5: Peter had just walked into an audio store. At the moment of the beep 
Peter is vigilantly taking in his surroundings. He is taking in his surroundings 
from periphery to periphery and sees everything simultaneously; however, his 
eyes are pointed forward, unmoving. Although he is looking at everything, 
nothing is particularly in focus. The vigilant taking in is done with the purpose of 
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finding anything that may be out of place or dangerous, but this is not in his 
awareness at the moment of the beep. 
In sample 5.4 Peter is visually vigilant or aware of his environment, however his 
vigilance is not safety-based but is instead a “searching” vigilance. In sample 7.5 Peter 
was taking in or seeing his entire environment without scanning or moving his eyes. This 
seeing was vigilant and purposeful, done presumably in the pursuit of safety.   
Finally, Peter described a slightly differing version of vigilance that involved the 
same intense awareness of his environment, however it appears that in this instance we 
have “caught him” just following the initial visual scanning phase and he appears to have 
“honed” his attention in on a potential threat. 
Sample 1.5: Peter was sitting in the corner booth of a restaurant at the Orleans, 
rapidly surveying each individual person in his environment, one at a time, from 
close right to far left. At the moment of the beep Peter is looking at a guy dressed 
in all black and wearing a Raider’s shirt, black shoes with a blue stripe, with a 
scar on his face and an earring in his right ear.  This man is about 30-40 feet 
away, at Peter’s 10 o’clock. He is paying most attention to the guy’s facial 
expression, trying to determine whether the guy is a “go/green checkmark/good” 
or a “no-go/red X/bad.” Peter is enraged, his fists clenching, jaw clenching so 
hard that he worried (after the beep) he might shatter his teeth, but this rage is not 
in his awareness at the moment of the beep.  He wants to fight, is in the kind of 
mood where he will pick a fight with someone (anyone), wants to break the arm 
of the guy in the black shirt, but none of that is directly in his experience at the 
moment of the beep.  
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The two examples in which Peter reports experiencing vigilance most consistent 
with his presupposition about always scanning the environment for danger and attending 
to many aspects of the environment simultaneously were on the first day of sampling 
when it was difficult to be confident that Peter was apprehending and describing his 
actual experience.  The two later examples of vigilance share the feature of Peter 
scanning or seeing the entire environment at once without his focus shifting from one 
area of his visual field to another.  Thus it seems reasonable to be more confident about 
this aspect of his vigilance more so than his description of being able to attend to many 
detailed aspects of his visual field simultaneously.   
Discussion 
Overall, Peter’s inner experience consisted mostly of an absorption in or noticing 
of the sensory aspects of his environment; almost half of his samples involved this 
sensory awareness. What is particularly interesting about Peter is the “evolution” of his 
sampling – we see an increase in the reporting of sensory awareness following the fourth 
day of sampling, and an equal decrease in pain-reports. However, the doing of pain 
instances continued throughout the course of sampling and were highly unusual and not 
seen in previous DES studies. As mentioned previously, it is unclear why exactly this 
shift occurred, but hypotheses include an increase in comfort with the sampling process 
and the interviewers, increasing skill at apprehending his inner experience, actual change 
in his inner experience as the result of sampling and/or possibly as some loosening of his 
previously firmly-held beliefs about his inner experience. Peter also experienced a series 
of graphic, violent inner seeing samples that occurred in the absence of any directly 
experienced emotion. We hypothesize that these inner seeings are Peter’s way of 
 159 
indirectly experiencing, or “relieving” himself of, feelings such as anger, rage and hatred; 
this becomes especially meaningful when considering the fact that Peter did not report a 
single feeling-experience throughout the course of sampling (or in our discussions with 
him outside of sampling).  There were some instances where Peter experienced visual 
vigilance where he was attending to his entire visual field at once.  There was little 
evidence that inner speaking was a salient feature of Peter’s inner experience with only a 
few instances of very rudimentary inner speaking being observed over the nine days of 
sampling. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Idiographic Description of Geoff’s Experience 
 Geoff was a 28 year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us in March and April 
2010. He was deployed with the Army to Iraq from 2005 to 2006 and again for 15 
months from 2007 to 2009. During his first deployment Geoff stated his military 
occupational specialty was a mechanic but he was involved in raids and ambushes on a 
regular basis. During his second tour, Geoff reported that he experienced more boredom, 
but also had more time to think, causing him to experience, in his own words, more 
thoughts “that mess with your mind about everything you’ve done.” He described a 
number of traumatic incidents throughout his time in Iraq, and he endorsed significant 
symptomatology of posttraumatic stress disorder. Geoff also described a long family 
history of military involvement, and exhibited a great deal of pride in his family’s history 
as well as his own military history. He described his training and his deployment 
experiences as rewarding overall and a source of pride. 
Geoff collected a total of 31 samples over 6 sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. Two of his 31 samples 
occurred while he was sleeping and therefore will not be discussed. Please refer to Table 
9 for frequencies of inner experience phenomena for Geoff. 
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Table 9 
 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Geoff (17 samples) 
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Sensory 
Awareness 10 59 
Vigilance 
(internal and 
external) 
8 47 
Flashback 2 12 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 1 6 
Feeling 1 6 
Inner Speaking 0 0 
Inner Seeing 0 0 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
The Evolution of Sampling 
What was particularly striking about Geoff was that, unlike our other participants, 
Geoff seemed to experience significant difficulty with the DES task throughout the 
sampling process. Geoff’s difficulty with the task was apparent from the first day of 
sampling. He appeared to have difficulty understanding the concept of the moment of the 
beep, despite discussions about the moment of the beep during our expositional 
interview. However, difficulty with sampling on the first day is not entirely uncommon, 
which is why we usually discard samples from that day. But Geoff’s difficulty with 
comprehension of the task appeared to continue well beyond the first day. His lack of 
clarity about the moment of the beep became especially apparent on the third day of 
sampling. Geoff’s initial report of his experience ‘at the moment of the beep’ in a 
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particular sample (sample 3.2) was that he was looking for a pen to write in his notebook 
as a result of the beep. Therefore, it appeared on that occasion (and likely on other 
occasions), Geoff was reporting his experience immediately following the beep, and not 
just prior to the beep as instructed.  
During our expositional interview with Geoff on this third day of sampling we 
belabored the concept of the moment of the beep, using examples and metaphors until we 
were satisfied that Geoff had a better understanding of the concept of the moment of the 
beep. Geoff indicated that he did in fact understand the concept and would incorporate 
his new understanding into future sampling days. However, Geoff’s struggle with the 
sampling process appeared to continue on the fourth through sixth days of sampling 
though his clarity increased somewhat.  
Although we believe that Geoff was better able to complete the sampling task 
following the third day of sampling, we must still approach all his samples with a certain 
degree of skepticism. Geoff’s difficulty in accessing the moment of the beep may have 
been a result of the nature of his inner experience; perhaps some feature of his experience 
prevented him from gaining access to the moment of the beep (i.e., his experiential 
process was so fragmented that he was unable to home in on just one moment in time). 
Perhaps Geoff was not dedicated to the DES task in general; perhaps he did not take the 
time or effort to understand the task. However, Geoff reported on several occasions that 
he found the task intriguing and that he took the task seriously. Furthermore Geoff 
consistently came to his appointments, participated fully and with apparent good humor 
in all expositional interviews, despite our tough questions, and often comment on the 
sampling process.  It is also possible that the presuppositions of the investigators 
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somehow interfered with our ability to apprehend Geoff’s experience because it was so 
different from our own. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, the fact that we had 
two and usually three investigators present for Geoff’s expositional interviews and that 
we attempted to bracket our presuppositions as best we could makes this explanation 
seem unlikely. Regardless of the source of our skepticism, we never became fully 
convinced of Geoff’s reliability in reporting his momentary experience. 
For the reasons discussed, prudence suggests we should be cautious about 
interpreting samples from the first three days of Geoff’s sampling.  Therefore, the first 14 
samples (days 1 through 3) will not be fully discussed unless they aid in clarifying his 
later experiences.  We remain aware of the possibility that Geoff may never have clearly 
understood the moment of the beep or the sampling process, but we believe that his 
abilities improved following the third day of sampling. 
The Prominence of Sensory Awareness 
The most common feature of Geoff’s inner experience was sensory awareness.  
Either the presence or the recognition of sensory awareness changed substantially over 
the course of his sampling.  Specifically, Geoff reported sensory awareness during the 
first day of sampling and it was evident in 3 (25%) of his 12 samples during the first three 
days; but it was present in 10 (59%) of his 17 samples from days 4-6.  This pattern is 
consistent with the notion that sensory awareness is a core feature of Geoff’s inner 
experience and that he became better at recognizing it as he improved his ability to focus 
on the moment of the beep and to apprehend his inner experience.  
Of the 10 instances of sensory awareness occurring during sampling days 4 
through 6, 8 (47%) were externally-focused and 2 (11%) were bodily. Geoff’s externally-
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focused sensory awareness included focusing on single color or sounds within his 
environment.  
Sample 4.1: Geoff was setting up his Xbox to play a video game and the lower 
half of the TV screen was green. At the moment of the beep Geoff is completely 
absorbed in the greenness.  
Sample 5.2: At the moment of the beep Geoff is listening to a Johnny Cash song; 
he is completely absorbed in the song.  
Sample 6.2: Geoff was outside, watching a lady walk by with a large, dark brown 
dog on a leash. At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in the brownness of 
the dog’s fur. 
As these examples show, Geoff’s instances of externally-focused sensory awareness were 
quite simple and were typical of moments of sensory awareness reported by other 
participants.  
Geoff also experienced two instances of bodily sensory awareness that involved 
intense pain.  
Sample 5.3: At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in back pain. The pain 
is intense (greater than 10 on a 10-point scale), sharp, stabbing, like many sharp 
objects bilaterally stabbing into his sides just above his hips, moving horizontally 
toward and past the center of his lower back/spine.  
Sample 5.6: Geoff had just stubbed the toes of his right foot on the doorframe to 
his room. At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in severe pain. The pain is 
in the smaller toes of his right foot and is intense, sharp and stabbing.  
The Experience of Vigilance 
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 Geoff reported a phenomenon we have termed vigilance in eight of his 17 
samples (47%) from the fourth, fifth and sixth days of sampling. Geoff’s vigilance was in 
some ways similar to the vigilance reported by other participants in this study (i.e., 
externally-focused); however, Geoff’s vigilance also included several instances of 
internally focused vigilance or self-monitoring. He was usually monitoring or noticing his 
internal level of calmness or relaxedness and was insistent throughout sampling that he 
was not feeling calm or relaxed, but was noticing that he was calm or relaxed at any given 
moment.  
A typical example in which Geoff is experiencing externally-focused vigilance, in 
which he is “monitoring” his surroundings as part of his experience, is presented below: 
Sample 4.4: Geoff was playing a fighting game on the Xbox and was intent on 
killing the bad guy character. At the moment of the beep Geoff is intensely 
focused on beating the bad guy and is playing aggressively. At the same time 
Geoff feels aggressiveness, his heart is beating a little faster. Geoff is also, 
directly in his experience but at a low level, monitoring his surroundings, keeping 
track of who is there, what is happening. 
Similarly to sample 4.4, several of Geoff’s vigilance reports involved him 
engaged in some other task while simultaneously, though less saliently in his experience, 
monitoring his surroundings:  
Sample 6.5: Geoff was at home and there was a good deal of commotion going 
on around him – Rachel and her mother were speaking, Rachel was talking to 
Junior, the A/C had just come on and was noisy, the scent of food was in the air, 
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and Geoff and Peter were trying to watch a movie. At the moment of the beep 
Geoff is aware of all these sensations in his surroundings.  
In other instances, the vigilance was the primary or only aspect in his experience: 
Sample 6.3: Geoff was walking out of his house towards his car. At the moment 
of the beep Geoff sees an orange-juice container that’s on the sidewalk, the 
orange on the juice container, and a guy walking by on the sidewalk all at the 
same time. The container, the orange and the guy walking are all lined up in a 
straight line from Geoff’s perspective in a way that is striking to him. These 
objects and their configuration strike Geoff as odd/unusual/out of the ordinary/out 
of place/weird somehow; this is not a thought but is somehow present to Geoff. 
Geoff is intently, vigilantly focused on these objects and the surroundings, though 
his visual taking in of the greater surroundings may not have occurred until just 
after the beep. 
 As mentioned above, several of Geoff’s samples involved the experience of 
internally-focused vigilance, or self monitoring:  
Sample 6.4: Geoff had just had a conversation with his girlfriend that had left him 
happy and calm. At the moment of the beep Geoff is somehow noticing that he is 
calm/relaxed both mentally and physically. The physical calmness exists 
throughout his body.  
Geoff reported this noticing or monitoring of his calmness on several occasions. He was 
not simply feeling calm (or happy, or relaxed), but instead was somehow vigilantly 
monitoring his level of calmness (or happiness or relaxedness) as if to reassure himself 
that he was indeed calm (or happy or relaxed). This phenomenon was unusual to us, and 
 167 
we often met Geoff’s reports of self-monitoring with intense, direct questioning. In fact, 
Geoff reported this self-monitoring from the first day of sampling, and despite our 
interrogations, never backed down from his self-monitoring claims.  
Sample 4.2: Geoff was watching Peter play a video game on the Xbox. He had 
been thinking about how well his relationship with his current girlfriend was 
going. At the moment of the beep Geoff is directly experiencing himself as being 
mentally and physically very happy. This happiness manifests physically as 
relaxedness/at-easeness in his body, which Geoff is noticing at the moment of the 
beep. Geoff is also, directly in his experience but at a low level, monitoring his 
surroundings, keeping track of who is there, what is happening. 
In the above example Geoff is monitoring both his internal self and his external 
environment. We never became 100% convinced of Geoff’s reports of “internal 
vigilance.” It is possible that Geoff’s self-narrative includes the belief that he is, at all 
times, aware of his internal levels of calmness. In fact Geoff reported that he believes this 
to be true; that he is always, to some degree, monitoring his internal levels of calmness 
just as he is always, to some degree, monitoring his surrounding environment. It is 
possible that this belief interfered with his ability to report in-experience phenomena. 
However, despite his claims that he is always actively monitoring himself and his 
environment, Geoff did not report these phenomena in every sample as would be 
expected if his belief were accurate. 
Other Phenomena 
Flashbacks. 
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Geoff reported two flashbacks, moments when he experienced reliving events 
from his past. One came on the third day of sampling and the second came on the fifth 
day of sampling. In both instances Geoff was unclear as to the details of the experience 
and altered his descriptions as we questioned him. Geoff did not say his flashback 
experiences were distressing or trauma-related. In fact, he described one flashback 
(sample 3.3) as rather calm and relaxed. 
Sample 3.3: Geoff was sitting outside with Peter. Everything was perfect, the 
weather was warm and the sun was setting. The setting sun reminded Geoff of 
being in Iraq. At the moment of the beep Geoff is reliving an experience in Iraq. 
He is in Iraq, standing in a concrete tower, watching the sunset. This reliving is 
multisensory and contains many true-to-life elements including his friend 
standing just to his right, Arabic prayers in the background, hedgehogs playing in 
the field below, and his M16 leaning to his left.  
It should be noted that Geoff could not say which of these aspects were being 
experienced at the moment of the beep. As discussed previously, it is likely that he had 
not yet grasped the concept of the moment of the beep. It is also possible that he was 
experiencing all these aspects at one time, or that his consciousness was so interrupted by 
or absorbed in this flashback that he was later unable to tease the various elements of the 
experience apart. Geoff’s second flashback experience occurred on the fifth day of 
sampling.  
Sample 5.5: Geoff was in his room watching his white football jersey flapping in 
the wind. At the moment of the beep Geoff is, experientially, in Iraq. He is in a 
Humvee holding onto the steel handle of a 50-caliber machine gun. He feels the 
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coldness of the triggers of the gun on both thumbs. He sees a white flag ahead of 
him. The seen flag is a large piece of white fabric, maybe a bed-sheet or a dress.  
Geoff’s flashback was the beginning of a scene in which Geoff’s platoon had been 
ambushed by a group of Iraqi soldiers pretending to surrender. The ambush had turned 
into a sustained firefight in which quite a few people were killed. The battle had not yet 
begun in Geoff’s flashback. Geoff believed that the flashback was triggered by seeing his 
white football jersey moving in the wind, which was similar to the way the white flag in 
Iraq had been moving that day. It should be noted that Geoff’s description of this 
flashback was inconsistent. Initially he stated that he was absorbed in the whiteness of the 
flag. Later he stated that he was absorbed not in the whiteness of the flag but in the 
significance of the flag (that the flag stands for surrender, or that the surrender is a ploy). 
It was unclear to us whether Geoff’s inconsistency was a matter of a lack of clear 
understanding of the moment of the beep, or whether, as mentioned previously, Geoff’s 
consciousness was interrupted to such an extent by this flashback or reliving experience 
that he was unable to tease apart and accurately report on the details of the experience. It 
is possible that the flashback experience was so jarring to Geoff’s awareness that the 
details became difficult to decipher afterwards. Of course, because we only saw two 
flashback experiences, we are unable to say much more at this point. 
Feeling. 
 The closest Geoff came to reporting feeling occurred in one sample, on the fourth 
day of sampling (sample 4.4, see above). In this sample Geoff was aggressively playing a 
videogame, focused on beating the bad guy. He said he was feeling aggressive toward a 
videogame character he was attempting to defeat, and that that was accompanied by an 
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elevated heart rate. However, aggressiveness is not usually considered a feeling, and we 
cannot be certain how he experienced this. Although Geoff did not report any other 
instances of directly-experienced feeling, Geoff was, in several samples, monitoring his 
internal levels of calm and happiness. This monitoring is orthogonally related to the 
experience of feelings. Geoff was very clear that he was not necessarily feeling calm or 
happy at any given instance, but was instead noticing his calmness/happiness. He was not 
experiencing feeling but was instead monitoring his levels of ongoing emotion. 
Thinking. 
Geoff had no instances of inner speaking in any of his samples, and one possible 
instance of unsymbolized thinking.  
Sample 5.1: Geoff was in his room. At the moment of the beep he hears the 
engine sound of a low, fast-flying F-18. He is absorbed in the sound of the plane. 
Geoff is also having a simultaneous, general mental process about how low and 
fast the plane is flying.  
It was unclear during the interview whether Geoff was actually separately thinking about 
the lowness/fastness of the plane or whether he was just absorbed in the sound of the 
plane, and in his explanation to us, described the sound as one that would come from a 
low, fast plane. Regardless, there is very little experienced thinking in any of Geoff’s 
samples.  Finally, Geoff had no instances of inner seeing in any of his samples. 
Discussion 
Geoff sampled with us for 6 days and collected a total of 29 samples during that 
time. Geoff struggled with the descriptive experience sampling task, from initially being 
unclear regarding the concept of “the moment of the beep” to apparently struggling to 
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capture, describe and apprehend his inner experience. Although his ability to capture and 
describe his experience seemed to improve somewhat over the course of sampling, it was 
evident that Geoff did not become fully proficient at the task of sampling in the 6 days 
we met with him. Geoff’s continued difficulty with the task is unusual based upon our 
previous sampling experience. It is likely that his difficulty with the task speaks to 
something unique about Geoff’s experience itself, and is unlikely to be indicative of a 
simple lack of effort or interest in the task.   
Despite his struggles with the task, Geoff reported sensory awareness consistently 
throughout the course of sampling. Furthermore, his reports of sensory awareness 
increased in frequency as sampling progressed and his ability to do the task improved. 
Geoff’s sensory awareness descriptions were much clearer than his other experiences; he 
was better able to describe these instances, and appeared much more confident in his 
descriptions than he was when describing other experiential phenomena. When 
describing his sensory awareness experiences Geoff remained consistent, whereas his 
reports tended to change when attempting to describe and discuss more complex 
experiential phenomena. For example, Geoff often struggled when describing his 
“internal vigilance” or self-monitoring.  
Geoff had no clear feeling experiences but often described his tendency to 
“monitor” his calmness. It may be that feelings are problematic for Geoff – that he is 
unable to clearly apprehend his feelings, or perhaps that he does not have nuanced feeling 
experiences. The monitoring of calmness may very well be a conscious effort by Geoff to 
maintain control over his emotions, emotions that are not clearly apprehended by Geoff. 
For example, in sample 5.6 when he stubbed his toe, Geoff described his experience as 
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primarily sensory awareness (absorption in pain) but also mentioned, several times, 
significant anger following the stubbing of his toe. In other samples that occurred earlier 
in the course of sampling (days 1 and 2), Geoff described similar instances in which he 
was, for example, tightly gripping his steering wheel out of anger without the experience 
of anger being present at the moment of the beep. Taken together, Geoff’s samples of 
monitoring his calmness and his lack of experienced feelings may suggest that the direct 
experience and management of feelings is problematic for him. 
Geoff had essentially no experience related to thinking (e.g., inner speaking, 
unsymbolized thinking). This absence of thinking experience may be an indicator that 
Geoff had little in the way of “clear” experience outside of the phenomenon of sensory 
awareness. If experience itself is conceptualized as a skill, individuals who have complex 
thinking experience (or more complex experience in general) tend to be more highly 
skilled “experiencers” whereas in Geoff’s case, we see an individual who is rather 
unskilled at creating and apprehending experience. Geoff’s previously mentioned 
tendency to alter his descriptions when discussing non-sensory awareness related, 
somewhat more complex instances of experience, provides further evidence for his lack 
of skill in creation and apprehension of experience. It is possible that an inability to 
separate himself from his presuppositions hampers Geoff’s ability to clearly apprehend 
and describe his experience. Conversely, a lack of clearly apprehendable experience may 
cause Geoff to be more “tied” to his beliefs about the nature of his experience, and may 
therefore result in “messier” experience apprehension. For example, because Geoff has 
difficulty in clearly apprehending his inner experience, he may rely upon his 
presuppositions to “fill in the blanks” or account for the aspects of his experience he is 
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unable to apprehend. This “filling in” of the blanks then lends itself to changeable 
descriptions of inner experience. However, Geoff’s descriptions of sensory awareness 
remained unchanged or unchangeable, providing evidence for their clarity and veracity.  
Finally, Geoff’s reports of external vigilance fell within the realm of questionable 
experience. It is possible that the vigilance Geoff described was not actually experienced 
but instead was a strong presupposition, possibly as a result of his military training and 
expectations of himself in relation to that training. Geoff described a great deal of pride in 
his military history and the training he received while in the military. He often described 
the importance of being aware of his surroundings as part of being successful in the 
military. The fact that his reports of external vigilance became less frequent as sampling 
progressed provides additional evidence that some of his presuppositions were so 
powerful that he was unable to completely break away from them and his beliefs about 
himself, thereby interfering with his ability to clearly apprehend his inner experience. It is 
also possible that Geoff’s reports of experienced vigilance were faithful to his experience 
but that his vigilance was difficult for him to describe or otherwise difficult for him to 
clearly grasp.   
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CHAPTER 10 
Idiographic Description of Mark’s Experience 
 Mark was a 26 year-old Hispanic male who sampled with us during March and 
April 2010. Mark met criteria for significant PTSD symptomatology on the PCL-M and 
considered himself to have symptoms of PTSD following his two deployments to Iraq 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mark was not in treatment for PTSD at the time of 
sampling. Mark was in the Army as Infantry/Paratrooper for two tours in Iraq in which he 
was involved in several firefights and in what he referred to as “traditional warfare” 
including bursts of combat followed by several days of “quiet, thinking time.” Mark was 
involved in the initial invasion into Baghdad in 2002/2003 and was responsible for 
escorting convoys to and from the city, parachuting into and securing identified cities and 
locations, and airdropping equipment and supplies. He described several instances in 
which he was exposed to violence (e.g., observing severe beatings of civilians, soldiers 
being hit with shrapnel, a little girl holding a bomb which then exploded), improvised 
explosive device (IED) blasts and incoming gunfire. He described situations in which “all 
hell broke loose” and he was “very scared and shocked.” As Mark discussed his wartime 
experiences he became visibly anxious. He said he believed his military experiences 
impacted him in many ways, often negatively. He tried to seek treatment shortly 
following discharge from the military, but did not like the effects of medication and 
group psychotherapy was unhelpful. At that point, he decided to “live his life” and not 
“allow” his wartime experiences and PTSD symptoms to prevent him from 
accomplishing the things he wants to accomplish.  
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Mark collected a total of 46 samples over 8 sampling days and attended an 
expositional interview within 24 hours of each sampling day. After discarding the 
samples from the first day of sampling, we were left with 41 samples. The most salient 
phenomenon in Mark’s inner experience was unsymbolized thinking. As shown in Table 
10, 18 of Mark’s 41 samples (44%) involved unsymbolized thinking and sensory eight of 
his 41 samples (19%) sensory awareness. Five of his samples (12%) involved 
concentrated doing, three (7%) involved vigilance. Mark had three (7%) instances of 
inner speaking/worded thinking and three (7%) instances of inner seeing. Five of Mark’s 
41 samples (12%) involved multiple awareness. Two (4%) of his samples involved 
directly experienced feeling.  
 Table 10 
Frequency of Inner Experience Phenomena for Mark (41 samples) 
 
  
 Number of 
Samples 
Frequency (%) 
Sensory 
Awareness 8 19 
Vigilance  3 7 
Concentrated 
Doing 5 12 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 18 44 
Amusement 4 10 
Feeling 2 4 
Inner Speaking 
& Worded 
Thinking 
3 7 
Inner Seeing 3 7 
Note: All totals in the table are approximations. 
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Feeling 
Mark had samples that appeared to involve directly experienced and clearly 
apprehended feeling, presented below.  
Sample 6.3: Mark was driving in heavy traffic, attempting to change lanes but 
being blocked by the driver behind him. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
looking behind him, concentrating on finding a space in which to merge. At the 
same time he is feeling frustrated and frustratedly, innerly saying “this asshole!” 
(referring to the driver who is not letting him merge).  
Sample 6.5: Mark was trying to find a shirt to wear to the gym, but was having 
trouble doing so because he’d gained weight and all his shirts were “suffocatingly 
tight.” At the moment of the beep Mark is frustrated/angry/sad that he has gained 
weight and can’t find a shirt that fits. The frustration/anger/sadness are three 
elements of one emotional experience. The notion that his shirts no longer fit is 
also present. He is expressing this frustration/anger/sadness by forcefully 
jamming shirts back into the drawer.  
Although clearly experienced feelings were relatively rare for Mark, there were 
quite a few instances where it appeared there were ongoing emotional processes without 
an experiential aspect of emotion (i.e., a feeling) being directly in experience.  At many 
of these moments, Mark’s emotion experience was unclear and apparently difficult for 
him (and for us) to apprehend. Mark had difficulty with the experience of feeling early on 
and throughout the course of sampling. Mark oftentimes was able to label a feeling in his 
experience, however, was sometimes unable to clarify the actual experiential nature of 
the feeling – in other words, he struggled to describe the way in which he experienced 
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whatever feeling he had labeled. In the four samples presented below, Mark describes his 
feelings as being experienced “mentally” but is unable to elaborate beyond that 
descriptor. The emotions in the four samples are also less prominent in his awareness 
than other phenomena. 
Sample 5.1: Mark was making his bed. At the moment of the beep he is thinking 
that he hates making the bed. This thought does not involve any specific words 
and is not being spoken; it is a general thought about hating making the bed. At 
the same time Mark is mildly, mentally frustrated about making the bed. 
Sample 5.3: Mark was cleaning his truck and was trying to decide whether or not 
to throw away a stack of old journal articles. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
looking at the article on top and is trying to remember what the article is about in 
order to decide whether or not to keep it. Also in his awareness, though much less 
prominently, is a sense of mental frustration that he’s let his truck get so 
disorganized. 
Sample 8.1: Mark is driving on the freeway, somewhat aware of traffic 
surrounding him, but there is not much traffic and not much awareness of it.  At 
the moment of the beep he innerly sees a recreation of a video that he and his 
class had watched earlier; he sees the words “GLOBALIZATION IS GOOD” 
printed in block white letters below a long-haired guy with hair blowing in the 
wind—a glamour-shot kind of scene.  He had seen this same scene earlier; now he 
does not see the TV screen, the entertainment center, the living room wall, etc; he 
sees just the glamour guy and the words, with most of his attention aimed at the 
words.  At the same time he is experiencing dislike for this one-sided video, a 
 178 
mental dislike that seems to be a feeling more than a thought, but it is difficult to 
be sure. 
Sample 6.4: Mark was sitting on the kitchen floor, one of his dogs lying next to 
him on his left, one his right.  He is scratching their bellies.  At the moment of the 
beep Mark is thinking something most closely captured by the words, “I wish I 
could spend more time with you guys.” This thought is not occurring in words 
and is not innerly spoken, instead it is a general idea, directed at his dogs. Mark is 
also happy, which is experienced both bodily and mentally but he could not 
describe it further. Mark is also experiencing the sensation of his dogs’ fur on his 
fingers, and noticing the change in texture of fur caused by canola oil, from soft 
and fuzzy to kind of gummy, on the dog on his left. 
In these four samples Mark is experiencing what he understands to be a “mental” feeling, 
although in all four samples he is unable to clearly define the experience. In these 
samples, Mark had difficulty apprehending emotion-related experiences although he was 
able to clearly apprehend and describe other experiential phenomena (e.g., inner seeing, 
unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness). In fact, Mark sometimes “experienced” 
feeling through these other phenomena, primarily unsymbolized thought. 
Sample 2.2: Mark is at his girlfriend’s house watching the movie Catch Me If You 
Can while waiting for his girlfriend and several others to get ready to go out.  At 
the beep he is frustratedly thinking repetitively that they always take forever to 
get ready.  (His impression was that he had been thinking this pretty constantly, or 
maybe continuously, for perhaps 15 minutes.). This is a thought rather than a 
feeling though it expresses frustration with the repeated delays involved in 
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waiting for his girlfriend to get ready.  This thought does not involve specific 
words or other images.  
Sample 2.5: Mark was walking in front of City Center Hotel/Casino.  At the beep 
he is thinking a bunch of related thoughts about it being a horrible complex.  He 
experienced this as a series of related but separate thoughts about what a badly 
planned/unpleasant place it was, like “it looks like downtown LA” and “it isn’t 
wheelchair accessible” and “it’s not welcoming.”  It was difficult for him to 
determine which thought or thoughts were present at the beep but thinking it’s a 
horrible complex seemed to be most salient.  There were no words or images 
related to these thoughts.  These thoughts seemed to carry negative emotion but 
there was no feeling directly in his experience.      
In the above two samples Mark’s experience is primarily that of unsymbolized thoughts. 
What is interesting about these symbolized thoughts is the fact that they appear to 
represent, or be substitutes for, feeling. In both, Mark’s thoughts somehow express 
emotion though he does not appear to directly experience any feeling.  Another example 
of this is presented below. 
Sample 3.3: Mark is a political operative for Senator X’s re-election campaign.  
About 15 minutes before the beep, Mark had been at an immigration reform rally 
at which he had said to the assemblage that Senator X would get legislation 
presented in the Senate.  A woman, a fellow Democrat, had responded that 
another senator would get it presented.  That had angered Mark—it undermined 
the campaign of Senator X in favor of the other senator who was not up for re-
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election. The anger had continued to build, and now, as Mark is driving home, he 
is intensely angry.  
At the moment of the beep he is thinking what seems like hundreds of 
thoughts, all simultaneous, some of which are innerly shouted or almost shouted: 
“How could she do this?!?” “Why would she do this?!?” “What was she 
thinking?!?” and so on. These inner speakings/shoutings are in his own inner 
voice, experienced as if he had spoken/shouted them aloud.  But they also occur 
so rapidly that it is difficult to know whether they are happening sequentially so 
fast as to be inseparable or are all present at the same time.  Thus there is both a 
sense that the inner speakings happen at each one’s own natural rate, but also that 
they happen incredibly rapidly.  Mark also, simultaneously, experiences a tingling 
hotness in the core of his body.  He is gripping the steering wheel tightly, but it is 
not clear whether this is in his experience at the moment of the beep. 
Sample 3.3 is particularly interesting in that Mark is experiencing a rapid succession of 
angry, inner shoutings. These inner shoutings appear to somehow represent, or be the 
main feature of Mark’s emotion experience. During our expositional interview Mark 
repeatedly stated that he was extremely angry at the time of this sample and at the 
moment of the beep, however, despite this ongoing emotional process (anger), it does not 
appear that Mark felt anger at the moment of the beep – instead it seems as though his 
anger is represented by a rapid succession of inner shoutings.  
Unsymbolized Thinking  
 The most frequently occurring phenomenon in Mark’s experience was 
unsymbolized thinking, present in 44% of his samples. Several of his unsymbolized 
 181 
thinking samples are typical and can be found in Appendix A. However, a number of his 
unsymbolized thinking samples were rather complex and included multiple thoughts 
occurring either simultaneously or in rapid succession; these are presented below.  
Sample 4.5: Mark was on the phone with his girlfriend and was trying to decide 
where they should go jogging tomorrow – at the park or on the street. At the 
moment of the beep Mark is thinking about the various features of the park and 
the street, trying to make a decision. He is thinking about the various pros and 
cons of each location (e.g., The park track is circular, I don’t like running in 
circles; the length of the park track is known; which is easier to get to?; etc.).  
There are more of these details on the “park” side of the decision [which Mark 
takes to mean he is mentally leaning toward the park, but he doesn’t know 
whether the number of details is the result of the mental leaning or whether the 
number of details causes the leaning]. At the same time, though less prominently, 
he hears his girlfriend’s voice on the phone, but is not paying attention to what 
she is saying. 
Sample 5.2: Mark was sorting his laundry into darks and lights. At the moment of 
the beep Mark is holding a blue shirt and trying to decide whether the blue shirt 
should go in the light or dark pile. This process of trying to decide consists of a 
fast-paced thought made up of several elements that form a whole; these 
elements, if put into words (they did not actually involve words) include, “is it 
lighter or darker in color?” “Will it bleed?” “What pile should it go in?” and other 
similar thought-lets. That is, it does not seem like one thought that could be 
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looked at in several different directions, but instead seems like some kind of a 
combination or cluster of thoughts.  There are no specific words present.  
Sample 7.4: Mark was buying deodorant and was trying to decide whether buying 
2 single Degree sticks would be cheaper, or whether buying the 2-pack would be 
cheaper. He was performing a sequence of very rough mental math, rounding 
prices up or down in order to make an assessment of which was cheapest. At the 
moment of the beep Mark is towards the end of the rough mental math sequence 
and has concluded that buying 2 singles would equal a little less than $4 which is 
cheaper than buying a 2-pack at $4.33. This mental math is not occurring in words 
or images, it has no discernable characteristics. At this moment in time, although 
he has decided which option is cheapest, Mark has not yet decided which option 
he will go with.  
Sample 8.2: Driving on the freeway, a song had come on the radio.  The song was 
well known to Mark; it was a bout a Mexican laborer who had come to the US to 
work and would like to go back to Mexico.  At the moment of the beep Mark is 
thinking about the immigration law that had just been passed in Arizona and 
several of its ramifications: boycotts, protests, marches, lawsuits.  All these 
concepts are present as aspects of one thought; they are present without words or 
other symbols.  The song, apparently as a meaningful entity (not merely the 
music) is also slightly present. 
Sample 8.3: Mark is at home reading a photocopy of his professor’s book, which 
has seven sections, each of which is organized like the paper Mark is currently 
writing: each section begins with a history.  The paper Mark is trying to write 
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must begin with a history, and at the moment of the beep Mark is trying to think 
about that history.  Four topics of his paper are specifically present to him: 
USAid, Black Columbia, the role of the State Department, and the US War on 
Drugs.  At the same time, he is trying to decide whether there is anything else that 
should be included in his paper he is explicitly trying to decide, a thought process 
that exists less prominently but somehow simultaneous to the four-topic 
consideration and the answer seems to be No as indicated by the fact that most of 
his attention remains on the original four topics.  The topics are present without 
words or symbols. 
The unsymbolized thoughts presented in the samples above involve complex thinking 
processes comprised of multiple, rapidly successive thoughts which capture one, larger 
concept or idea (for example, several ongoing thoughts related to the concept of jogging 
at the park or sorting laundry). It appears this form of unsymbolized thought is 
instrumental in Mark’s decision-making process as well as his analytical process. 
Sensory Awareness  
Mark experienced sensory awareness in 19% of his sampled moments. Examples 
of his sensory awareness are presented below. As can be seen, a number of his samples 
are rather typical examples of sensory awareness.  
Sample 4.1: Mark was driving at night. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
completely absorbed in the bright headlights of an oncoming car; there is nothing 
else in his awareness. 
Sample 7.5: Mark was carrying lots of shopping bags in each hand. At the 
moment of the beep Mark is absorbed in the heavy feeling of the bags in his hands 
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and arms. The heaviness feels like a strong squeezing on the outside of his palms 
and heavy downward pressure across the middle of each palm where the bags are.  
He can also feel the weight/strain in his arms and shoulders.  
Sample 4.4: Mark was in his car, stopped at a red light. He was looking at the 
electronic signage for Payday Loans. The sign was electronic and there were 
animated green frogs moving across the sign. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
completely absorbed in the frogs that are jumping across the length of the sign.  
We noticed a trend with auditory sensory awareness in Mark’s sensory awareness 
samples; Mark tended to experience other people’s voices as indistinctive sounds, as 
opposed to paying attention to the content of what was being said. Examples of this have 
been underlined in the samples below: 
Sample 4.3: Mark was walking with his friends. At the moment of the beep Mark 
is texting message to his girlfriend, “I’ll give you a call, I’m going home.” This is 
happening more or less automatically—that is, he is not directly experiencing the 
“I’ll give you a call, I’m going home” sentence. At the same time he hears his 
friend Tony’s voice, but is not paying attention to what Tony is saying.  The voice 
is more or less like noise, devoid of meaning. 
Sample 4.5: Mark was on the phone with his girlfriend and was trying to decide 
where they should go jogging tomorrow – at the park or on the street. At the 
moment of the beep Mark is thinking about the various features of the park and 
the street, trying to make a decision. He is thinking about the various pros and 
cons of each location (e.g., The park track is circular, I don’t like running in 
circles; the length of the park track is known; which is easier to get to?; etc.).  
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There are more of these details on the “park” side of the decision [which Mark 
takes to mean he is mentally leaning toward the park, but he doesn’t know 
whether the number of details is the result of the mental leaning or whether the 
number of details causes the leaning]. At the same time, though less prominently, 
he hears his girlfriend’s voice on the phone, but is not paying attention to what 
she is saying. 
 Finally, Mark had one instance of sensory awareness in imagination involving a 
food craving. 
Sample 7.2: Mark was at the store with his girlfriend. He was looking at boxes of 
cookies on the store shelf, and was trying to decide between chocolate chip and 
oatmeal raisin cookies. At the moment of the beep Mark is thinking he likes 
oatmeal cookies. This thought is not occurring in words or images, and has no 
characteristics but is instead more of an idea or notion. At the same time, Mark is 
craving the oatmeal raison cookies and mentally imagining the taste of oatmeal 
cookies – he is imagining the raisins and the sweet taste of oatmeal. This 
craving/imagining is located in Mark’s head.  
 Overall, Mark’s sensory awareness experience was typical in some instances and 
less typical in others. His sensory awareness was primarily visual and auditory, with one 
tactile sensory awareness and no olfactory or gustatory experiences (although his sensory 
awareness in imagination experience was gustatory). His auditory experience was notable 
in that he tended to focus on the sounds of others’ voices and ignore the content or 
meaning behind those words, essentially reducing language to its most basic elements 
(e.g., tones).  
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Concentrated Doing 
Mark’s concentrated doing samples are relatively typical of the concentrated 
doing samples encountered in the other participants in the current study. In the five 
samples presented below, Mark is carefully engaged in the doing of a task (e.g., 
highlighting, sorting, texting, pulling/listening and tying). He is not “mindlessly” going 
about these tasks, but instead is paying close attention to a specific portion of the task at 
hand.  
Sample 3.5: Mark was in the process of composing an RSVP list for work on his 
computer.  At the beep he is carefully highlighting a telephone number with his 
cursor, being sure not to go too far.  There was nothing else in his experience 
other than paying careful attention to what he was doing. 
Sample 5.6: Mark was sorting his clean laundry and watching the Lakers playoff 
game. At the moment of the beep Mark is looking for the mate of the sock he is 
holding. He is looking at every sock one by one, eliminating each ‘incorrect’ 
sock, kind of like a visual rejection of the non-mate socks. At the same time, 
though much less prominently, he hears the commentator on the TV.  
Sample 7.1: Mark was in the car sending a text message to his friend, telling him 
that he can’t hang out because his girl’s parents are having a BBQ. At the moment 
of the beep Mark is typing the “r” or “l” of the word “girl.” Most central in his 
experience is his typing of the word girl.  To a lesser degree, he is mentally 
spellchecking the word “girl.” This spellchecking is difficult for Mark to describe, 
and may involve a visual comparison of the actual word he has typed and some 
mental form of the word girl. At the same time in his experience, but to a far 
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lesser degree, Mark is tracking the basic gist of what his girlfriend is saying as she 
tells him how nervous/excited she is about starting her new nursing job.  This 
tracking is more or less on autopilot: he is only slightly (if at all) listening to her. 
Sample 7.6: Mark was building a clothes rack. At the moment of the beep Mark 
is engaged in the task; he is carefully pulling the telescope rod outward, carefully 
listening for a clicking sound in order to ensure it is in place. At the same time 
Mark is thinking that he needs to make sure it clicks into place and that he needs 
to be careful not to break or bend the rod. These thoughts are present 
simultaneously; there are no words or images present, more of a notion or idea. 
Sample 8.4: Mark is putting his shoes, focused on the shoelace that he is tying.  
He’s quite concentrated on this act [telling us about this is embarrassing, as if he 
should have outgrown this].  He is also thinking (10%) that he has to pick up his 
girlfriend, that it’s frustrating because disrupts his studying plans.  He does not 
experience frustration. 
Mark shared an experience in which he was fully absorbed in the watching of a 
movie. The experience was not purely sensorial (because he was absorbed in the content 
of the movie and not in some sensorial aspect of the movie, such as for example, the 
color of the actor’s shirt), nor was it a true example of concentrated doing. This sample is 
shared here as it shares the “immersed” quality of sample 4.4, presented in the sensory 
awareness section, but also shares some characteristics of the concentrated doing samples 
presented in this section. 
Sample 2.1: Mark was at home by himself watching the movie Catch Me If You 
Can.  At the beep he is fully immersed watching the movie. The Leonardo 
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DiCaprio character has just walked in on his mother having an affair with her 
husband’s friend.  There is nothing else in his awareness. 
In this sample and in sample 4.4, he described his immersion/absorption in very 
strong terms, saying that you would have to call his name “three or four times” to 
penetrate it or “shake me out of it.”  The qualitative nature of samples 2.1 and 4.4 
separates them from other sensory awareness samples in which the focus of attention is 
on sensorial aspects of the environment, although usually without the intense level of 
focus experienced by Mark. 
Samples 2.1 and 4.4 are reminiscent of samples we have termed “concentrated 
doing.” In fact, sample 4.4 may be considered on the edge of concentrated doing, as Mark 
is fully absorbed in the “doing” of watching a movie. However, it differs from more 
typical concentrated doing in that Mark is not actually completing a task of some kind.  
Vigilance 
 Three of Mark’s samples (7%) involved the experience of vigilance.  
Sample 2.6: Mark was walking in front of City Center through a covered 
construction walkway.  This is a crowded and chaotic area with lots of people.  At 
the beep he is visually taking in the scene, purposefully tracking the kids in his 
group.  He is seeing the entire scene as one unchanging seeing and shifting 
cognitively from kid to kid, checking to be sure each one is present and accounted 
for.  That is, the gaze stays constant while the attention within the gaze shifts from 
kid to kid.  This is an intense, focused process where he is working hard to keep 
track of the kids in his group.   
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Sample 3.1: Mark was driving to school in traffic. At the moment of the beep 
Mark is in a state of preparedness/readiness with concern to navigating the traffic 
surrounding him – he is very aware of the car that is directly in front of him and 
the two cars that are in front of him in adjacent lanes.  That is, his attention is 
entirely occupied by these specific three cars, and this attention is not merely a 
relaxed noticing but a state of heightened alertness. 
Sample 8.6: Driving his girlfriend home in his girlfriend’s car, many things 
present to him in a vigilance kind of way.  At the moment of the beep, most 
prominent are the lights of the car behind him that has lit up the dirty back 
window of the car. He sees the construction site ahead of him.  He sees the orange 
speed limit sign, but cannot make out the speed—it is as if he is expecting or 
waiting for the speed to be seeable.  He is expecting his girlfriend, who is half 
asleep, to make some comment about the driving, something like “Don’t drive too 
fast” or “Don’t have an accident,” to which he will respond something like “OK, 
babe.”  There have been several such interchanges, and at the moment of the beep 
he is expecting another.  All this is experienced as a heightened awareness, a 
vigilant attending to everything around him 
Mark’s experience in all three of these samples involved a heightened sense of awareness 
beyond what is typically seen with DES participants in other studies. He was not merely 
counting the number of kids, noticing the other cars in traffic or driving while taking in 
his surroundings. There existed an almost exaggerated sense of awareness, akin to what 
might be referred to as hypervigilance.  
Inner Seeing 
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 Mark’s inner seeing experiences were rather complex, and are presented here (one 
of the three has already been discussed above in the “feeling” section, Sample 8.1). 
Sample 5.4: Mark was cleaning his pitching wedge and thinking back to his golf 
outing with his buddies the day before. At the moment of the beep Mark innerly 
sees himself, from behind, standing in a sand trap and using his pitching wedge to 
try to get the ball out. He sees his friends standing on the green, and hears them 
laughing as a group. His friend Victor’s laughing stands out most prominently.  
There seems to be three visual experiences, of three separate sand traps, seen in 
quick sequence, one after the other.  All have approximately the same visual 
characteristics—Mark is seen from the back, his friends are on the green.  He’s 
not sure exactly which scene he is seeing at the moment of the beep.  
Accompanying this seeing is a low-level thought about needing a sand wedge so 
that he doesn’t have to use his pitching wedge.  
The above sample is interesting in that it is reminiscent of Mark’s unsymbolized thinking 
samples in which he has several rapidly successive (or possibly even simultaneous) 
thoughts within a very brief period of time – so much so that the moment of the beep 
appears to capture several thoughts (or in this case, inner seeings) at one time. The 
sample presented below is interesting due to the nature of the experience accompanying 
the inner seeing.  
Sample 5.5: Mark was watching a TV show about ancient warriors and their 
weapons. He had just watched a ninja use a weapon to slash a hanging pig. At the 
moment of the beep he is watching a Spartan warrior use a large sword to slash 
through the body of a hanging pig. At the same time he innerly sees a nondescript 
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human torso being sliced in the same way as is the pig, and is imagining what the 
pain would feel like. This imagining of the pain is a mental thing, and is not felt 
bodily or otherwise. 
In this sample Mark is imagining pain, though not actually feeling pain at the moment of 
the beep. Interestingly, another participant, Peter (Chapter 8) also described the 
imagination of pain, although he also indicated he was able to imagine pain and 
subsequently feel that imagined pain. Here, Mark imagined pain but did not have the 
actual experience of feeling pain. In order to attempt to comprehend this, we might 
conceptualize it as we conceptualized some of Mark’s feeling experiences. As discussed 
above, in some instances, Mark described ongoing emotions that were not felt (for 
example, anger). It is possible that imagined pain that is not felt is somewhat similar to 
ongoing emotion that is not felt.   
Discussion 
 Mark’s emotion experience was sometimes difficult for him (and us) to 
apprehend. Often his emotion experience was primarily “mental” (lacking in bodily 
sensations) and, in some instances, was experienced through unsymbolized thought. In 
other words, sometimes his thinking processes seemed to be substitutes for feeling-
experience. It is unclear why this is; it may be that Mark was restricted by the boundaries 
of language and vocabulary and simply lacked the ability to effectively speak about 
feeling. It is also possible that some of Mark’s feeling experiences were difficult for him 
to apprehend clearly, while other feeling experiences were easier to apprehend. Mark had 
a high rate of unsymbolized thoughts throughout the course of sampling. His 
unsymbolized thoughts were usually complex and multifaceted, with multiple 
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simultaneously occurring/rapidly successive thoughts present at the moment of the beep. 
However, this was not limited to unsymbolized thinking, as we also see the rapid-
succession phenomenon in inner speaking/feeling and inner seeing samples as well. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
Across-Participant Results and Discussion 
 
DES is primarily an idiographic approach to apprehending the inner experience of 
individuals, and as such, the present study has focused on presenting idiographic 
descriptions of the inner experience of each of our seven participants separately, in 
chapters 5 through 11. The focus in those seven chapters was on the characterization of 
the moment-by-moment inner experience of each individual participant. In this section 
we consider the question of similarity or shared features of inner experience among the 
participants. Each of these individuals was selected based on their reporting experiences 
and symptoms consistent with PTSD.  Thus shared features of inner experience may be, 
in some way, related to or indicative of the inner experience of individuals with PTSD.  
This study is exploratory, with a small, nonrepresentative sample and open-ended 
examination of the inner experience of these individuals.  Thus any conclusions or 
speculations must be tentative, awaiting further confirmation or disconfirmation.  
Nonetheless, this approach has the potential to discover the unexpected, possibly yielding 
new directions for study.   
The across-participant results are based on a total of 221 samples (not including 
training samples) gathered from seven participants. Table 11 presents the relative 
frequency of some of the phenomena of inner experience. The table includes phenomena 
identified in the Hurlburt and Heavey (1999) codebook (in boldface) as well as 
phenomena unique to the participants in this study.
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Table 11 
Noteworthy Characteristics of Inner Experience across Participants (percentages) 
 Participants 
 
 
Jacob Brandon Louis Andrew Peter 
 
Geoff 
 
Mark All Subjects 
Number of Samples 33 (15%) 
25 
(11%) 
28 
(13%) 
32 
(14%) 
45 
(20%) 
17 
(8%) 
41 
(19%) 
221 
(100%) 
Characteristics of 
Inner Experience         
Sensory Awareness 15%1 36% 14% 28% 43% 59% 19%  31% 
Inner Seeing 
 24% 40% 32% 6%  13% 0% 7% 17% 
Feeling 3% 0% 18% 78% 0% 6% 4% 16% 
Unsymbolized 
Thinking 24% 8% 9% 9% 2% 6% 44%       15% 
Inner Speaking 
 0% 0% 21% 6% 4% 0% 4% 5% 
Vigilance 0% 8% 0% 3% 2% 47% 7% 10% 
Concentrated Doing 9% 8% 3% 3% 0% 0% 12% 5% 
Flashback 0% 8% 0% 0% 2% 12% 0% 3% 
Note.  
1. Percentages represent the frequency of each characteristic for each participant 
with average percentages represented in boldface in the far right column. 
 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) identified the five most frequently occurring 
phenomena of inner experience: inner seeing, feeling, inner speaking, sensory awareness 
and unsymbolized thinking. Each occurred in roughly one quarter of sampled moments in 
their stratified sample. In the current study, we see lower rates of inner seeing, feeling 
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and unsymbolized thinking, and substantially lower rates of inner speaking. The 
participants in the current study also evidenced other forms of experience that were 
noteworthy: vigilance (7%), concentrated doing (5%) and, to a lesser extent, flashbacks 
(2%).  
Vigilance 
Five of our seven participants (Brandon, Andrew, Peter, Geoff and Mark) 
experienced vigilance, defined as heightened alertness and watchfulness paid to the 
environment as a whole. Vigilance, or hypervigilance, is included as a symptom of PTSD 
in the current conceptualization of the disorder (Criterion D4; APA, 2000) and of our 
seven participants, six rated the extent to which they’ve been vigilant (“being ‘super-
alert’ or watchful or on guard”) as either 4 (quite a bit) or 5 (extremely) on the PCL-M. 
One participant, Louis, rated his vigilance as 3 (moderately) and did not report any 
instances of vigilance over the course of sampling. Geoff reported the most instances of 
vigilance, over half of the total instances of vigilance in the study; he rated the extent to 
which he is vigilant as 5 (extremely) on the PCL-M. Mark reported three instances of 
vigilance, Brandon reported two instances and Andrew and Peter reported one instance of 
vigilance each.  
All five participants reported instances of vigilance that involved alertly scanning 
or being watchful of their external environment (e.g., while at a restaurant, while driving, 
while walking through a store, while in a parking lot, etc.). All participants were 
consistent in their vigilance experience, describing themselves as alert, aware of 
everything, taking everything in, scanning everything, and so forth. However, Geoff was 
the only participant who reported instances of what we have termed “internal vigilance” 
 196 
or a careful assessment of one’s inner bodily processes beyond simply noticing or being 
absorbed in these processes. This type of vigilance has not been described in the extant 
PTSD literature and may be an experience unique to Geoff. Because we did not see this 
experience in our other participants, we will not comment on it further in this section (see 
Chapter 9 for additional commentary on Geoff’s vigilance). 
In general, the experience of vigilance is extremely rare if not nonexistent in other 
DES studies (personal communication, R.T. Hurlburt, 2010). Although we see the 
phenomenon with relatively low frequency in this study, it is important to make note of 
its presence. Two aspects stand out: 1) vigilance is present in a study with PTSD-positive 
participants and not in other DES studies and 2) despite the subjective ratings of the 
prominence of vigilance provided by the participants on the PCL-M, vigilance was 
encountered at an experiential frequency of only 10%. These two aspects taken together 
may imply that while vigilance does in fact appear to be a symptom of PTSD (or at least 
an experiential phenomenon associated with PTSD), perhaps it occurs at a much lower 
frequency than subjectively perceived. 
Concentrated Doing 
Concentrated doing might be conceptualized as falling on the other side of the 
same coin as vigilance. Whereas vigilance involves a careful alertness or watchfulness 
directed at the external environment as a whole, concentrated doing involves intentional, 
careful, alert focus on one particular aspect of one particular task.  Although the other 
side of the coin, so to speak, it does in some way also seem to be the same “coin” given 
that both involve a heightened state of alertness and attention.  Five of the participants 
had instances of concentrated doing: Mark (five instances), Jacob (three instances), 
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Brandon (two instances), Louis (one instance) and Andrew (one instance).  The average 
frequency of concentrated doing across participants in the current study was 5%.  
Concentrated doing is not a well-established experiential phenomenon, and has 
only been examined and discussed in one previous study (e.g., Mizrachi, 2010). In 
Mizrachi’s study of the experience of left-handers, concentrated doing occurred at a 
similar rate as in the present study. The significance of concentrated doing is as-yet 
unclear, although concentrated doing may be related to both sensory awareness and 
vigilance. As concentrated doing involves a focus on the sensory aspects of the “doing” 
so as not to make a mistake, it can be thought of as a particularly careful attention to 
sensory details. Furthermore, because the level of attention and focus is so intense during 
concentrated doing, it can also be thought of as bearing similarities to vigilance, as 
discussed above. 
Flashbacks 
Three of our participants (Geoff, Brandon and Peter) experienced flashbacks over 
the course of sampling; this resulted in an average frequency of 3% across participants. 
Descriptions of momentary flashback experiences are rare in the extant PTSD literature. 
Flashbacks are conceptualized as more intense versions of reexperiencing symptoms in 
most theoretical approaches to PTSD, although some theorists (e.g., multirepresentational 
theorists) conceptualize flashbacks as involving completely separate memory systems 
than simple reexperiencing symptoms (Cahil & Foa, 2007). Our participants did not 
appear to experience “reexperiencing” over the course of sampling (e.g., distressing 
recollections of the event, physiological distress or reactivity to exposure to reminders of 
the event), and because DES is interested in momentary, waking experience, we did not 
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explore the existence of distressing dreams of the event. The only reexperiencing 
symptom we witnessed was flashbacks, and again, this occurred in only three 
participants.  
In total, three participants had five instances of flashbacks over the course of 
sampling. Peter’s flashback experience was directly combat-related and involved the 
momentary reexperiencing of his close friend and fellow soldier’s death, just as it had 
occurred during deployment. This was the most intensive flashback experienced by any 
of our participants; following the discussion of this sample, Peter was visibly shaken and 
required a brief pause in order to “gather” himself. Geoff’s two flashback experiences 
were more benign. The first involved reliving the experience of standing in a watchtower 
in Iraq, surveying the environment. The second involved the reliving of driving toward an 
Iraqi town and seeing a white flag waving in the distance. Geoff did not describe these 
flashback experiences as particularly emotional or distressing. He indicated that both 
were triggered by a specific aspect of his surroundings (e.g., sitting outside on a warm 
day triggered the first flashback, and the second was triggered by watching his white 
football jersey flapping in the wind).  Both of Brandon’s flashback experiences involved 
training exercises. In his first Brandon was reliving a specific part of a combat lifesaver 
course (inserting a catheter in another soldier’s arm) and in the second he was reliving a 
live-fire Humvee/gunner exercise that took place during combat training. Brandon did not 
describe either of these flashbacks as distressing, though he did indicate that both were 
“hyper-real;” more clear and focused than they were when they were occurring. Brandon 
also indicated triggers for his flashback experiences; the first involved reading about an 
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EMT course leading to the flashback involving the catheter. The second trigger was a 
bumper sticker that read “dezzert assault” that Brandon noticed while driving. 
Interestingly, all participants in our study endorsed the occurrence of flashbacks 
on the PCL-M although six of the seven rated flashbacks as being only “a little bit” or 
“moderately” problematic and one (Geoff) rated flashbacks as “extremely” problematic 
in the past month. In a recent study, flashbacks were endorsed by 46.6% of participants 
with a current PTSD diagnosis, whereas only 4% of participants without a past or current 
PTSD diagnosis reported flashbacks (Holowaka, Marx, Kaloupek & Keane, 2011). 
Though our study had a substantially smaller sample size, three of our seven participants, 
or 43% experienced flashbacks over the course of sampling, a rate similar to the 
endorsement rate in Holowaka et al.’s (2011) study. Therefore, our finding lends support 
to the idea that flashbacks are experienced by individuals with PTSD. However, it should 
be noted that of the five flashbacks reported in this study, only one could be described as 
“distressing” to the experiencer (e.g., Peter). This finding is unique in that the extant 
PTSD literature describes flashbacks as “distressing” recollections or reliving of a trauma 
experience. Though Peter’s flashback fits the current description of a flashback, neither 
Brandon nor Geoff described their flashbacks as distressing or even as being trauma-
related. Therefore, it is possible that flashbacks of a non-distressing, benign nature (in 
addition to distressing flashbacks) may be a phenomenon experienced by individuals who 
reports symptoms of PTSD.  
Inner Speaking, Unsymbolized Thinking and Inner Seeing 
Inner speaking occurred with a frequency of 5% in the current study and 
unsymbolized thinking with a frequency of 15%.  Three of the seven participants (Jacob, 
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Brandon and Geoff) reported no instances of inner speaking, and those who did report 
inner speaking had rather unsophisticated and simplistic inner speaking.  
Only Jacob (24%) and Mark (44%) had more than an occasional instance of 
unsymbolized thinking. Inner seeing was also seen at a frequency lower than that found 
by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), though it was more evenly distributed among the seven 
participants than either inner speaking or unsymbolized thinking. Overall, “thinking” 
experience, and especially inner speaking, occurred with low frequency in this study as 
compared with Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). 
Sensory Awareness 
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in the present 
study, occurring with an average frequency of 31% across participants. Sensory 
awareness is the experience of close attention paid to sensory (e.g., visual, auditory, 
olfactory, gustatory and tactile) details of the external environment, or to internal (bodily) 
processes (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Bensaheb, 2009). Sensory awareness in imagination is 
included in this category and includes the experience of attention paid to sensory aspects 
within imagination. Sensory awareness occurred at a slightly higher rate in the current 
study (31%) compared to the 22% found by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). However, of 
the seven participants in this study, two (Geoff and Peter) evidenced substantially higher 
rates of sensory awareness, with greater than 40% of their samples involving the 
phenomenon. In both cases, we saw a progressive increase in the relative frequency of 
sensory awareness across time, with both participants reporting fewer instances of 
sensory awareness early in sampling and more toward the end of sampling. Interestingly, 
both these participants had little to no inner speaking, unsymbolized thought or inner 
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seeing. Brandon also evidenced higher rates of sensory awareness, with 36% of his 
samples involving the phenomenon.  
Emotion Experience  
Although feeling experience occurred with low frequency in the present study, the 
nature of emotion experience in our sample warrants further discussion. We coded 
“feeling” in 16% or our total samples. Andrew accounted for 25 of the 34 feeling 
samples, or 73% of the total feeling samples in the current study. Without the inclusion of 
his samples, the experience of feeling occurred with low frequency (4%) within our 
sample. This low frequency in and of itself is unusual and substantially lower than in 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). Furthermore, emotion experience was problematic or 
atypical for all of our participants. For example, Brandon experienced no emotion-related 
phenomena over the course of sampling; a rather unusual finding. Of the remaining six 
participants, Jacob, Peter and Geoff appeared to experience emotions in a particularly 
fragmented and disintegrated manner, such that their ongoing emotions did not always 
result in clearly experienced feelings. Louis, Andrew and Mark tended to have some 
difficulty in apprehending feeling experiences as well, although they evidenced rare 
instances of more clearly apprehended and integrated emotion experience.  
For Jacob, Louis and Andrew, when we did encounter somewhat more clear and 
integrated emotions, the emotion was often anger. Even for emotion experiences that 
were ongoing but not clearly apprehended, the ongoing emotion was oftentimes either 
anger or another related, negatively valenced emotion (e.g., frustration, hatred, etc.). This 
finding coincides with the conceptualization of emotions in military veterans with PTSD. 
The military, and in fact society as a whole often discourages the expression of emotions 
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in men (Cahill & Foa, 2007). However it is generally acceptable for men to experience 
and express anger, and in the military, even encouraged (Keane et al., 1985). It may 
follow then that when they did experience feeling, the participants in this study 
experienced anger at a higher frequency than other emotions, as they are more 
“practiced” in the experience of this particular emotion.  
Overall Jacob, Geoff and Peter appeared to be rather unskilled “feelers.” Jacob 
appeared to experience emotion though his emotions were usually fragmented and not 
directly felt (e.g., as in the instance when he visualized himself throwing his computer 
out of anger, but did not actually feel angry). Geoff appeared to struggle with the 
apprehension of his emotion experience; he was often “monitoring” his level of calmness, 
but never actually experiencing calmness (or any other feeling). Peter never experienced 
direct feelings over the course of sampling, but did experience several graphic and violent 
images that appeared to represent emotions such as hatred or anger. Much as Mark’s 
unsymbolized thoughts may have been a substitution for emotion, we hypothesized that 
Peter’s inner seeings or images may have been a substitution for emotion. Brandon never 
experienced any emotion-related experience over the course of sampling; it is 
hypothesized that this is less likely due to sampling simply “missing” his emotion 
experience and more likely due to a lack of emotion experience in general.    
The remaining three participants (Louis, Andrew and Mark) appeared to have 
some instances of clearer emotion-experience, as well as several instances of diffuse, 
vague and disjointed experience that was apparently not clearly apprehended. However in 
Mark’s case, it appeared that unsymbolized thoughts often acted as a substitute for 
feelings. He had perhaps two more clearly apprehended feeling samples over the course 
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of sampling. Though he reported frequent “feeling” experiences, it was quite often 
questionable what Andrew meant by feeling. At times it appeared he used the word rather 
liberally, to describe not only feelings but also thoughts, notions, and so forth. However, 
at times he was better able to describe the feelings he labeled than at others. Louis may 
have had three integrated emotion experiences (e.g., samples 2.3, 2.4, 4.5) but usually 
struggled with the integration of the various elements of his ongoing emotion processes 
such that his apprehension was oftentimes unclear.  
Overall, the participants in this study struggled with the experience of feelings, 
some to a greater extent than others. Feeling was absent, disintegrated and disjointed, or 
diffuse and atypical across our participants. Though it was apparent that ongoing 
emotions were present for some of our participants, these emotions were rarely integrated 
well enough to be experienced of “felt.”  
Experiential Skill 
In the preceding paragraphs we commented on the frequency of noteworthy 
characteristics of inner experience among our seven participants. In this section we will 
discuss possible explanations for these findings. It is important to clarify at the outset that 
due to the exploratory nature of our study, our comments represent speculation only, and 
are not meant to be interpreted as solid or confident conclusions. This is the first study 
that employed the descriptive experience sampling method to examine the experience of 
individuals who report symptoms of PTSD and as such we interpret our findings with that 
knowledge in mind. At the same time, two of the examiners in this study (R.T. Hurlburt 
and C.L. Heavey) have spent many years examining the experiential phenomenology of 
various populations, and have extensive knowledge in the area of experience sampling. 
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Some of our speculations are based upon this knowledge. It is also important to note that 
the following discussion of skill does not apply to every participant or every experiential 
phenomenon in the same way. For example, Mark had several rather complex instances 
of unsymbolized thought over the course of sampling; Peter had complex inner seeing 
experiences, as did Jacob and so forth.  
As discussed previously, sensory awareness occurred with greater frequency than 
other experiential phenomena in the current study. It is possible that sensory awareness is 
a more rudimentary form of inner experience, perhaps requiring less experiential skill on 
the part of the experiencer (R.T. Hurlburt, personal communication, June, 2010). Sensory 
awareness may require less experiential skill than, for example, complex inner seeing or 
feeling experiences. Alternately, sensory awareness may sometimes be the result of high 
skill (R.T. Hurlburt, personal communication, June 2010). For example, if conceptualized 
as resulting from an ability to hone in on the present and concentrate experience on only 
sensorial details of one’s environment while actively excluding completing stimuli, then 
sensory awareness takes a rather greater amount of skill.  
Experiential “skill” can be thought of as similar to any other skill acquired and 
practiced by human beings – generally skills involve the coordinated and fluid interaction 
of various bodily and cognitive systems in order to produce a desired outcome. For 
example, a golfer with a higher level of skill at playing golf is able to more easily and 
naturally (without much thought) coordinate his bodily movement (the stroke) with his 
visual input (where the golf ball is) with cognitive processes (e.g., “hitting the ball there 
will give me the best chance of getting it in the hole with the fewest strokes”). However, 
a less skilled golfer may not as readily coordinate these various systems, or may 
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mistakenly involve unnecessary systems that then interfere with his ability to skillfully 
play golf.  
It is possible that experiential skill might be thought of in the same way – a 
skillful “feeler” for example, may be readily able to coordinate all the various aspects of 
emotion-experience (e.g., bodily sensations and cognitive processes) into an integrated 
whole to produce a fully experienced feeling, whereas an unskilled or less skilled “feeler” 
may only experience disjointed aspects of an ongoing emotion at any given point, without 
the ability to skillfully integrate these separate aspects into a whole.  The experience of 
sensory awareness, in contrast, may not require integration or coordination among 
various systems – sensory awareness involves absorption of attention on some sensation 
or sensory aspect of the world. To put this in practical terms, it may require less 
coordinated skill to become visually absorbed in the brownness of the brown-colored 
stew than it does to feel, for example, pride at having prepared delicious stew and 
hopefulness that others will enjoy it as well.  
Of course, it is possible that more skill is required in sensory awareness than other 
forms of experience, particularly in some situations or with some types of sensory 
awareness.  Perhaps it requires more coordination and skill to block out, or at the highest 
levels of attainment, simply not to create, competing information (e.g., ongoing thoughts, 
ongoing emotions) and simply focus in on the sensory aspects of the world. If 
conceptualized from this perspective, then the participants in this study might be thought 
of as highly skilled sensory awareness experiencers. Although we cannot draw a 
definitive conclusion on this point, it seems possible that sensory awareness requires less 
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skill as it does not involve creating experience in the same way as inner speaking or inner 
seeing or even unsymbolized thinking.  
It is also possible that sensory awareness is less related to skill and instead simply 
a result of effort. Perhaps sensory awareness is a less effortful form of inner experience, 
easier to engage in than feeling or thought. So it is possible that the higher rate of sensory 
awareness seen in the study is simply a result of lower levels of expended experiential 
effort. Our task here is not necessarily to identify one truth, but rather to consider the 
various possibilities based upon the information we have collected.  
Further evidence of the potential variability of experiential skill in the participants 
of the current study is seen in the low frequency of feeling and inner speaking. Feeling 
was present in 15% of the overall samples collected, with a range of 0% to 78% among 
participants. As mentioned previously, Andrew’s frequency of feeling experience inflated 
the overall frequency; when his feeling experience is removed, feeling is experienced 
with 4% frequency across the other six participants, a substantial difference. Inner 
speaking occurred with very low frequency (5%) across participants in the present study; 
only four (Louis, Andrew, Peter and Mark) of the seven participants experienced any 
instances of inner speaking. When inner speaking was present, it was simple, one to two-
worded thoughts. Louis had the majority of inner speaking samples (50%). His inner 
speaking was particularly basic and simplistic. For example, in one sample, as he was 
reading, he was saying what he was reading to himself. In three other examples, Louis 
was simply repeating phrases to himself over and over (e.g., “Where did I fucking put 
that shit,” “March 1st” and “I hate this fucking shit!”). Andrew’s inner speaking samples 
were equally unsophisticated; for example, in one of his two inner speaking samples he 
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was innerly saying to himself the word “daaammmnnn.” In Peter’s case, his inner 
speaking samples consisted of saying the word “lawyer” to himself and repeating the 
phrase “lefty-loosey, righty-tighty” to himself. Finally, of Mark’s two inner speaking 
samples, one was rather basic (e.g., saying to himself “this asshole!”) whereas the second 
sample (sample 3.3) was more complex and discussed in Chapter 10. The minimal 
presence (or complete absence) of feeling and inner speaking experience may be an 
indicator that the participants in this study potentially had little in the way of “clear” 
experience and may have been, in some cases, less skilled experiencers in the area of 
feeling and inner speaking. 
Inner seeing and unsymbolized thinking occurred with lower frequency (17% and 
15%, respectively) than in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study. It should be noted that 
one participant (Mark) provided over half of the unsymbolized thought samples (18 of 34 
or 53%); without the inclusion of those samples, unsymbolized thinking, also a more 
complex form of experience, occurred with a frequency of 7% among the other six 
participants. This low frequency of unsymbolized thought may again indicate that the 
majority (six of seven) of our participants were not highly skilled “unsymbolized 
thinkers.” The same can be said for the substantially reduced frequency of inner seeing (a 
more complex form of experience; personal communication, R.T. Hurlburt, 2010) in the 
current study; this finding is possibly a result of lower levels of “inner seeing” skill. It is 
harder to make the case in this instance that the lower frequency of these more complex 
forms of inner experience is due to a higher skill level.  
Again, if different types of experience (e.g., feeling, inner speaking, 
unsymbolized thinking, etc.) are conceptualized as skills, an individual who has complex 
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inner seeing experiences and an absence of feelings, for example, may be thought of as a 
skilled “inner seer” and an unskilled “feeler.” Much as an athlete who excels in golf (and 
is therefore a skilled golfer) may struggle when playing basketball (and may be 
considered an unskilled basketball player).  
Overall, the frequencies of experiential phenomena in the present study are lower 
than the frequencies of the same experiential phenomena in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), 
with the exception of sensory awareness. It is hypothesized that one reason for this may 
be directly related to the experiential skill of the participants in the current study; our 
participants, in general, may be more skilled when it comes to sensory awareness than 
when, for example, it comes to feeling. Again, this may be because sensory awareness 
may be a more rudimentary form of inner experience, and therefore perhaps more readily 
“experienced” and “mastered” than other forms of inner experience. However, it may 
very well be the case that sensory awareness is a higher form of experience, requiring 
greater skill (as discussed above) and out participants were somehow more practiced or 
skilled in this area. 
If we were to momentarily assume that the low frequency of potentially more 
complex inner experience (e.g., feeling and inner speaking specifically) in the present 
study is suggestive of less experiential skill in those areas, we might then infer that 
perhaps the individuals with PTSD symptoms in this study have less integrated and 
coordinated inner experience, resulting in low experiential skill. For example, our 
participants did not integrate the disparate aspects of emotion well and therefore can be 
said to have a low feeling skill. Likewise, the participants in this study had infrequent, 
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simplistic inner speaking experience, and therefore can be said to have a low inner 
speaking skill.  
The potentially lower level of, for example, feeling and inner speaking skill 
observed in the participants in the current study may provide insight into the development 
of PTSD when PTSD is conceptualized as developing and being maintained by a lack of 
effective processing of a trauma memory, a conceptualization held by several theories of 
PTSD (e.g., Cahill & Foa, 2007; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). As discussed above, the ability to 
fully integrate and coordinate various experiential phenomena, like other abilities or 
skills, likely exists on a continuum from “highly skilled” to “unskilled.”  The individuals 
in this study may fall toward the lower felling and inner speaking skill end of the 
continuum. Furthermore, they all have significant symptoms of PTSD. Low experiential 
skill in an area such as feeling may result in poorly integrated or uncoordinated feeling 
experience, and therefore potentially more shallow levels of emotion processing.  
Thereby, perhaps individuals who go on to develop PTSD through lack of 
effective trauma processing as well as disjointed, disintegrated trauma memories are 
individuals who had a lower level of feeling skill to begin with, and thus were not adept 
at the processing of emotion-laden experience such as a traumatic, life-threatening event. 
The introduction of the trauma (or, as in the case of our participants, multiple traumas 
over an extended period of time) then further disrupted an already inefficient (or less 
efficient) emotion-processing system.  
Low feeling skill is hypothesized to be more relevant in individuals who develop 
PTSD than low inner speaking skill, due to the highly emotional nature of trauma. Of 
course, it is possible that low inner speaking skill (or low skill in some other aspect of 
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experience) is somehow related to PTSD as well, though this connection is much less 
clear and therefore will not be discussed further in this document. 
An alternate hypothesis of course is that trauma somehow degrades the ability to 
effectively integrate and coordinate feeling processes or experiences.  This could be due 
to excessive avoidance of the trauma memory and the resulting emotional numbing. In 
other words, it is possible that individuals who are not particularly skilled “feelers” may 
more readily develop PTSD following a trauma, or, alternately, that low feeling skill is a 
result or “symptom” of the types of trauma that can lead to PTSD.  It is also possible that 
feeling skill and PTSD are two completely unrelated phenomena.  
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 The present study had a number of limitations. The first limitation was the small 
sample size (N=7). DES studies are, by their nature, very time and labor intensive and 
require dedicated adherence from participants as well as researchers. For example, DES 
as it was applied in this study and described in the methodology required approximately 
50 hours of expositional interviews, with many additional hours devoted to introducing 
and explaining the method to participants, digitalizing the interviews, coding samples, 
writing and reviewing sample descriptions and completing multiple iterations of 
descriptive chapters. Further, the DES process requires extensive involvement on the part 
of the participant; from wearing the beeper and collecting samples, to coming in on a 
regular basis to complete expositional interviews. The involved nature of DES makes 
large samples difficult to study. Further, due to the small sample size, statistically 
significant conclusions cannot be drawn from the data collected, nor can broad-based 
generalizations to other groups be made. Given the qualitative nature of the data collected 
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(i.e., samples of experience), quantitative analysis becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
outside of reporting frequencies of salient characteristics. Even with a larger sample size, 
quantitative analysis of this type of data remains difficult. 
 A second limitation of the study is a consequence of when and how the 
participants collected moments of inner experience. Participants were free to collect their 
moments in their own natural environments at a time of their choosing, thereby 
increasing ecological validity. It is possible that the varying conditions under which 
participants collected their sampled moments may have resulted in systematic differences 
among the individuals. Furthermore, participants may have had presuppositions that 
influenced the way in which they perceived and presented their inner experience.  
 A third limitation of the current study is the possibility that the researchers’ 
presuppositions and personal belief systems interfered with the accurate apprehension of 
the participants’ inner experience. However, this is believed to be unlikely as three 
investigators were involved in the sampling process in an attempt to reduce the likelihood 
of contamination of the data by presuppositions. 
 The findings of the current study indicate that additional research using DES to 
explore the experience of recent war veterans who report symptoms of PTSD would be 
worthwhile. Future research might address the limitations of this study discussed above 
by using a larger sample size. Sampling with participants over a more extended period of 
time may aid in our understanding of the frequency of occurrence of certain phenomena 
observed in the current study, for example, vigilance, concentrated doing and flashbacks. 
Additional DES studies with the current population may help to shed further light on the 
discussion of experiential “skill ” in individuals with PTSD. For example, future research 
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might include an examination of the inner experience of soldiers prior to and following 
first deployments to a combat zone. Pre- and post-deployment sampling studies may shed 
light on the nature of inner experience in individuals prior to the development of PTSD 
and experiential changes that may (or may not) occur as a result of the combat experience 
and the subsequent development of PTSD symptoms. 
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APPENDIX A 
Participant Samples 
Jacob (Chapter 4) 
Sample 1.1: The Steelers were playing the Bengals on television. Jacob was watching 
Bryan Leonard make a good play and was reminded of a television show he had watched 
previously, titled “Hard Knocks.” On this show, the commentators/coaches had been 
discussing the prospect of cutting Bryan Leonard from the team during spring training. At 
the moment of the beep Jacob is saying out loud, “I can’t believe how retarded these 
coaches are” in a slightly sarcastic tone. He is laughing or snickering sarcastically as he 
says these words out loud. Although his friend is in the room, he is not saying these 
words to anyone. Jacob understands that the retardedness of the coaches refers to their 
wanting to cut Bryan Leonard from the team.    
 
Sample 1.2: The football game was still on but Jacob had gotten up to get a tissue to 
blow his nose. At the moment of the beep Jacob is blowing his nose and is hoping he 
won’t be sick on Tuesday so that he can see his girlfriend. This hoping is not occurring in 
images or words but Jacob is confident that he is thinking that at the moment of the beep.  
He is blowing his nose, however, this is not in his awareness; it is just something he is 
doing at the moment. 
 
Sample 1.3: Jacob was at the park, taking his dog for a walk. His dog was not on a leash 
and was running around with another dog that was not on a leash. The two dogs had just 
run up to a man whose dogs were on a leash, and a second or so before the beep the man 
had angrily and arrogantly said, as if to no one but obviously aimed at Jacob, “People 
should really keep their fucking dogs on a leash!!” At the moment of the beep anger 
explodes through Jacob’s body, an intense heat that instantaneously spreads throughout 
his entire body—trunk, arms, legs, head, everywhere. The heat is intense, like being 
outside in the Las Vegas desert sun, but the heat is mostly inside his body, not 
particularly on the surface. (This heat occurs instantly and reaches full intensity 
immediately, and causes Jacob to break out in a sweat, but none of that is in his 
experience at the moment of the beep.) Jacob also feels his heart racing. At the same 
time, he is seeing the man, head-to-toe, but instead of seeing the fully detailed man (as he 
had been seeing him before the incident), he is seeing only the outline of the man, as if 
the man existed as “a target” standing in front of him. 
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Sample 1.4: A Kay Jewelers commercial was playing on television. At the moment of 
the beep Jacob is thinking about why guys get suckered into spending money on 
diamonds, and why girls don’t have to do the same thing. This thinking does not have any 
identifiable characteristics (e.g., no specific words, no images).  At the same time, Jacob 
is feeling a sense of irritated frustration associated with the whole diamond-buying 
enterprise.  This feeling is not experienced to be in his body or in his head, nor even 
“mental”, but he is confident that he is directly experiencing irritated frustration at the 
moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 1.5: Jacob was still writing down notes from the last beep. This beep was not 
discussed. 
 
Sample 1.6: Jacob was watching football, and Troy Aikman was commentating on the 
performance of the Dallas Cowboys. Troy Aikman has been providing commentary on 
the Dallas Cowboys for many years, and Jacob has always felt that he always talks shit 
about the Cowboys, despite his many years of serving as the quarterback for the team. 
Troy Aikman’s shit-talking has always pissed Jacob off. At the moment of the beep Jacob 
is thinking that Troy Aikman always talks bad about the Cowboys. Jacob is thinking 
about Aikman, but is not feeling pissed off. The thinking does not have any identifiable 
characteristics (e.g., no specific words, no image). 
 
Sample 2.1: Jacob had just said the word “treat” to his dog who had responded by 
becoming excited. At the moment of the beep Jacob was wondering whether his dog 
really understood him or whether the dog’s reaction was habit. Jacob did not experience 
words, images, or any other symbols as part of this wondering. 
 
Sample 2.2: Jacob was walking toward the refrigerator to get a glass of fresh orange 
juice. At the moment of the beep Jacob is innerly seeing himself from a third-person 
perspective from his right, opening the refrigerator door with his left hand and reaching 
into the refrigerator with his right hand. The refrigerator is “see-through” as though its 
walls are made of glass. He is innerly seeing himself reaching all the way into the back of 
the refrigerator with his hand come out the back of the refrigerator into an orange 
orchard. Another hand is reaching out of a tree towards Jacob’s hand, handing him a clear 
glass full of orange juice.  
Sample 2.3: Jacob was watching the show Countdown to the UFC 106 on TV. They were 
discussing the upcoming fight between Tito Ortiz and Forrest Griffin. At the moment of 
the beep Jacob listening to what Tito Ortiz is saying and hoping that Tito wins the fight. 
The hoping that Tito Ortiz wins the fight is a part of the listening rather than a separate 
thought process.  
 
Sample 2.4: Jacob was looking at his laundry that was separated into 3 piles: darks, 
mediums and lights. At the moment of the beep Jacob is looking at the 3 piles, wondering 
which of the piles he should wash first, which pile has the clothes he needs for tomorrow 
or the next day. This wondering does not have any identifiable characteristics (e.g., no 
specific words or images).  
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Sample 2.5: Dozed off, this beep was not discussed. 
 
Sample 2.6: Jacob was watching Sports Center on TV. On the left side of the TV screen 
was a vertical list of the 6 upcoming topics to be discussed on the show.  At the moment 
of the beep Jacob is reading the words on the screen, “Larry Johnson signs one year deal 
with the Bengals.” [This happens to be the 3rd topic in the list but that is not a part of 
Jacob’s awareness at the moment.] He is reading the words and attending to the meaning 
of the words.  
 
Sample 3.1: Jacob was at home painting his toenails while waiting for a football game to 
start. At the beep he is concentrating on what he is doing by visually focusing on what he 
is painting and being careful not to get paint on anything but his toenail. His being careful 
is not a separate thought process; he is carefully painting including paying attention to 
what he is seeing. He is seeing his hand from just above his knuckles down to where he is 
holding the paint brush in his fingers and he is seeing his right big toe from just above the 
joint to the end. He is not seeing anything else nor is he aware of anything else in his 
surroundings.  
 
Sample 3.2: Jacob was at home watching a football game with his roommate. The 
Cowboys had just scored a touchdown to get ahead in the game and Jacob had just given 
his roommate a hard high-five as part of a ritual they perform after each Cowboys 
touchdown. At the moment of the beep he is feeling a pleasant lack of tension throughout 
his body. The lack of tension is spread evenly and diffusely throughout his body, possibly 
including his head. 
 
Sample 3.3: Jacob was walking his dog in the park in his neighborhood. His dog had just 
pooped and he had picked it up and was throwing it away. At the beep he was looking at 
a pile of dog poop on the grass, wondering why people don’t pick up their dog’s poop. 
This wondering was occurring without any words or images. He was also feeling 
moderately irritated. The irritation did not have any location, sensations or other 
experiential details.  
 
Sample 3.4: At the moment of the beep Jacob is hoping that it is not going to be breezy 
the next night when he is working outside. This hoping is innerly seeing three palm trees 
as if he were standing on the roof of the parking garage where he works. The palm trees 
are swaying to the left from a strong breeze coming from the right.  
 
Sample 3.5: Jacob was at home eating dinner. He was by himself, sitting at the counter in 
his kitchen. At the beep he is eating a Spam Musubi, a slice of Spam on rice wrapped in 
seaweed. He tastes the salty, ham-like taste of the Spam and is wondering what is in 
Spam. This wondering is occurring without words, images or other characteristics. 
 
Sample 4.1: Jacob was at his house chasing his dog around the island in his kitchen. This 
is a game they play regularly. At the moment of the beep he is trying to catch his dog and 
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not hit the cabinets as he runs. He experiences this as paying attention to what he is 
doing; it is not a thinking experience. 
 
Sample 4.2: Jacob was using his computer to look up information on the Kelly Blue 
Book web site about a car that his mother-in-law was thinking about buying. He was 
looking at a web page that listed possible options the car can have. He had just read the 
option of leather seats. At the moment of the beep he is innerly seeing a Toyota 
Highlander, the car his mother-in-law is thinking about buying. He is seeing the car as if 
standing a few feet away from the driver’s door, which is open. He is seeing into the car, 
looking at the tan leather interior. He can also see the open door and the steering column 
and steering wheel, with the Toyota logo on it. 
 
Sample 4.3: Jacob had been watching football on TV and a commercial for the Marines 
had come on. As he watched, the commercial tell the story of young men who had 
enlisted in the Marines, gone through boot camp, and then to the Silent Drill Team, a 
chill had overcome him—a wave of goosebumps had suddenly tingled across the surface 
of his entire body, head to toe. The chill was not of coldness, but was a good feeling. He 
was much more aware of the tingly goosebumpiness than of the commercial, though he 
was still paying attention to the commercial. 
 
Sample 4.4: He had installed the new version of iTunes on his computer and it was not 
working. He had clicked four times on the place where his music was supposed to be, but 
it kept telling him it was not there. At the moment of the beep he intensely wants to break 
his computer. He innerly sees himself throw his computer, a laptop, out the window near 
where he is sitting. From a first-person perspective he sees his right arm draw back with 
his computer in his hand and then throw the computer like a Frisbee through one of the 
three small kitchen windows in front of him. He sees the window shatter as the computer 
goes through it. He is confident that even though the inner seeing expresses the desire to 
break the computer, he also has, apart from the inner seeing, a strong urge to break the 
computer. It is impossible for him to put this break-the-computer urge into words other 
than to say it is clearly apprehended as ongoing at the moment of the beep, and that it 
exists in parallel with the inner seeing. [He noted that he often has the desire to break 
something when he is angry and that he has a sense that if he does break something, he 
feels better, though this was not in his awareness at the moment of the beep]. 
 
Sample 4.5: He was clipping the fingernails on his left hand. At the beep he was in the 
process of clipping the fingernail on his middle finger. He was thinking that he wished 
his fingernails did not grow so fast. This thinking was occurring with words, images or 
other characteristics. He awareness was more occupied by what he was thinking than 
what he was doing. 
 
Sample 4.6: He was taking a shower, washing his left arm. (The beeper was on the 
counter outside of the shower.) At the beep he was wondering why he always washes his 
left arm first. This thinking was occurring without words, images or other characteristics.  
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Sample 5.1: Jacob was at his house, getting undressed after work, taking off the several 
layers of clothing he had been wearing to keep warm at work. At the moment of the beep 
he is taking off his under-armor cold gear pants. There is little or nothing in his 
experience at the moment of the beep; he is merely more or less automatically taking off 
the pants. 
 
Sample 5.2: He was sitting at his house waxing the underside of his snowboard, which 
involves melting wax onto the snowboard, and then smoothing the wax out when it is at 
the right consistency. He was holding the wax up to a hot iron, melting it onto his 
snowboard. The wax was dripping from the hot iron down onto his snowboard. At the 
moment of the beep he is paying attention both to the wax as it melts next to the iron and 
to the wax that has dripped onto the board. He is paying close or rapt or concentrated 
attention to the consistency/appearance of the wax as it relates to the “spreadableness” of 
the wax (so that it is not lumpy, too watery or too cold).  
 
Sample 5.3: He was eating pizza with his roommate and they had been talking about how 
much they love pizza. He had just taken a bite of the pizza.  At the moment of the beep he 
tastes the pizza in his mouth. He is enjoying/loving/“into” the taste of the pizza. He is 
also looking at the pizza on the counter in front of him, but this is not as salient in his 
awareness as the really good taste of the pizza.  
 
Sample 5.4: He was texting his best friend about the UFC fight between Jon Jones and 
Matt Hamil, which had taken place the previous night. At the moment of the beep, he 
innerly sees Jones “12 to 6” elbowing Hamil in the face. He sees Jones’ back and right 
side from a slight right angle, sitting on top of Hamil who is lying on his back.  He sees 
Jones’ elbow come straight down and hit Hamil in the face. He apparently sees this just 
as he had seen it on TV.  At the same time he is texting his friend regarding the “12 to 6” 
elbow assault on Hamil, but this is not in his awareness at the moment. 
 
Sample 5.5: He was studying for his final, reading and memorizing phrases. At the 
moment of the beep, he is reading a phrase, and is not aware of anything in his awareness 
 
Sample 5.6: At the moment of the beep he is thinking about all the things he needs to do 
this week (papers, finals, work, meetings), and that with next week (following the end of 
the semester) will come relief. There are no characteristics associated with this thinking; 
it is more of a mental process absent of words, images or other characteristics. 
Sample 6.1: Jacob was on the computer, looking at the UFC website and reading a 
Twitter posted by Diego Sanchez that read, “Bringing the storm from San Diego to 
Memphis.” This quote reminded Jacob of the arrogant, cocky nature of Diego Sanchez. 
At the moment of the beep Jacob innerly sees Diego Sanchez doing his post-fight 
commentary/interview. He sees Sanchez from the chest up, facing forward, speaking into 
a microphone, however there is no sound as part of or accompanying this seeing. He is 
focused on Sanchez’s face, on his “little, arrogant smile” in particular.  Whereas he 
clearly is critical of Sanchez, he does not feel critical at the moment of the beep. 
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Sample 6.2: He was on the computer, looking up new insurance for his motorcycle on 
Geico’s website. At the moment of the beep he is typing his VIN number into an empty 
cell on the screen. He is very carefully concentrating on the numbers and letters of his 
VIN number on the screen as he is typing them in, in order to type them correctly. Also 
present in his experience, although to a much lesser degree, are the Geico gecko at the top 
right corner of the screen, and the other blank cells that he has yet to fill out.  
 
Sample 6.3: Jacob was innerly seeing money and a ring, except that the money and the 
ring themselves were not being seen. That is, Jacob was confident that he was innerly 
seeing and that the inner seeing was of money and a ring, but equally confident that the 
money and ring themselves were not innerly experienced at the moment of the beep.  
 
Sample 6.4: Jacob was in the bathroom looking in the mirror. At the moment of the beep 
he is looking at a chip in a tooth in the bottom row of his teeth. His way of seeing this 
tooth somehow represents to him that he should go to the dentist.   
 
Sample 6.5: He was on the computer, reading the names of dentists on his insurance 
provider’s website. At the moment of the beep, he is both reading the name, “Nancy 
Nguyen” and wondering why so many of the dentists have Vietnamese last names, and 
why there are so many Vietnamese dentists. This wondering has no characteristics (no 
words, images).  Most of his attention is aimed at the thought; the reading is pretty close 
to just happening on autopilot. 
 
Sample 6.6: He was asleep and the beep woke him.  
 
Sample 7.1: Jacob was doing the dishes and his hands were submerged in warm, soapy 
water. At the moment of the beep Jacob feels the sensation of the warm dishwater on his 
hands and the texture of the sponge in his hand. He is also seeing the bubbles in the 
water.  
 
Sample 7.2: Jacob was holding the dog’s leash, getting ready to take the dog out on a 
walk. At the moment of the beep Jacob is watching his dog jump up and down in 
anticipation of going outside. There is amusement that is associated with seeing his dog 
jump up and down. It is unclear, however, whether that amusement is in Jacob’s 
awareness at the moment of the beep or whether he became aware of the amusement after 
the beep, when assessing what was happening at the moment of the beep.  
Sample 7.3: Jacob was taking his last final online, and had just read the test question, 
“What is the advantage of behavioral checklists over interviews?” He was reading 
through the 4 response options. At the moment of the beep Jacob is someplace between 
the reading, and selecting the correct response, however, he can’t say with any certainty 
what, if anything, is in his awareness at the moment of the beep.  
 
Sample 7.4: Jacob was on the phone with his uncle, who had just asked Jacob how to get 
from the South Point hotel to the Las Vegas airport. At the moment of the beep Jacob is 
innerly seeing the South Point hotel and the intersection in front of it, from the 
perspective of diagonally across the street, looking up at the hotel.  He innerly sees the 
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intersection, the hotel, and an empty parking lot, but mostly he is drawn to the goldness 
of the innerly seen hotel’s windows. 
 
Sample 7.5: Jacob was folding his laundry, and was putting the folded items in 8 
separate piles that corresponded with the drawers in which he was going to later place the 
items (shirts in one pile, underwear in another, socks in another, and so on). At the 
moment of the beep Jacob is folding a shirt on ‘autopilot.’ He is somehow aware of his 8-
pile categorization system—that is, the categorization system itself is somehow present to 
him at the moment of the beep—that is, he is not merely folding a shirt that belongs to 
one of the categories, but is instead somehow aware of the category scheme that includes 
the shirt category.  Perhaps because the level of his category awareness was difficult for 
him to ascertain is at the moment of the beep, and perhaps because we muddied the 
water, we were not successful in clarifying this. 
 
Sample 7.6: Jacob was watching The Office with his roommate. Michael, a character on 
the show, had just said, “Football is like rock and roll, basketball is like jazz.” Jacob 
found this a funny and stupid thing to say. At the moment of the beep Jacob is laughing. 
His laughing has a “[Michael’s]-an-idiot” quality to it, but Jacob is not aware of this at 
the moment of the beep.  
 
Brandon (Chapter 5)  
 
Sample 1.1: Brandon was at Target with his wife and 2 children. At the moment of the 
beep Brandon is looking at poofy baby shoes and wondering about the usefulness of these 
poofy shoes for his son during the upcoming trip to Utah where it will be cold. This 
wondering does not have any characteristics (e.g., words, images, etc.)  He is barely 
noticing that his wife is speaking to him, but he is not aware of what she is saying. 
 
Sample 1.2: Brandon was in the car with his wife and 2 children. His wife was driving.  
Just before the beep, Brandon had noticed a handicapped placard hanging from the 
rearview mirror of the car in front of them. This placard had reminded Brandon of 
working as at the air-show this past weekend directing handicapped drivers to a special 
parking lot.  At the moment of the beep Brandon is feeling bored and vigilant, which was 
how he had felt while directing traffic during the air show.  This is one mixed feeling 
without bodily sensations.   There is also a slight remnant of thinking back to his convoy 
training and the idea that where they are driving would make a great ambush site.  This 
thought is leaving his awareness and just a slight trace of it remains.   
 
Sample 1.3: Brandon was in the car with his wife and 2 children. At the moment of the 
beep he was listening to his daughter talking about imaginary superpowers and feeling 
proud of her for being imaginative.  This feeling of pride did not involve sensations or 
any other characteristics.  The feeling of pride was more central in his awareness than 
what she was saying. At the periphery of his awareness Brandon is considering what his 
plans are for the day.  
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Sample 1.4: Brandon was holding his daughter’s hand walking through the parking lot. 
At the moment of the beep he was vigilantly taking in the auditory and visual stimuli in 
his environment because he does not want his daughter to get hurt while crossing through 
the parking lot.  He is more focused on the environment than he is on the reason for his 
vigilance.  He is noticing the sound of a car alarm and beginning to have a thought that he 
should be aware of any unsavory people in the surroundings.  He is also beginning to 
experience a physical tenseness in his body.  
 
Sample 2.1: Not discussed due to time. 
 
Sample 2.2: Brandon was driving on Interstate 15 [his wife took the notes], making a 
curve. At the moment of the beep he was seeing everything in his visual field that was 
outside his windshield: cars, roadway, signs, and so on.  All these things were seen with 
equal attention and clarity—he was “paying attention to everything.”  The cars on the 
other side of the freeway divider were seen as well, but without quite so much intensity.  
Things inside the car—instruments, his wife, etc., were not part of his visual seeing.  At 
the same time he was noticing the feel of the steering wheel against his hand—the 
hardness of it, the place where the spoke of the wheel and the rim of the wheel came 
against his hand.  Most of his attention was on the visual display (70/30). 
 
Sample 2.3: Brandon was drinking Starbucks coffee. At the moment of the beep he is 
tasting the bitterness of the coffee and the sweetness of the chocolate. He may have also 
been noticing the heat of the liquid, but was less confident of that.  
 
Sample 2.4: Brandon was in the grocery story, standing in front of the baby food 
selecting jars.  At the moment of the beep he is innerly seeing his daughter’s face as she 
is eating green beans for the first time—seeing the intensity of her expression, the bits of 
green beans around her mouth, a little of the yellow onesie at her neck (but the rest faded 
into irrelevance).  This inner seeing is understood to be an accurate reseeing of an event 
that had taken place a few years earlier, and which had been captured on videotape and 
viewed in the interim. 
 
Sample 2.5: Brandon was at work reading an email that said that a power company truck 
had disrupted the gas line to his building so there would be no hot water.  At the moment 
of the beep he is thinking about the absence of hot water—that there will not be hot 
water.  This is clearly a thinking and does not involve words or images.  At the same time 
he is innerly seeing a fuzzy or blurry hot water tank, the white part of the tank, not the 
controls or water lines. More of his experience was occupied with the thinking than the 
seeing (70/30). 
 
Sample 2.6: Brandon was at work writing an email about an upcoming office Christmas 
party, which was to take place on December 11 the following week.  At the moment of 
the beep he is typing “DEC 11” and seeing those characters in black against the white 
computer screen.  At that moment he is more interested in the way the characters look 
than in the meaning they convey.  At the same time he innerly sees the December 11 
block of a standard office-type calendar, with a red circle drawn around it.  He sees a 
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square with a black 11 in it, and a few surrounding squares; he does not see the whole 
calendar page (he does not see, for example, “December”) but he understands himself to 
be looking at a December page.  The red circle is as if drawn with a chisel-point Sharpie, 
and is drawn as he himself would draw it—with a slight overlap of pen strokes at the top 
of the circle.  The inner seeing of the circle occupies him slightly more than the seeing of 
DEC 11 (60/40). 
 
Sample 2.7: Brandon was at work, beginning the outline of an English paper on the Boy 
Scouts that he was working on.  At the moment of the beep he was writing “BSA” 
[meaning Boy Scouts of America], but the writing itself and its meaning were not present 
to him; instead, he was feeling the tension in his right forearm, in the inside from just 
below his elbow to just above his wrist.  [He says he holds the pencil too tight.]  At the 
same time he was innerly seeing his Eagle Scout patch, as if he were in high school 
wearing his Boy Scout uniform looking down at the left side of his chest.  That is, he saw 
the patch accurately as if viewed obliquely from above.  He saw a bit of the tan uniform 
around the patch; the rest of the uniform faded into irrelevance.  More of his experience 
was on the tension than on the seeing (70/30). 
 
Sample 2.8: Brandon was at physical therapy doing a standing stretch, bending at the 
waist reaching toward the floor.  At the moment of the beep he was feeling the stretch in 
his hamstrings at the base of his thighs, feeling it in both legs but the left leg was a little 
looser.  At the same time he was innerly seeing his hands on the floor next to his feet, 
viewed from his own first person, as if he could complete the stretch that he was now 
attempting but unable to finish.  That is, he was seeing himself from his own eyes, as he 
would like to be.  This seeing was clear, in color, and accurate in detail (if he could attain 
that posture).  The stretch and the inner seeing were pretty much 50/50 in his experience. 
 
(Sample 3.1, 3.2: Not discussed due to time). 
 
Sample 3.3: Brandon was sitting down, reading a book of leather tooling patterns, trying 
to find a pattern for the belt he was making. He was looking at a leaf pattern for tooling. 
At the moment of the beep Brandon is innerly seeing the belt he is currently making, as if 
he had tooled the leaf pattern repeatedly along the entire belt.  He sees the belt stretched 
out in front of him, and slightly above him, such that he is looking up to see it [he’s not 
actually looking up, but his ‘inner eyes’ are looking up]. The place where the buckle 
should go is on his left [however there is no buckle, only the hole and 2 snaps where the 
buckle will go].  He does not see the entire left end of the belt; there is an additional hole 
and two snaps, but they are “faded into irrelevance.” The leaf tooling pattern repeats, and 
runs across the length of the belt, from the right of where the buckle should be, and has a 
1/8 inch border along the top and bottom of the length of the belt, where there is no 
tooling pattern. At the same time, Brandon is physically looking down at the book in 
front of him, but this is not as salient in his awareness as his inner seeing (about a 70-30 
attentional split).  
 
Sample 3.4: Brandon was running up the stairs to attend to his son who was crying. He 
was halfway up the stairs. At the moment of the beep Brandon is aware of his physical 
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alignment in space – of not falling over. He is paying attention to the physicality of 
balancing as he is running up the stairs. He was also aware of tension in his legs and 
back, but this awareness may have occurred after the beep 
 
Sample 3.5: Brandon was eating a banana, his eyes aimed at the yellow peel of the 
banana. As he was eating/seeing the banana, Brandon was trying to imagine what the 
color yellow tastes like. At the moment of the beep Brandon is tasting the color yellow. 
He is experiencing a vivid, imagined taste, one that is much more vivid than the taste of 
the actual banana in his mouth. This taste, however, does not seem to be the ‘right’ taste 
in that it does not taste the way yellow ‘should’ taste. The shade of yellow Brandon is 
unsuccessfully attempting to taste is a bright, sunshine yellow, different from the yellow 
of the banana and the banana peel. The yellow taste Brandon is actually tasting is slightly 
more sweet than sour, more salty than not, and really, really very light and airy [lighter 
than whipped cream], but difficult to capture with words, and not the yellow he is trying 
to taste. Although Brandon is chewing an actual, unimagined banana at the time of beep, 
he is fully engrossed in his imagined tasting, and is not tasting the real banana. 
 
Sample 3.6: Brandon was at work discussing with a coworker the oddness of duck-
Brandoned platypuses and how they don’t really fit into any category. At the moment of 
the beep Brandon is innerly seeing God standing at a workbench, putting together a duck-
Brandoned platypus. Brandon is seeing God about 2-3 yards away and slightly to the 
right. Brandon is seeing God standing at his workbench, which is a “standard” 
workbench with four legs. God is human-like in form, an older man [in his 60s or 70s] 
with a long white beard, long white hair, and a long white robe.  The pieces of the 
platypus are laid out in front of God, on his workbench. The head of the platypus is in 
God’s left hand, and the “furry kiwi” body of the platypus in his right, and he is 
assembling these two pieces. The tail and 2 legs of the platypus are lying on God’s 
workbench. Brandon hears God chuckle to himself as he’s assembling the platypus, 
chuckling in a self-amused, inside joke kind of way; his chuckle sounds like an older 
man’s voice, but is not familiar to Brandon. The coworker is speaking, and Brandon is 
tracking it, but it occupies only a minor part of his awareness. 
 
Sample 3.7: Brandon was at work, preparing trays of cookies for the cookie drive. 
Brandon was in charge of getting the cookies out to the airmen, and was paying attention 
to how many cookies were in the bag ready to go, and how many more were needed. At 
the moment of the beep Brandon is thinking, 6 trays of cookies in the bag, no trays of 
cookies on the table. This is definitely a thought process but has no associated words, 
images or other characteristics. 
 
Sample 3.8: Brandon was holding his son Patrick, walking toward Patrick’s high chair. 
At the moment of the beep Brandon is looking at the seat-part of the high chair, the ‘hole’ 
of the chair, where he is planning on putting Patrick. He is both paying attention to 
Patrick’s weight on his chest, arms and hands in order to keep him balanced, and focused 
on the hole in the chair with the intention of placing Patrick in this hole. This intention is 
known, but has no associated characteristics (no words, images, etc.). 
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Sample 4.1: Brandon was stitching with string the leather of a knife sheath he was 
making for his father-in-law. He had just tied a knot in the stitching string and was 
pulling the knot tight. At the moment of the beep Brandon is aware of the sensation of the 
stitching string ‘biting’ into the outside of his left pinky finger.   
 
Sample 4.2: Brandon was reaching for a pair of scissors as part of the task of making a 
leather belt buckle. The reaching for the scissors was happening on autopilot, not part of 
his experience at the moment of the beep. At the moment of the beep Brandon is innerly 
seeing an expanded or zoomed-in version of the way he is going to stitch the buckle he is 
planning on making. He is seeing the buckle, with its holes arranged in an arch and the 
lacing (the leather string) woven in and out of each hole.  The lacing is loosely woven 
through each hole, an exaggeration of the way it appears before it has been tightened, so 
that he can clearly see the pattern that he must make to execute this stitching. [Brandon 
has never used this particular stitch pattern.  Prior to the beep he had looked in a book at a 
picture/diagram of how to execute this particular pattern.  Now, at the moment of the 
beep, he is innerly seeing how that pattern is applied to the particular belt he is making].  
The inner seeing is similar in structure to the book’s picture—a zoomed-in or expanded 
view of a loose stitching, but the innerly seen leather of the buckle is a tan-brown color 
and the lacing is a dark brown color, rather than black and white like in the book, and the 
innerly seen holes are arranged in an arch rather than straight like in the book. This 
seeing is clear, like a snapshot, and is located in front of Brandon, someplace “above the 
horizon”; that is, he is innerly looking up at the imaginary buckle, while is actual eyes are 
aimed down at the scissors.  
 
Sample 4.3: Brandon was working on the lacing of the belt. He was pulling the lacing 
through each hole and tightening the lacing while doing so, making sure the lacing was 
not twisted. At the moment of the beep Brandon is looking at the lacing with the purpose 
of ensuring that the lacing lays flat on the leather. This ensuring-it-lays-flat intention is 
explicitly present in Brandon’s experience at the moment of the beep; that is, it is not 
merely that he is trying to get it flat, but rather that he directly apprehends this trying-to-
get-it-flatness.  The trying-to-get-it-flatness is a part of the looking, and is not a separate 
thought process.  
 
Sample 4.4: Brandon was still working on the lacing of the belt. At the moment of the 
beep Brandon innerly hears Faith Hill sing “This, this is Christ the King,” the first line of 
the second stanza of “What Child is This.” He hears this singing accompanied by the 
band, apparently exactly as it exists on the CD, except that the singing is heard centered 
is his head, instead of outside as would be the case if he heard an actual CD.  He means 
“in his head” to be taken literally—the voice sounds as if it were physically located in his 
head.  The location is centered in the center of his physical brain, but he can’t say the 
extent—that is, whether it is in a small location in the center or occupying his entire skull 
is not important to him.   
 
Sample 4.5: Brandon was telling his wife he would be late for dinner but would 
definitely be home for dinner, but that is happening mostly or completely outside of 
awareness. At the moment of the beep Brandon is innerly smelling, tasting and seeing a 
 224 
“He Man” casserole. [This is a family recipe Brandon has had before – made of ground 
beef, cheese, potatoes and cream of ‘something’]. Most prominently, he is smelling the 
casserole – the smell is a mixture of the ingredients, and is true to the smell of the ‘real-
life’ casserole. He is also tasting the casserole, but to a lesser degree. He is innerly seeing 
the casserole sitting atop the dinner table, but the seeing is the least salient part of his 
experience. This seeing is in front of Brandon, and slightly to his left. Brandon is also 
speaking at the moment of the beep but this is not in his awareness. 
 
Sample 4.6: Brandon was working on the lacing of the belt buckle. At the moment of the 
beep he is innerly hearing dialog from the movie ‘Pirates of the Caribbean—Dead Man’s 
Chest’. Specifically, he is hearing Will (a character from the film) speaking. This hearing 
is inside his head, and as far as he can tell sounds exactly the same as it did in the movie. 
He is not hearing any background noise, music, etc. from the movie.  
 
Sample 5.1: Brandon was reading the instructions on a box of leather dye. At the 
moment of the beep Brandon is innerly seeing black, leather shoes. He is seeing the shoes 
directly in front of him and at eye level; the toes of the shoes are pointed to the left. The 
shoes are side-by-side and he is seeing them from a profile view, such that he can see 
most of the left side of the left shoe, and only bits and pieces of the right shoe. This 
seeing is clear, but not as clear as “real life seeing” – about 80-85% as clear as real life. 
Brandon is also aware of reading the instructions on the leather dye box, but this 
awareness is much less salient than the seeing (about 30% versus 70%). The leather dye 
in the box that he is reading is red, and Brandon is a bit surprised that he is innerly seeing 
black shoes. 
 
Sample 5.2: Brandon was on the computer, reading the description of an EMT course. At 
the moment of the beep Brandon is reliving an event. He is in Iraq, going through combat 
lifesaver course training. He is experiencing this as though it is happening right now, at 
the moment of the beep. He is seeing his buddy, the simulated casualty, lying down. 
Brandon is seeing and feeling his right hand clamped on his buddy’s artery, and his 
[Brandon’s] left hand holding the catheter/needle which Brandon is about to push into his 
buddy’s artery. He is also hearing the sound of helicopters around him [and possibly 
(he’s not sure) seeing and hearing the sound of other people engaged in a similar 
exercise], and smelling the distinctive smell of that area [the area in which the actual 
training took place]. However these aspects are less relevant than the seeing of his 
buddy’s artery and the catheter. This reliving is hyper-real – it is more relevant, sharper 
somehow, and more in focus than the real-life training had been, as if the “relevance 
control knob, which usually goes from one to ten, has been turned up to twelve.” 
 
Sample 5.3: Brandon was at Target with his wife. His wife was trying on a dress and had 
asked Brandon his opinion of how she looked in the dress. At the moment of the beep 
Brandon is looking at Rachel with approval. This approval is somehow a part of the 
looking, and does not exist separately from the looking. In his looking, he is directly 
apprehending this approvingness. His looking is more than just looking with approval but 
less than looking with a separate “approval” thought.  
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Sample 5.4: Brandon was still at Target and was walking with his daughter, trying to find 
a space heater. At the moment of the beep Brandon is asking himself, “If I were a space 
heater, where would I be?” The words are present all at once, and have no perception-like 
characteristics. Brandon is very clear that he is not hearing this, seeing this, or innerly 
speaking this, however, these are the exact words he is asking himself, and any other 
variation on these words [e.g., “I wonder where I would be if I were a space heater”] 
would be inaccurate.  
 
Sample 5.5: Brandon was in his car, and his wife was driving. They had just passed a 
truck with a bumper sticker that read “Dezzert Assault.” At the moment of the beep 
Brandon is reliving a live-fire exercise during combat skills training. He is experiencing 
this as though it is happening right now, at the moment of the beep. He is sitting in the 
gunnery of a HumVee – with his body sticking up through a hole in the top of the 
HumVee, and he is holding his M4 weapon against his left shoulder. He is looking out 
ahead of him, seeing both what is in his line of sight [what is in front of where he is 
pointing his weapon] as well as his surroundings. He is seeing what is in his line of sight 
with his left eye [he shoots left handed]– the target he has just shot at, and his 
surroundings with his right eye – the hill in front of him, the curving road ahead.  At the 
same time Brandon is feeling the recoil of the M4 against his left shoulder, hearing the 
sound of the HumVee’s engine and the sound of the tires on the road. He is also smelling 
the grass. All this is understood to be an accurate reliving of the original event with two 
exceptions: first, the grass he is smelling at the moment of the beep is distinctively 
different from the actual grass he was smelling during the combat training; the “relived” 
grass smells stronger, fresher like fresh-cut grass. Second, the entire reliving (sights, 
sounds, smells, sensations) is hyper-real – more intense and sharper than the actual 
training. At the moment of the beep the experience is a reliving; a second later, when 
responding to the beep, he recognizes the grass smell as being stronger and the whole 
event as being hyper-clear. 
 
Sample 5.6: Brandon was plugging the Christmas tree lights into the socket. At the 
moment of the beep Brandon is seeing the socket and the plug part of the lights, with the 
intention of plugging the plug into the socket. The intention is tied into the seeing, and 
can’t be pulled apart – as Brandon described, they are tied together in the way the three-
layered toothpaste is tied together and can not be separated without making a mess.  
  
Louis (Chapter 6) 
Sample 2.1: Louis was sitting on his bed with his laptop in his lap, reading an email. At 
the moment of the beep he is reading the subject line of the email – ‘Sender: [company 
name].’ As he is reading this he is saying it to himself in his normal voice. He is also 
aware of himself and his dog in space. This awareness is not visual or mental, but is a 
knowledge of his own location/existence in space in relation to the other items in the 
room. 
 
Sample 2.2: Louis was on the phone with his friend, Joe. Joe had been describing his 
evening, that he and his friends were drunk, that their designated driver had ditched them, 
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and that they were now walking down the street, still drunk. At the moment of the beep 
Louis is trying to form an image of Joe’s location. Louis is having what he calls a 
“thought blur” which consists of a not-fully-formed image of his friend Joe walking 
down a street. In this image, Joe is clear, and in motion, walking from Louis’s left to 
Louis’s right. There are trees in this seeing/image, however, they are less clear than Joe 
is, but not completely unformed or blurry either. The remainder of the scene is much 
more blurry, dark, unformed. It is as if this image is being built by Louis; the more 
information Joe gives him about where he is, the more pieces of Louis’s blurry image get 
“filled in.” Louis’s attention is also equally directed toward what Joe is saying; he is 
listening to Joe’s description of where Joe is. 
 
Sample 2.3: Louis was driving in his car, and had just seen a man with long, black hair 
hugging a girl. At the moment of the beep Louis is having a condescending/irritable 
reaction [Louis indicated that both these words accurately reflect his reaction] to the 
man’s hair. This reaction is more mental and does not involve any words or other 
characteristics. [Louis reported that the condescending reaction can be captured by the 
phrase “pshhh, look at this guy” but that this thought was not actually present to him at 
the moment of the beep]. 
 
Sample 2.4: Louis had just noticed that he did not have his sampling notebook, and was 
searching through his backpack for it. He was repeating the phrase, “Where did I fucking 
put that shit” to himself over and over. At the moment of the beep he is saying to himself, 
“where did I fucking put that shit” and is feeling condescending about the notebook not 
being there. 
 
Sample 3.1: While driving Louis was trying to remember his dog’s vaccination 
appointment by innerly saying the words “March first” to himself repeatedly. At the 
moment of the beep he is on his second iteration of innerly saying the words “March 
[beep] first.” He is innerly saying “March first” to himself, in his normal speaking voice, 
with a flat tone.  
 
Sample 3.2: Louis was in the process of sitting down at the table (he was mid-sit). At the 
moment of the beep he is looking at the TV, seeing a close-up of the face of one of the 
designers on Project Runway. There may or may not exist in his awareness some sense of 
other objects in his surroundings - his dog to his right, his mother at the table, the chair he 
is abut to sit in; but we can not be sure.  
 
Sample 3.3: Louis was lying on his bed. At the moment of the beep he is hearing a high-
pitched ringing sound in his ears (which sounds like the twanging of a wine glass). This 
ringing is in both ears but a little louder in the right ear. He is also hearing the sound of 
the garbage collectors on the street outside his room [it is unclear whether these are two 
separate hearing processes or one, complex hearing process].  
 
Sample 3.4: Louis had been driving to his brother’s house and had passed a woman 
walking down the street. He had then passed her again when leaving his brother’s house a 
short while later. At the moment of the beep he is toying with the idea of picking this 
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woman up. He is experiencing a series of inner seeings that represent   ‘what if’ questions 
related to whether or not he should offer the woman a ride.  These inner seeings include 
innerly seeing the woman sitting next to him in the passenger seat of the car seen as if 
standing in front of the car looking in through the windshield. The woman is more in 
focus in the image.  This inner seeing is associated with wondering what would happen if 
he picked her up.  Another inner seeing involves seeing himself walking into class late.  
From a first-person perspective he sees his classmates are turning backward looking at 
him, and the teacher standing in front of the class is giving him a stern look. This inner 
seeing represents whether or not he would be late to class if he gave the woman a ride.  
Because he was driving at the moment of the beep, Louis was unable to immediately 
record his experience at the moment of the beep and was therefore unable to pinpoint 
which of these series of questions and inner seeing combinations was present right at the 
beep. 
 
Sample 3.5: Louis was in class. He was watching his friends play a game of Scrabble on 
their iPhones.  Louis’s friend had just made the word, “VD.” At the moment of the beep 
Louis is laughing because the letters stand for “venereal disease.” Louis is laughing hard 
and it is a good feeling.  He’s not paying attention to anything else; he’s just laughing. 
 
Sample 3.6: Louis and his friend James were talking about Louis’ upcoming move 
[relocation]. James had just asked Louis a question about where Louis was moving. At 
the moment of the beep, Louis is talking. He is not paying attention to anything in 
particular; he’s just talking. 
 
Sample 4.1: Louis was lying in bed with his eyes closed trying to relax. At the moment 
of the beep he is innerly seeing/hearing Quinn, a character from the TV show “Glee,” 
sing “Smile,” a song from the show. He is seeing/hearing Quinn singing “sad words 
goodbye” along with the accompanying melody, and is more focused on the hearing 
aspect of this experience than the seeing aspect. He is seeing Quinn from straight ahead, 
from the waist up, wearing a red and white cheerleader’s outfit (which she wears on the 
show), with the center of his attention on her mouth as she sings. He sees her in motion, 
singing the song. This seeing does not appear to have a specific location in space, but 
Louis seems to be looking forward at her.  
 
Sample 4.2: Louis was lying in his bed with his eyes closed trying to relax and to clear 
his mind.  A bit before the beep he was actively trying to clear his mind. At the moment 
of the beep this active trying to clear his mind has been replaced by what is apparently 
the fruit of the trying: he innerly sees a dark, three-dimensional void that is spreading, 
pushing off to the sides his previous thoughts. These thoughts are represented by very 
bright, white light around the right and left edges of the expanding darkness. The 
spreading, expanding void is a ragged square, the edges of which are not straight but are 
jagged as the void pushes the thoughts away.  
 
Sample 4.3: Louis was in the car, waiting to make a right turn at a red light. At the 
moment of the beep he is watching the cars coming toward him from his left. He is 
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impatiently/eagerly awaiting a hole in the traffic, but this is less centrally in his 
awareness than the watching of the cars. 
 
Sample 4.4: Louis was driving and hearing a Rhianna song on the radio. At the moment 
of the beep he hears the Rhianna song and innerly sees a close-up of Rhianna’s face and 
particularly her Mohawk hair. The background is black behind her. He sees Rhianna sing 
the song that he hears on the radio, as if he were watching a music video. He is also 
paying attention to the physical sensation of his jaw opening as he is yawning, but this is 
less central to his experience. 
 
Sample 4.5: Louis was cleaning the trunk of his car because his dog had “shit in the 
trunk.” At the moment of the beep Louis is innerly screaming, “I hate this fucking shit!” 
He is irate/angry/pissed off.  The inner screaming is loud and intense, but not at 100% of 
his possible intensity. Besides the yelling, his anger is manifested as a heat expanding in 
his chest and radiating out to his hands, which are shaking. His physical anger is less 
centrally in his awareness than the inner yelling. 
 
Sample 4.6: Louis was watching a documentary on TV. He was watching a woman speak 
about something. At the moment of the beep he is focused on the redness of the woman’s 
lips. He is absorbed in the redness of her lips and is not aware of anything else.  
 
Sample 5.1: Louis was leaning down, and his dog was licking his face. At the moment of 
the beep Louis is innerly saying, “awww kisses” in his own voice, only high-pitched and 
more feminine. He is also feeling the wetness of his dog’s saliva on his right cheek.  
 
Sample 5.2: At the moment of the beep Louis is staring intently into his dog’s eyes, 
holding his dog tightly by the snout and is saying in a harsh voice, “When I say no I mean 
no [beep], OK Hailey?” Louis is feeling irritated, and this irritation is manifesting in his 
aggressive handling of the dog’s snout. In staring at the dog, Louis is trying to 
communicate with her telepathically; trying to impose his thoughts on her.  
 
Sample 5.3: Louis was using a ladle to scoop beef stew from the pot into a bowl. At the 
moment of the beep he is paying attention to what he is doing, trying not to spill the stew. 
He also smells the beef stew, which smells good. There is a segment of a Bon Jovi song 
playing over and over in his head (this segment is the only part of the song he knows), 
and at the moment of the beep he is hearing the music and lyrics, “halfway there, oh oh, 
living on a prayer.”  
 
Sample 5.4: Louis was driving and looking at the mountains. At the moment of the beep 
he is looking at the mountains and remembering his platoon; he is experiencing a series 
of inner seeings of himself and his platoon hiking. Some of these inner seeings are 
memories of events he experienced with his platoon during training in California and 
others are not. During our interview Louis was unsure exactly which of these inner 
seeings was at the moment of the beep. Examples of these include the following: 1) Louis 
and three other guys from his platoon are hiking and have run out of water. Louis sees 
one of the guys is asking him for water. The guys are wearing Kevlar and helmets but 
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their faces are undefined, blurry. 2) Louis and his platoon members are getting ready to 
scale a mountain; they are in the prone position.  
 
Sample 5.5: Louis was reading a text message on his cell phone. At the moment of the 
beep he is innerly reading the text message to himself in his own, nondistinct voice, “It’s 
Holly’s birthday today.” He is also innerly seeing Holly’s face smiling brightly. 
 
Sample 5.6: Louis was thinking about an interaction he’d had with a guy yesterday, and 
was replaying the interaction over in his head, obsessing about what he wishes he would 
have said at the time. At the moment of the beep Louis is mentally replaying the 
interaction; he innerly sees himself speaking with the guy. He sees himself from the third 
person perspective; he sees the back of his head and the guy’s face as well, as though he 
is seeing through his own head. Louis is talking to the guy, saying what he wishes he had 
said at the time. Louis also feels irritated/mad/disappointed in himself at the moment of 
the beep. (Louis did not want to disclose what he was innerly saying at the beep nor did 
he want to disclose the subject matter of the conversation).  
 
Sample 6.1: Louis was thinking about the sampling process, about being asked questions 
and responding to those questions. At the moment of the beep Louis is hearing Dr. 
Hurlburt’s voice saying, “…be in someone’s awareness” as part of the question, ‘what 
does it mean to be in someone’s awareness.’ However, the “what does it mean to” is 
implied—that is, it is not that he heard Hurlburt say the whole sentence but the beep 
came in the last half.  This hearing is a part of a general thinking process that involves 
being asked questions about inner experience, and answering those questions. Louis is 
also tracking/monitoring his dog across the room, but this is less central to his experience 
at the moment of the beep.  
 
Sample 6.2: Louis was talking with his mom, who was standing behind him. She had just 
asked him the name of the cruise they’re going on. At the moment of the beep Louis is 
saying out loud, “Carnival Cruise.” There is nothing in his awareness at the moment of 
the beep.  The words “Carnival Cruise” were “just blurted out,” apparently without the 
experience of creating them. 
 
Sample 6.3: Louis was sitting at the computer, navigating through the Carnival Cruise 
webpage looking for the name of the cruise ship that his mother had asked about. He is 
engaged in this action, reading the labels on the web buttons, clicking on buttons to 
narrow down his search. At the moment of the beep he is more drawn to the colors on the 
webpage than the content. There are bright colors on the side of the page that draw his 
attention, and the color of the buttons that change from dark to light as he clicks in the 
center of the page also draws his attention. 
 
Sample 6.4: At the moment of the beep Louis is scratching his dog and saying out loud, 
“good girl.” He is aware of scratching the dog, but what he is saying is not in his 
awareness, he’s just saying it.  He is much more aware of the act of scratching than of the 
feeling in his fingertips caused by the contact with the dog. 
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Sample 6.5: Louis was in his closet looking for something to wear, but the clothes at 
which his eyes are aimed are not in his experience at the moment of the beep. At the 
moment of the beep Louis hears himself say, “Hey, I missed you” to a friend, Joe.  Louis 
innerly sees Joe’s face and spiky hair from a first person perspective as if he is sitting in 
the class he has with his friend and turning to his right toward his friend, who is turned 
looking at him.  They are looking into each other’s eyes. Louis sees Joe’s spiked hair 
clearly, and sees the table at which they are sitting clearly, but Joe’s face is not 
differentiated.  Louis knows it is Joe, but he cannot see the features.  In particular, Louis 
cannot discern the emotional expression, if any, on Joe’s face. Louis does not experience 
emotion, despite the apparent emotional situation of the inner seeing. 
 
Sample 6.6: Louis was looking at himself in the mirror and had noticed a stain on his 
sweater. At the moment of the beep Louis is trying to figure out how that stain got there. 
He is innerly seeing himself from the neck down to the waist, wearing the sweater and 
moving about – the sweater is not stained. The “rest” of the seeing has not formed –Louis 
is trying to trying to figure out how the stain got on the sweater which involved trying to 
fill in the inner seeing with the details of when he had last worn the sweater.  
 
Andrew (Chapter 7) 
 
Sample 1.1: Andrew was reading materials on the computer, studying for his 
communications class. At the moment of the beep he is blank. The blankness is like being 
spaced out.  
 
Sample 1.2: Andrew was lying on the couch and trying to relax and take a nap. At the 
moment of the beep his body is feeling heavy/weighted down and simultaneously like he 
is floating. His eyelids are heavy. He is trying to relax and fall asleep but is feeling like 
he cannot control his relaxation. He feels frustrated and defeated about his lack of 
control. 
 
Sample 1.3: Andrew was thinking about Stew, a marine he had been deployed with in 
Iraq and was wishing he had whooped Stew’s ass for messing with Hank, a marine under 
Andrew’s charge. At the moment of the beep Andrew is recollecting an event that had 
occurred in Iraq. This recollection is a visual still-shot from the first-person perspective 
of an actual event that occurred in Iraq. Andrew is seeing Stew’s face about a ½ foot 
away, and is seeing Hank standing in the background off to the right. Andrew is seeing 
brown dirt and desert in the background [what he is seeing is not an accurate 
representation of the actual background present at the time of the ‘real-life’ event; the 
background in his seeing is less defined and less detailed]. Although there is no motion, 
Andrew can hear Stew saying “Shut the fuck up” over and over. Stew is not quite yelling 
this at Andrew, but is saying it in a loud voice.  Simultaneously, Andrew is feeling angry, 
pissed off. He experiences this anger in the area of his heart and as his heart beating 
faster, “like an adrenaline rush.”    
 
Sample 1.4: Andrew was on Facebook playing Farmville. He was in the process of 
arranging the various elements of his farm so that everything would be perfectly 
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symmetrical. As he moved each element toward symmetry, he felt an increasing rush of 
joy and happiness.  At the moment of the beep Andrew is moving a tree into a more 
symmetrical position and is experiencing tremendous joy and happiness. This 
joy/happiness is experienced as lightness in the chest; as if he is “smiling on the inside.” 
Andrew has a slight awareness of the tree in the background, but this is far less central to 
his experience than the joy/happiness. 
 
Sample 1.5: Andrew was sitting at the computer, searching for something to entertain 
him. At the moment of the beep he is staring at the Google search page, trying to think of 
something to enter into the search window to find something to entertain him. 
 
Sample 1.6: It was about 10:04 pm and Andrew was thinking he should go to bed but 
was dreading the task after being unable to sleep the night before. At the moment of the 
beep Andrew is innerly seeing his room. He is seeing the foot of the bed, his bookshelf, 
and the shadow of the closet. Most prominently, he is seeing the orange 
glow/illumination of the streetlight shining into his room through the blinds. The orange 
glow of the streetlight is the most salient aspect of his seeing; this orange glow represents 
the inability to sleep. Andrew is simultaneously experiencing dread, experienced as a 
kind of mental sigh.  
 
Sample 2.1: Andrew was sitting at the DMV waiting for his number to be called. At the 
moment of the beep Andrew is feeling anonymous, like he’s just a number, or just one of 
many. This feeling is a comfortable, familiar one. He is also looking at the numbers on 
the number display board.  
 
Sample 2.2: Andrew was at the DMV having a conversation with an older man. The man 
was describing his wartime experiences to Andrew. At the moment of the beep Andrew 
was relating to this man; there was a feeling of connection/bond with this man. The 
connection was a result of having a shared experience of war, although this was not in 
Andrew’s awareness at the moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 2.3: Andrew was at home reading news story on his computer. The story was 
about Marines in Afghanistan and had an accompanying video feed. This story reminded 
Andrew of his wartime buddies, who he had not seen in a while. At the moment of the 
beep Andrew is missing his friends. This missing feeling has a little bit of sadness to it, 
and an accompanying mild heaviness in his chest area, right around his heart.  
 
Sample 2.4: Andrew had just finished doing his laundry and was looking at the finished 
laundry with a sense of accomplishment. At the moment of the beep Andrew is feeling 
happy and a small energy rush. The happiness and energy are two separate experiences 
but are occurring simultaneously. The small energy rush is in his chest around his heart 
and also spreading to his arms in a pulse-like sensation. There is a simultaneous 
lightness/weightlessness in the area of his heart.  
 
Sample 2.5: Andrew was lying in his bed listening to music. At the moment of the beep 
Andrew is paying attention to the meaning of the lyrics of the song –“no one’s going to 
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hold me back” – and feeling unstoppable. This unstoppable feeling was a mental feeling 
of relating to the song lyrics and feeling unstoppable as a result.  
 
Sample 2.6: At the moment of the beep Andrew is thinking about the sampling meeting 
and anticipating the release of the weight on his shoulders/the burden of his feelings 
during the sampling meeting. There is a jittery feeling around his heart that may represent 
anticipation. He is also anticipating the interview itself, but that is less salient at the 
moment of the beep.  
 
Sample 3.1: Andrew had just finished eating the eggs Benedict he had cooked for 
breakfast. At the moment of the beep he is feeling euphoric: very warm and comforted. 
He describes this feeling as feeling like “home-cooked meals, or eating something hot on 
a cold day that your mom made.”  He is also feeling a mild sense of accomplishment for 
having cooked himself eggs Benedict but this is less central to his awareness at the 
moment. The TV is on, and he is seeing it enough to know that a commercial is on, but he 
is not paying much attention to it. 
 
Sample 3.2: Andrew had just finished speaking on the phone with his grandmother. At 
the moment of the beep he is feeling that he failed his family members who are in another 
city.  The feeling of failure is specific to his family members in this other city and does 
not include his family members in Las Vegas.  He also feels detachment. His heart feels 
like it is being squeezed in someone’s hand.  This is a medium level of pressure, like a 
firm handshake all around his heart.  
 
Sample 3.3: Andrew had just been with his mother and was now driving in his car, 
leaving his mother. At the moment of the beep Andrew is seeing a still image of his 
mother’s face. His mother is looking directly at him and he sees that she is sad though he 
cannot see the details of her face.  He can see that she is not crying or frowning. Andrew 
is feeling a sense of responsibility toward his mother, mixed with a little sadness; this 
feels like a heaviness pushing down on his shoulders. Andrew’s eyes also feel a little 
warm/humid, like they are about to get watery. Andrew was aware of the world around 
him (the noises, the other cars, etc.) but also felt like he was invisible, like was not fully 
present in the world around him. This sense of being invisible was only peripherally in 
his awareness at the moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 3.4: Andrew was getting ready to go out and was looking at himself in the 
mirror. At the moment of the beep Andrew is feeling calm/at ease, and a little bit happy. 
These are mental feelings that are not accompanied by any sensations.  He is also looking 
into his eyes in the mirror and can see himself from the chest up. 
 
Sample 3.5: Andrew was on his way to Claim Jumper.  His ex-girlfriend is driving, 
taking him out to dinner at his favorite restaurant. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
eager, energized about going to Claim Jumper.  His body surges with excitement, 
primarily experienced as a surge of energy or adrenaline that starts in the region of his 
heart and branches out through his chest toward his shoulders, feeling like several (maybe 
3 to 5) marble-sized ball-bearings rolling through his veins toward his shoulders. His 
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right leg bounces up and down as he rapidly taps his foot—he’s more aware of the 
bouncing of his hand on his knee than he is of the foot itself.  The bouncing-hand-on-leg 
experience is not as central to him as the chest rush.  It is unclear whether the “going to 
Claim Jumper” is actually present as part of his excitement at the beep, or whether it is 
simply excitement brought on by the going to Claim Jumper.   
 
Sample 3.6: Andrew was at Claim Jumper. At the moment of the beep he is feeling 
happy about being at Claim Jumper. This happiness has no accompanying characteristics 
or sensations; he is just happy. At the same time, much less central in his experience, he 
is uneasy or vigilant.  He hears/sees in an undifferentiated way the noise and activity of 
the restaurant and feels as if someone there is watching him, feels distressed because he 
doesn’t know who, feels his body tense and stiffen as he monitors the surroundings. 
 
Sample 4.1: Andrew was sitting in his car at school. At the moment of the beep he is 
staring at the airport parking garage, but it is not clear whether this means that his 
eyeballs are idly aimed at the garage, or whether he is actually seeing the garage. He is 
feeling lazy, restless, frustrated at having to be at school, dreading having to leave his car. 
His eyelids are feeling heavy and his eyes feel pressure, like they are being pushed down 
from behind. These things are said to be all interrelated but separate, but the interviewers 
had difficulty ascertaining the extent to which they are actually experienced at the 
moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 4.2: Andrew was walking to class. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
experiencing the coolness of the breeze on his arm, contrasted against the heat of the sun. 
The coolness is on the surface of his skin, but also just below the surface; it feels 
pleasant. Andrew is also feeling better/happier, brought on by arm coolness, the nice 
weather and the familiarity of the song that he is listening to on his iPod. Although he 
believes the iPod music is affecting his mood, the music itself is not central to his 
experience.  
 
Sample 4.3: Andrew was in class, hearing the professor lecture, and taking notes. At the 
moment of the beep Andrew is writing what he had seen on the overhead.  He has written 
perhaps two words and is now trying unsuccessfully to remember what words come next. 
It is unclear to the interviewers whether he is merely trying to remember, or whether he is 
trying to remember and also observing himself as unsuccessfully remembering.  He is 
also hearing the professor’s voice but it sounds like noise, not words, and he is not 
comprehending the content of what the professor is saying. 
Sample 4.4: Andrew was at home, and had received a job offer about 10 minutes prior to 
the beep. At the moment of the beep, Andrew is happy and has a sense of 
accomplishment. Andrew feels physically lighter in his whole body, as though a physical 
weight has been lifted from his shoulders, and has somehow a mental sigh of relief, as if 
he is mentally saying “Yes!” but in fact is not saying anything, mentally or otherwise.  
Much less salient is a slight nervousness about having been out of retail work for some 
time.  
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Sample 5.1: Andrew was sitting on the couch with his shoes off, after a long day at work. 
At the moment of the beep Andrew’s feet are aching all over and he feels a dull, round 
jabbing pain in the bottom middle of his foot, in the meaty part between the heel and the 
balls of his feet. The jabbing is approximately 1.5 inches in diameter, like a dull rod 
pushing up into the area where the arches of his feet should be.  (He has flat feet.)  His is 
also feeling heat release out of his feet into the cool air.  His feet had been hot and steamy 
from having shoes on all day; he is feeling this heat escape his feet.  At the same time 
Andrew is feeling relaxed all over his body, but this is very minimally in his experience 
(about 5%).  
 
Sample 5.2: Andrew was sitting on the couch and slowly drinking a beer. At the moment 
of the beep Andrew is feeling the carbonation of the beer on the inside of his mouth. The 
carbonation feels like light stinging sensations all over his mouth; the stinging is very 
mildly aversive. Andrew also tastes the limey-ness of the lime beer, which he likes, and 
he is generally thinking the beer tastes good. This thinking does not have any 
characteristics (words, images, etc) but is somehow present at the moment of the beep.  
 
Sample 5.3: Andrew was sitting on the couch. At the moment of the beep he is moving 
his hands on the couch and feeling the coolness of the fabric on his hands. He also feels 
his body (not including arms and hands) melting or sinking into the couch. He is also 
having a mental process about being relaxed, something like, “I’m so relaxed” only there 
are no actual words present.  
 
Sample 5.4: Andrew was watching America’s Best Dance Crew on TV. At the moment 
of the beep he is wanting/wishing he could do the tricks the dancers are doing. This 
wanting is a mental/cognitive process with no characteristics. Part of the wanting is 
bodily, like an adrenaline rush causing his heart to beat faster. He is also innerly saying to 
himself “dammmnnnnn” (indicating amazement) and the beep catches the last, lingering 
part of the word, “mmmnnnnn.” Andrew is also paying attention to the TV, watching the 
dancers do dance tricks, although this is slightly less in his awareness.  
 
Sample 5.5: Andrew was in and out of napping, dozing off. At the moment of the beep 
he is feeling a familiar, comforting tiredness both mentally and physically. This tiredness 
is like a happy, comforting relief in his head and body. He is feeling the tiredness 
particularly in the sensation of his eyelids being heavy.   
 
Sample 6.1: Andrew was joking around with his army buddies. At the moment of the 
beep Andrew laughing – this laughter is hearty, genuine, all-consuming. He is noticing 
the slight tightness in his abdomen caused by the hearty laughter. He is almost 
completely absorbed in this laughter at the moment of the beep (about 90%) and is also 
feeling a close/comfortableness (about 10%) toward his buddies. On retrospection, 
Andrew views this laughter as “being myself,” unlike laughter in other (not with his 
buddy) situations which he views as being restrained or inauthentic. 
 
Sample 6.2: Andrew was laughing and joking around with his marine buddies. Andrew’s 
buddy had just made a joking jab at Andrew, and Andrew was responding. At the 
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moment of the beep Andrew saying out loud, “Shut the fuck up and go eat a bucket of 
Crisco” (the beep catches him as he’s saying the latter part of the sentence, which is 
written here in bold). Andrew is saying this in a snickering, joking way, and is also trying 
to hold back his laughter. This holding back feels like laughter in his head which he’s 
trying to keep from coming out so that he can finish his sentence.  
 
Sample 6.3: Andrew was sitting through a presentation. At the moment of the beep 
Andrew is feeling fidgety in his chest, arms and hands. This fidgetiness is an internal, 
bodily feeling that he takes to be heightened by the left over energy from his previous 
laughter. He is also feeling impatient/wanting to go home. He is also squeezing the skin 
in the middle of his forehead with his fingers to the point of pain. It seems that the 
squeezing of the forehead skin is a part of/reaction to/defense of the impatience, but that 
is not certain.   
 
Sample 6.4: Andrew was sitting through a presentation about post-war trauma, emotions, 
and other topics relevant to returning troops. At the moment of the beep he is intensely 
staring at the wheel of the table in front of him, and is mostly absorbed in this staring. He 
is also reflecting on how detached he has been and feeling mildly down. This reflecting 
seemed somewhat like a thought but, if it was one, it was vague and ill defined.   
 
Sample 6.5: Andrew was lying on the ground, staring at the ceiling. At the moment of 
the beep he is innerly saying, “I’m not going to miss this.” He is also feeling impatience 
and is wanting to leave and much less saliently, he is having a paradoxical feeling of 
wanting to stay. 
 
Sample 7.1: Andrew was walking around his house after getting off the phone with a 
loan officer who had given him bad news regarding his loan. At the moment of the beep 
Andrew is furious, betrayed, which manifests itself in part as directly experienced 
warmth throughout his body, most intensely in his chest and ears.  As part of or parallel 
to this rage, Andrew wants to punch something: he feels a surge of energy in his arms, 
which he feels as trembling (although he doubts that they were physically trembling) and 
tickling, particularly his biceps and palms, as if he is physically restraining himself from 
punching. Andrew reports that the rage has been building over the past 5 or 10 minutes 
since getting off the phone. The fury/betrayal/rage is understood to be the result of the 
loan-officer conversation, but Andrew does not experience his rage as being aimed at the 
loan-officer—it is experienced as pure, objectless rage. 
 
Sample 7.2: Andrew was on the phone; a girl from work whom he had been dating on 
and off, had telephoned him; she wanted to talk. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
saying to her, “I just saw you [beep] less than an hour ago” and is annoyed and feels like 
he wants to escape. The annoyance is a mental process that is 50% directed toward the 
girl on the phone, and 50% directed toward the loan officer from the previous beep. 
Wanting to escape is a feeling of anticipation, like his insides are being pulled forward 
and he wants to run away.  
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Sample 7.3: Andrew was eating his favorite Subway sandwich, a spicy Italian with 
chipotle sauce. At the moment of the beep Andrew tastes the sandwich, particularly the 
chipotle sauce and the pepperoni, and the taste is good, pleasant. He is effortfully 
concentrating on the sandwich, trying not to let his mind wander to other things 
(particularly the loan situation of 7.1). There is a small lingering sense of annoyance still 
present.  
 
Sample 7.4: Andrew was lying on the couch with the TV on. At the moment of the beep 
Andrew is annoyed and wants to kick something. He feels his heart beating fast, and feels 
a tickling, trembling surge of energy in the upper, front part of both thighs.  
 
Sample 7.5: Andrew was lying on the couch. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
feeling consumed by anger/annoyance and is at the same time noticing how consumed he 
is by anger/annoyance. The majority (he calls it 75%) of his experience is taken up by the 
noticing of how consumed he is by anger (by comparison to the consumed-by-anger 
itself, 25%). This “consumed by anger” is like a cloudiness that is surrounding him, or 
encasing him.  That is, his seeing (and perhaps his other senses) is cloudy, unclear. 
 
Sample 7.6: Andrew was playing a videogame. At the moment of the beep Andrew is 
enjoying playing the videogame. He also simultaneously experiences a very low level of 
annoyance that is lingering in the physical space behind him–he is physically out in front 
of it. Very minimally in his awareness is the intense, vivid image of the videogame on the 
TV screen, which is somehow experienced as both being on the TV screen and being 
internal, like Andrew is somehow connected to the videogame. 
  
Peter (Chapter 8) 
 
Sample 1.1: At the moment of the beep Peteris concentrating on the pain in his right 
knee (60% concentration) and his lower back (40% concentration). The pain in his knee 
has flared up to a peak and then remained constant, feels like very intense pressure 
pushing from the back of his kneecap directly outwards. The pain in his back is a dull 
pain like someone is carefully, slowly pushing a pin up through the middle of the bottom 
vertebra and up into the next 2 vertebrae.  Peter is also looking at his son who is standing 
in front of him.  He is in a daze, spaced out, and is searching within himself for some 
emotion, and finding no emotion – like he is a shell.  The searching for emotion is said to 
be an active doing, trying unsuccessfully to find emotion.  
 
Sample 1.2: Peter was walking through the casino at the Luxor.  His eyes were aimed at 
a security guard in front of him, but Peter was not experiencing him. At the moment of 
the beep Peter is paying attention to the people all around him. Specifically, he is looking 
at the mirror reflection of the 13 people behind him. The mirror is a thin mirror about 3 
inches wide located on a pillar 45 degrees off to Peter’s right. Peter is looking at the 
reflection of the people in this mirror with his peripheral vision (his eyes are pointed 
forward), and is seeing 13 people reflected in the mirror.  He is paying attention to the 
details of each person he is seeing in the reflection. This was understood to be a direct 
seeing of the reflection of these people.  [When it was pointed out to Peter that what he 
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was seeing seemed to violate the geometry of optics, Peter’s conviction that he was 
actually seeing the reflection of 13 people was not swayed]. At the same time he is 
having the thought that he hates people walking behind him; this thought is in his direct 
experience but does not include words or images. At the same time Peter is innerly seeing 
the badge of the security officer who is standing in front of him. He is seeing the gold 
badge with black lettering that reads “J.D. Minnesota.” He is seeing the badge about a 
foot out in front of him and to the upper left. The seeing of the badge is less clear than the 
actual seeing of the reflection of the people in the mirror.  Peter is also aware of the 6 
people off to his left and the about 20 people in front of him. 
 
Sample 1.3: Skipped this sample due to time. 
 
Sample 1.4: Skipped this sample due to time.  
 
Sample 1.5: Peter was sitting in the corner booth of a restaurant at the Orleans, rapidly 
surveying each individual person in his environment, one at a time, from close right to far 
left. At the moment of the beep Peter is looking at a guy dressed in all black and wearing 
a Raider’s shirt, black shoes with a blue stripe, with a scar on his face and an earring in 
his right ear.  This man is about 30-40 feet away, at Peter’s 10 o’clock. He is paying most 
attention to the guy’s facial expression, trying to determine whether the guy is a 
“go/green checkmark/good” or a “no-go/red X/bad.” Peter is enraged, his fists clenching, 
jaw clenching so hard that he worried (after the beep) he might shatter his teeth, but this 
rage is not in his awareness at the moment of the beep.  He wants to fight, is in the kind 
of mood where he will pick a fight with someone (anyone), wants to break the arm of the 
guy in the black shirt, but none of that is directly in his experience at the moment of the 
beep.  
 
Sample 2.1: Peter was on the phone with his buddy Sam, who is talking. At the moment 
of the beep Peter is unsuccessfully trying to understand what Stan is saying. All his 
attention is focused on trying to understand Stan.  He hears Stan’s voice, but it is just 
noise, not words, much less the meaning behind the words.  There is nothing else in his 
experience other than this intense trying-to-understand – he is fully absorbed in trying to 
understand. 
 
Sample 2.2: Peter was sitting on the couch doing nothing in particular. At the moment of 
the beep Peter is innerly himself sitting on the couch. He is seeing himself from a 
perspective behind and slightly above and to the left.  He sees only lines, a curved solid, 
sketched line representing the left side of his face, another curved line representing the 
right side of the back of his head, and another curved line representing his left ear. He is 
seeing some straight lines that represent the walls and floor and couch.  Thus he sees only 
outlines—he does not see what is in between the outlines—as if he is seeing a pencil or 
charcoal sketch.  Everything he’s seeing looks as though it is sketched with a charcoal 
pencil.  
 
Sample 2.3: At the moment of the beep Peter is focusing on creating of physical pain all 
over his body, from the top of his head to the bottom of his feet and from the surface of 
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his body down to his bones. That is, he is not merely feeling the intense pain all over his 
body; he is focused on creating it and experiencing it. He described this as part of a 
process he goes through to create pain throughout his body so he can relieve his pain.   
 
Sample 2.4: It is unclear what is in Peter’s experience at the moment of the beep. It is 
possible that he was cold at the moment of the beep and was experiencing this coldness 
all over his body. He also mentioned that he was scared and alone but is unsure what was 
at the moment of the beep and what wasn’t.  We did not explore this beep in detail 
because we had run out of time and it was agreed that Peter’s revised understanding of 
experience and the moment of the beep would allow him to apprehend his experience for 
the next session.   
 
Sample 3.1: Peter was in class with a book open in front of him. At the moment of the 
beep Peter is reading from word to word on the page in front of him but he is not 
comprehending, or in any way understanding the words in front of him – the words may 
well have been in Japanese and this would not have made a difference. His eyes are just 
moving from word to word.  At the beep he had just read the words “cross- 
contamination” but he only comprehended what the words were after the beep.  
 
Sample 3.2: Peter was in class. At the moment of the beep Peter is innerly seeing himself 
strangling Carl. Peter is clearly seeing himself and Carl, head to toe, from a third-person 
perspective, the seen-Peter on the left and Carl on the right.  They (Seen Peter and Carl) 
are both wearing their white culinary school uniforms and standing in their culinary 
school classroom.  Real Peter sees tan walls and tables and chairs around them 
(apparently an accurate recreation of the actual classroom except that there are no people 
in the imaginary classroom other than Seen Peter and Carl, and there are many other 
students in the real classroom). Real Peter sees Seen Peter’s hands around Carl’s neck; 
the veins in Seen Peter’s hands and arms are pulsating. Carl is dead as a result of the 
strangling. Seen Peter is staring into Carl’s eyes, and this is Real Peter’s focus. Seen Peter 
is feeling sad, confused, angry, all at once, which Real Peter can tell by Seen Peter’s 
facial expression, but Real Peter is not experiencing any emotion. At the same time, Real 
Peter hears the dull buzz of voices in the room; these voices sound like they’re coming 
from behind him. 
 
Sample 3.3: At the moment of the beep Peter is concentrated on creating pain in his left 
knee. He is creating a dull physical pain going from the bottom of his kneecap, 
underneath it and upwards. Peter’s understanding was that he had felt strong pain in the 
right side of his body, and he was engaged in a strategy of pain management.  Somewhat 
before the beep, he had been trying successfully to imagine (that is, to experience 
nonexistent) pain in the left side of his head; then he had successfully imagined pain in 
his left shoulder, then his left arm, then his left torso, then his left thigh, and now was in 
the process imaging pain in his left knee. He was not yet successful in this attempt, and 
the beep interrupted the entire process. Without the interruption, it was Peter’s sense that 
he would have continued imaging pain down his left leg and foot, and when he had been 
successful in all those left-side aspects, he would then imagine pain in the entire left side 
of his body.  That imagining would have the effect of blocking the actual pain from his 
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right side for a while, perhaps measured in hours.  The beep disturbed the process, and he 
had to start it over again from his head on down.  
 
Sample 3.4: Peter was sitting in class. At the moment of the beep there is absolutely 
nothing in Peter’s experience – his experience is completely blank.  
 
Sample 3.5: Peter was searching for something, and was visually scanning the metal 
table in front of him, seeing papers and other clutter on the table. At the moment of the 
beep he is visually absorbed in the yellowness of a highlighter that is on the table. He is 
completely absorbed in the yellowness of the highlighter and there is nothing else in his 
awareness. 
 
Sample 4.1: At the moment of the beep Peter is producing pain in his left shoulder. He 
has just started this process and doesn’t feel any pain yet. He has excluded the rest of the 
world and is entirely concentrating on a specific, thin area about the diameter of a pen in 
the soft part of his shoulder, just below the bony part. 
 
Sample 4.2: At the moment of the beep, Peter is having a flashback of a scene from Iraq. 
He is in his Humvee, gloved hands on his 50-caliber rifle, seeing in full 3-D color his 
friend Jay being blown up by an IED [improvised explosive device]. He sees the top left 
part of Jay’s head being blown up and to the left, his right arm flying off to the right, his 
left arm being flung to the left, spurts of blood everywhere. Peter feels the grip of his 50-
caliber rifle, smells the gunpowder and the chlorine from the explosive, tastes the grit. 
This is a multi-sensory experience but there is no sound. [Peter reported that as far as he 
can tell, he did not hear anything in ‘real-life’ at the time of the actual explosion that 
killed his friend in Iraq. He was unsure why he heard no sound]. 
 
Sample 4.3: Peter was working on his car. At the moment of the beep he is completely 
absorbed in the sunlight gleaming brightly off the chrome of his car. 
 
Sample 4.4: At the moment of the beep Peter is feeling hot and is feeling a prickling, hot 
sensation on his forehead [Peter said this prickly feeling is the feeling of sweat forming 
on his forehead]. His entire face feels hot but the prickly feeling is only in his forehead. 
 
Sample 5.1: Peter had just touched his finger to the hot metal of his brake caliper. At the 
moment of the beep Peter is experiencing pain in the tip of his right finger. The word 
PAIN is mentally flashing; the word is written in bold, white block letters, all capitals. It 
was as if the seeing was directed forward. 
 
Sample 5.2: Peter was looking at an old black and white wall clock across the room. At 
the moment of the beep he is seeing the second hand snap from twenty-two seconds to 
twenty-three seconds. He is focused on the movement of the second hand; he is not 
concerned with the time. In synch with the snap of the second hand, click, click, click, he 
innerly hears a sharp, metallic clicking sound, something like the sound he thinks the 
second hand might be making were he able to hear it. The metallic clicking is somehow 
present to him with each snap of the second hand, but it is not actually heard in the real 
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world. (The sound is something like two knives being clicked together or the sound an 
M16 trigger makes when being tested). 
 
Sample 5.3: Peter was watching a boiling pot of thick stew. At the moment of the beep 
Peter is completely absorbed in a bubble that is about to break through the surface in the 
thick, red liquid of the stew (external sensory awareness). 
 
Sample 5.4: Peter was at home, trying to find his sunglasses. At the moment of the beep 
Peter is innerly saying “glasses” over and over again [“glasses, glasses, glasses….”] and 
is in shape-recognition mode, looking for the shape of his glasses. He is taking in his 
surroundings, from periphery to periphery, and sees everything in his surroundings 
simultaneously. He knows what he is looking for and has a sense that his glasses will 
jump out at him when he sees them, but this is not clearly in his experience. 
 
Sample 5.5: At the moment of the beep Peter is trying to remember the date. This trying 
is experienced as nothingness, like a mental blackness, an awaiting the answer to appear.   
 
Sample 5.6: At the moment of the beep Peter is innerly seeing himself pulling the skin 
off of a woman’s face. He is seeing this from the first person perspective; his right hand 
is reaching out in front of him, and is holding the woman’s face, pulling the skin away 
from the face. The skin is stretched out tightly and is about to rip. He can see her eyes 
pointed upwards because of the angle of the pulled skin.  He is seeing only his hand and 
the woman’s face and head – she has long, curly blond hair. There is no background. 
 
Sample 6.1: Peter was lying in bed, cheek-to-cheek with his son. At the moment of the 
beep Peter is absorbed in the cold, smooth feeling of his son’s cheek on his own cheek 
(bodily sensory awareness). 
 
Sample 6.2: Peter was looking around the room for his dog tags. At the moment of the 
beep Peter is looking directly at his dog tags and is walking toward them. There is 
nothing in his awareness at this moment.  
 
Sample 6.3: Peter was staring at a piece of paper and was spacing out. At the moment of 
the beep Peter is noticing the blurriness of his vision and is actively, mentally trying to 
refocus his eyes. He is also feeling the muscles around the outer edges of both eyeballs 
straining, but this is less central in his experience. 
Sample 6.4: Peter’s arm had just twitched. At the moment of the beep Peter is intently 
staring at a small, 50-cent-piece-sized spot on his right arm, anticipating seeing another 
twitch. He had seen the previous twitch, and was now looking at the same region of his 
arm to see another one.  (The twitch is not felt bodily—this is a visual phenomenon.)  
Simultaneously, he feels a tensing tightness about the size of a softball in the area of his 
sternum (just below his chest and just above is stomach); this bodily tenseness is what he 
calls the emotion of anticipation.  The tightness is a squeezing in of this region. 
 
Sample 6.5: Peter was in the car and was staring at the red light of the stop light. At the 
moment of the beep he is completely absorbed in the bright redness of the red light. At 
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the same time (or possibly a millisecond before or after, but so close in time that it was 
difficult for Peter to tease apart) Peter is wondering how many light bulbs there are. This 
wondering is not occurring in words or images, it is not being said or heard, it is a 
specific wondering with no characteristics. 
 
Sample 6.6: At the moment of the beep Peter is completely absorbed in the imaginary 
smelling and tasting of sulfur. The smell is so strong it includes a sensation of burning 
along the inside of both nostrils. (Peter noted that the smell and taste of sulfur were very, 
very strong, as though coming from a sulfur pit, however, there was no sulfur or sulfur pit 
in his environment). 
 
Sample 7.1: Peter was sitting in the dark, at home. At the moment of the beep he innerly 
sees himself stab someone in the side of the face. He sees his hand moving from the right 
to the left holding a knife horizontally, stabbing the face from the side. He sees his hand, 
the knife hilt and blade and the tip of the blade piercing the skin of the cheek. The face he 
is stabbing is blurry and unclear, except for the spot being stabbed, which is clear. He 
knows this face to be the face of the “enemy.”  
 
Sample 7.2: Peter was watching TV. The window was open and a cool breeze had just 
blown into the room. At the moment of the beep Peter feels cold on the left side of his 
back and ribs. This coldness is slightly stinging and penetrating from the surface of his 
skin where it is most intense, down to his bones, where it is less intense.  
 
Sample 7.3: Peter was cleaning his 45-colt revolver and doing function checks. At the 
moment of the beep Peter feels the roughness of the hammer on the meaty part of his 
thumb. He is completely absorbed in the roughness of the hammer, which feels like 
pressing his thumb on rough sandpaper (bodily sensory awareness).  
 
Sample 7.4: Peter was ironing his white chef’s jacket, and had just placed the iron off to 
the side. At the moment of the beep his eyes are fixed on the jacket, which is not directly 
in his experience.  Instead, he is completely absorbed (his word was “stuck”) in infinite, 
very bright, illuminated whiteness. This whiteness is much brighter than the whiteness of 
the chef’s jacket; it is as bright as looking into a headlight and is all around him in an 
unbounded, uniform fashion. 
 
Sample 7.5: Peter had just walked into an audio store. At the moment of the beep Peter is 
vigilantly taking in his surroundings. He is taking in his surroundings from periphery to 
periphery and sees everything simultaneously; however, his eyes are pointed forward, 
unmoving. Although he is looking at everything, nothing is particularly in focus. The 
vigilant taking in is done with the purpose of finding anything that may be out of place or 
dangerous, but this is not in his awareness at the moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 7.6: Peter‘s eyes were fixed on his Xbox, but the Xbox was not in his experience 
at the moment of the beep.  Instead, Peter sees a flash of intense, imagined redness. The 
redness is a solid, intense, fire engine red located only in the spot in which he is looking. 
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Sample 8.1: Peter was sitting at home on his couch, and was purposefully fantasizing 
about harming his ex-wife. At the moment of the beep Peter innerly sees his ex-wife 
lying on a stainless-steel countertop; she is nude and the top 3 layers of her skin have 
been peeled off by him, leaving a uniformly red tinge to her body from head to toe. Peter 
sees himself standing over her body and pouring liquid sodium-iodide onto her body – 
the beep occurs when the liquid is pouring out of its container but has not yet hit her body 
(it is in midstream). Peter sees, from a perspective slightly above and looking obliquely 
down, the right side of his own body from head to toe, standing over his ex-wife who is 
seen lying on a stainless steel table, her feet pointed toward where he is viewing the scene 
from. Her head is obscured by his body. To the center of this seeing is the pouring of the 
liquid onto her body, but Peter also sees details of the room, including windowed walls, 
knives and other tools used for skinning his ex-wife and an IV hooked into her arm.  The 
ex-wife is alive; the object of this imaginary skinning and pouring is to inflict a 
maximum amount of pain—salt into open wounds, head to toe. 
 
Sample 8.2: Peter was wondering about what type of lawyer he needed. At the moment 
of the beep Peter is innerly saying the word ‘lawyer’ in a flat tone of voice. He was 
engaged in wondering about what type of lawyer he needs, but that wondering was not in 
his awareness at the beep.   
 
Sample 8.3: At the moment of the beep Peter is feeling moderately hot all over the 
surface of his face.  
 
Sample 8.4: Peter was working on his car getting ready to tighten a bolt with a rachet. At 
the moment of the beep he is thinking, “lefty loosey, righty tighty.” This thought does not 
involve clear words or images but is unfolding over time such that the beep occurs at the 
pause between ‘loosey’ and ‘righty’ as if the thinking has some kind of rhythm or 
temporality even though it does not have words.  
 
Sample 8.5: Peter was at an auto-shop and a mechanic named Ryan was talking to him 
about car-parts. At the moment of the beep Peter innerly sees himself, from a first person 
perspective, punching Ryan in the face. Peter is most focused on the ripples in Ryan’s 
facial skin, created by the impact of the punch. The ripples are moving outward from the 
site of impact, from the cheek area toward the temple, and each ripple is distinct and 
markedly slowed down in time, such that it takes about two seconds for the ripples to 
travel from the point of impact to the ear (an event that would happen in real life in a 
fraction of a second).  However the rippling motion does not seem slowed down to Peter. 
Peter also sees his forearm and fist, and Ryan’s body from about the chest up, although 
Ryan’s body is non-descript and blurry.  Thus Peter sees himself hit Ryan in the face and 
sees the resulting skin ripples, all in one seeing that seems quite natural.  But on closer 
examination, the hitting takes place at the usual pace whereas the ripples are dramatically 
slowed, even though all seems quite natural and not time altered. 
 
Sample 8.6: Peter was looking at the front driver’s side of his truck and noticing how 
dirty it was. At the moment of the beep Peter is innerly saying, “Man, my truck is dirty.” 
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This inner saying is so vivid and intense that he may have also said it out loud at the same 
time, but he was not sure at the time of the interview. 
 
Sample 9.1: Peter was experiencing a completely consuming and loud ringing in his ears 
for at least several seconds. This ringing was so loud that he either did not hear or did not 
cognitively register that the beep was going off until after the ringing in his ears stopped. 
At the approximate moment of the beep Peter is completely consumed by the ringing in 
his ears. The ringing is intensely loud, clear, pure and high-pitched; approximately a 5000 
Hz tone [as roughly approximated using Audacity to create sine waves; 3520 seemed too 
low, 7040 seemed too high]. It is in his ears and inside his head. The sound is almost 
painful and is accompanied by or creates a strong pressure pushing from inside his head 
outwards in all directions.  
 
Sample 9.2: Peter was creating pain throughout his body. Just prior to the beep Peter was 
focused on creating pain in his right thigh. At the moment of the beep Peter is feeling 
pain he created that feels like a Charlie horse in his right thigh [the pain was not intended 
to feel like a Charlie horse specifically, but it ended up randomly feeling this way]. At the 
same time Peter innerly sees the top of his own thigh in front of him, laid out 
horizontally. The thigh is fuzzy, black and white, a 2D outline that includes veins, 
arteries, bones, but no skin. Peter is trying to see the inside middle of his thigh.  
 
Sample 9.3: Peter had just realized his left hand was sweaty after feeling a clammy, 
moist sensation in the palm of his hand. At the moment of the beep Peter is intensely 
absorbed in the sweatiness of his hand, which feels like a light, jiggling pressure all over 
his palm, finger pads and fingertips evenly.  He is also seeing his hand, but this is much 
less salient in his experience than the sensation, perhaps only 10%.   
 
Sample 9.4: Peter was sautéing mushrooms in cooking wine and had just tipped the pan 
to flip the mushrooms, catching the alcohol on fire and creating a sudden flare-up that 
startles him, and he draws back, catches his breath, opens his eyes wide. At the moment 
of the beep Peter is visually absorbed by fire close to his face, filling his visual field.  At 
this moment he does not feel the startle or any other reaction; it is just the fire. 
 
Sample 9.5: At the moment of the beep Peter is feeling a mild burning sensation in both  
eyes. He is rubbing his right eye, but his experience is of the burning, not the rubbing. 
Sample 9.6: Peter was examining his knife blade. At the moment of the beep Peter is 
looking at a chip in the blade of his knife. He is completely absorbed in the chip.  He said 
he later wondered how the chip had gotten there and was upset about it, but at the beep he 
was simply absorbed in looking at it.   
 
Geoff (Chapter 9) 
 
Sample 1.1: Geoff is on the computer, navigating the internet. At the moment of the beep 
he is focused on the redness of the red box on the screen.  
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Sample 1.2: Geoff was ladling stew into a bowl. At the moment of the beep he is focused 
on the brownness of the stew. 
 
Sample 1.3: Geoff was playing with his baby nephew, Junior. At the moment of the beep 
he is engaged in playing with Junior, and attending to Junior’s overall safety and 
happiness. Geoff ’s body feels tense, like he’s ready to attack anything that might 
threaten Junior.  
 
Sample 1.4: At the moment of the beep Geoff is extremely angry. He is also frustrated 
about being angry.  It is not at all clear whether he experiences the anger or anything else 
at the moment of the beep. Geoff was unable to further describe this experience Geoff did 
report that his anger was a result of speaking to his ex-wife. 
 
Sample 1.5: Dozing, beep may have woken him.  
 
Sample 1.6: Asleep and dreaming. The beep woke him.  
 
Sample 2.1: Geoff was surfing the web. At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in 
the blueness of the computer screen, and is also noticing himself as being very relaxed 
and calm.  
 
Sample 2.2: Geoff was driving and had just been cut off by an older lady ahead of him. 
At the moment of the beep Geoff is angry. He is aware that his left hand is very tightly 
gripping the steering wheel, his right hand is in the relaxed-but-ready position on the 
gearshift, and his right foot is ready to depress the pedal.   
 
Sample 2.3: Geoff was in a store, standing near the counter and scanning his 
environment. At the moment of the beep Geoff is looking at three men standing in front 
of him. The majority of his focus is on the “towel-head” who is dialing a cell phone; the 
intention of this focus is to determine whether the cell-phone dialing has a dangerous 
purpose. He is also seeing an Asian man and a Hispanic man with a beard. Geoff is 
feeling claustrophobic – his heart is beating fast, his hands and palms are starting to 
sweat, and he’s feeling sweaty all over.  
 
Sample 2.4: Geoff was in his car.  He had just turned the key, and nothing happened.  He 
is extremely angry, and is somehow going through a list of possibilities.  At the moment 
of the beep he is innerly seeing the battery (viewed from the side) and its red and black 
cables. 
 
Sample 3.1: Geoff was playing a videogame with his roommate Peter. At the moment of 
the beep Geoff is mentally calm and suspenseful from the game.  Geoff also sees the 
videogame, but this is not paying attention to playing.  
 
Sample 3.2: This beep came very soon after the first beep.  He was about to unpause the 
videogame he had been playing and had paused when the previous beep sounded.  His 
initial report was of his experience of looking for his pen as a result of hearing the beep.  
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When it was determined that this was after the beep he could not identify anything in his 
experience at the moment of the beep.  His experience was blank as best he could 
determine.   
 
Sample 3.3: Geoff was sitting outside with Peter. Everything was perfect, the weather 
was warm and the sun was setting. The setting sun reminded Geoff of being in Iraq. At 
the moment of the beep Geoff is reliving an experience in Iraq. He is in Iraq, standing in 
a concrete tower, watching the sunset. This reliving is multisensory and contains many 
true-to-life elements including his friend standing just to his right, Arabic prayers in the 
background, hedgehogs playing in the field below, and his M16 leaning to his left.  
 
Sample 3.4: Geoff was folding his laundry, and had the feeling he was being watched 
from afar. At the moment of the beep Geoff is alert and sensing a presence watching him. 
He is folding his laundry very slowly and purposefully, but his attention is divided 
between his own alertness and the presence he senses. 
 
Sample 4.1: Geoff was setting up his Xbox to play a video game and the lower half of 
the TV screen was green. At the moment of the beep Geoff is completely absorbed in the 
greenness.  
 
Sample 4.2: Geoff was watching Peter play a video game on the Xbox. He had been 
thinking about how well his relationship with his current girlfriend was going. At the 
moment of the beep Geoff is directly experiencing himself as being mentally and 
physically very happy. This happiness manifests physically as relaxedness/at-easeness in 
his body, which Geoff is noticing at the moment of the beep. Geoff is also, directly in his 
experience but at a low level, monitoring his surroundings, keeping track of who is there, 
what is happening. 
 
Sample 4.3: Geoff was watching Peter play the Xbox and was playing cars with Jimmy. 
At the moment of the beep Geoff is directly experiencing himself as being completely 
calm – emotionally, mentally and physically. That is, the calmness itself is central to his 
experience. Geoff is also, directly in his experience but at a low level, monitoring his 
surroundings, keeping track of who is there, what is happening. 
 
Sample 4.4: Geoff was playing a fighting game on the Xbox and was intent on killing the 
bad-guy character. At the moment of the beep Geoff is intensely focused on beating the 
bad-guy and is playing aggressively. At the same time Geoff feels aggressiveness, his 
heart is beating a little faster. Geoff is also, directly in his experience but at a low level, 
monitoring his surroundings, keeping track of who is there, what is happening. 
 
Sample 4.5: Geoff was outside. At the moment of the beep he is noticing that he is calm. 
He can also feel the cool breeze on his body, the warmth of the sun on his arm, and can 
hear the birds chirping. Geoff is also, directly in his experience but at a lower level than 
samples 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, monitoring his surroundings, keeping track of who is there, 
what is happening. 
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Sample 4.6: Geoff was still outside. At the moment of the beep he is completely 
absorbed in the sound of the engines of a very low-flying F-18.  
 
Sample 5.1: Geoff was in his room. At the moment of the beep he hears the engine sound 
of a low, fast-flying F-18. He is absorbed in the sound of the plane. Geoff is also having a 
simultaneous, general mental process about how low and fast the plane is flying. 
 
Sample 5.2: At the moment of the beep Geoff is listening to a Johnny Cash song; he is 
completely absorbed in the song.  
 
Sample 5.3: At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in back pain. The pain is 
intense (greater than 10 on a 10-point scale), sharp, stabbing, like many sharp objects 
bilaterally stabbing into his sides just above his hips, moving horizontally toward and 
past the center of his lower back/spine.  
 
Sample 5.4: Geoff was in his room, playing with his friend’s young child, “Jimmy.” At 
the moment of the beep Geoff is fully immersed in paying attention to Jimmy.  He is 
seeing Jimmy, listening to Jimmy, feeling Jimmy patting his leg.  
 
Sample 5.5: Geoff was in his room watching his white football jersey flapping in the 
wind. At the moment of the beep Geoff is, experientially, in Iraq. He is in a Humvee 
holding onto the steel handle of a 50-caliber machine gun. He feels the coldness of the 
triggers of the gun on both thumbs. He sees a white flag ahead of him. The seen flag is a 
large piece of white fabric, maybe a bed-sheet or a dress.  
 
Sample 5.6: Geoff had just stubbed the toes of his right foot on the doorframe to his 
room. At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in severe pain. The pain is in the 
smaller toes of his right foot and is intense, sharp and stabbing.  
 
Sample 6.1: At the moment of the beep Geoff is feeling the cool breeze on his skin, but 
mostly on his face. He is also seeing the trees sway in the breeze but this is less central to 
his experience than the sensation of the breeze on his skin. 
 
Sample 6.2: Geoff was outside, watching a lady walk by with a large, dark brown dog on 
a leash. At the moment of the beep Geoff is absorbed in the brownness of the dog’s fur. 
 
Sample 6.3: Geoff was walking out of his house towards his car. At the moment of the 
beep Geoff sees an orange-juice container that’s on the sidewalk, the orange on the juice 
container, and a guy walking by on the sidewalk all at the same time. The container, the 
orange and the guy walking are all lined up in a straight line from Geoff’s perspective in 
a way that is striking to him. These objects and their configuration strike Geoff as 
odd/unusual/out of the ordinary/out of place/weird somehow; this is not a thought but is 
somehow present to Geoff. Geoff is intently, vigilantly focused on these objects and the 
surroundings, though his visual taking in of the greater surroundings may not have 
occurred until just after the beep. 
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Sample 6.4: Geoff had just had a conversation with his girlfriend that had left him happy 
and calm. At the moment of the beep Geoff is somehow noticing that he is calm/relaxed 
both mentally and physically. The physical calmness exists throughout his body.  
 
Sample 6.5: Geoff was at home and there was a good deal of commotion going on 
around him – Rachel and her mother were speaking, Rachel was talking to Jimmy, the 
A/C had just come on and was noisy, the scent of food was in the air, and Geoff and Peter 
were trying to watch a movie. At the moment of the beep Geoff is aware of all these 
sensations in his surroundings.  
 
Mark (Chapter 10) 
Sample 1.1: Mark was in the student union by Starbucks. At the moment of the beep 
Mark is trying to decide whether or not to get coffee. This deciding process consists of 
innerly saying to himself, in his own voice, something like, “Should I get it or not?” 
Although words are present, Mark is not quite sure what the exact words are. He also 
smells coffee though this is not highly salient in his experience.  
 
Sample 1.2: Mark was talking to a couple of his friends. They were having a 
conversation about the earpiece and having been deployed in Iraq. At the moment of the 
beep Mark is wrapped up in the conversation; he is listening to what his friend is saying.  
 
Sample 1.3: Mark was checking the email account for the Senator Reid campaign. He 
was frustrated about people’s ignorance of politics but also somewhat sarcastically 
bemused, as he was going through these emails. At the moment of the beep Mark is in the 
process of deleting a bunch of emails. He is paying attention to what he is doing.  The 
notion that people do not understand politics and the accompanying sense of frustration 
and slight bemusement are still lingering.  
  
Sample 1.4: Mark had just read a logic/reasoning question from the Kaplan LSAT 
practice book. At the moment of the beep Mark it immersed in trying to figure out the 
correct response. He is deep in thought.  
 
Sample 1.5: Mark was driving down Harmon and was listening to the radio. At the 
moment of the beep he is listening to and enjoying a Mexican song and is feeling happy. 
This happiness is experienced bodily as an “almost jittery” sensation, like wanting to 
dance but holding back.  
 
Sample 2.1: Mark was at home by himself watching the movie Catch Me If You Can.  At 
the beep he is fully immersed watching the movie.  The Leonardo DiCaprio character has 
just walked in on his mother having an affair with her husband’s friend.  There is nothing 
else in his awareness. 
 
Sample 2.2: Mark is at his girlfriend’s house watching the movie Catch Me If You Can 
while waiting for his girlfriend and several others to get ready to go out.  At the beep he 
is frustratedly thinking repetitively that they always take forever to get ready.  (His 
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impression was that he had been thinking this pretty constantly, or maybe continuously. 
for perhaps 15 minutes.). This is a thought rather than a feeling though it expresses 
frustration with the repeated delays involved in waiting for his girlfriend to get ready.  
This thought does not involve specific words or other images.   
 
Sample 2.3: Mark was walking through the MGM Casino and saying to the people he 
was with, “The casino is really [beep] full.”  Other than what he was saying there was 
nothing else in his awareness.  (He said he was navigating through the crowd of people 
but that was entirely on autopilot.) 
Just Talking 
 
Sample 2.4: Mark was standing outside of the MGM casino talking with his girlfriend 
and her aunt.  At the beep his girlfriend was telling her aunt about the concert they [Mark 
and his girlfriend] had been to the night before.  Mark was listening to what she was 
saying and simultaneously evaluating the correctness/accuracy of it.  She was talking 
about going up to the stage while he had gone to the bathroom during the concert; she 
had told him about this earlier so he was somehow comparing the two versions of the 
story.  This thought process was running in parallel to her speaking; it did not involve 
words or images.   
 
Sample 2.5: Mark was walking in front of City Center Hotel/Casino.  At the beep he is 
thinking a bunch of related thoughts about it being a horrible complex.  He experienced 
this as a series of related but separate thoughts about what a badly planned/unpleasant 
place it was, like “it looks like downtown LA” and “it isn’t wheelchair accessible” and 
“it’s not welcoming.”  It was difficult for him to determine which thought or thoughts 
were present at the beep but thinking it’s a horrible complex seemed to be most salient.  
There were no words or images related to these thoughts.  These thoughts seemed to 
carry negative emotion but there was no feeling directly in his experience.   
 
Sample 2.6: Mark was walking in front of City Center through a covered construction 
walkway.  This is a crowded and chaotic area with lots of people.  At the beep he is 
visually taking in the scene, purposefully tracking the kids in his group.  He is seeing the 
entire scene as one unchanging seeing and shifting cognitively from kid to kid, checking 
to be sure each one is present and accounted for.  That is, the gaze stays constant while 
the attention within the gaze shifts from kid to kid.  This is an intense, focused process 
where he is working hard to keep track of the kids in his group.   
 
Sample 3.1: Mark was driving to school in traffic. At the moment of the beep Mark is in 
a state of preparedness/readiness with concern to navigating the traffic surrounding him – 
he is very aware of the car that is directly in front of him and the two cars that are in front 
of him in adjacent lanes.  That is, his attention is entirely occupied by these specific three 
cars, and this attention is not merely a relaxed noticing but a state of heightened alertness. 
 
Sample 3.2: Mark was sitting in the courtyard and was eating. He was mentally 
reviewing his “to do” list. At the moment of the beep Mark is thinking the words, 
‘volunteer list.’ The words are present to him but are not spoken, heard, or innerly seen; 
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the words do not have any characteristics, but Mark is sure that the specific words are 
somehow mentally present. The words ‘volunteer list’ represent the broader idea that 
Mark needs to finish making the volunteer list, although the finish-it portion is not 
explicitly in awareness at the moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 3.3: Mark is a political operative for Senator X’s re-election campaign.  About 
15 minutes before the beep, Mark had been at an immigration reform rally at which he 
had said to the assemblage that Senator X would get legislation presented in the Senate.  
A woman, a fellow Democrat, had responded that another senator would get it presented.  
That had angered Mark—it undermined the campaign of Senator X in favor of the other 
senator who was not up for re-election. The anger had continued to build, and now, as 
Mark is driving home, he is intensely angry.  
At the moment of the beep he is thinking what seems like hundreds of thoughts, all 
simultaneous, some of which are innerly shouted or almost shouted: “How could she do 
this?!? “Why would she do this?!?” “What was she thinking?!?” and so on. These inner 
speakings/shoutings are in his own inner voice, experienced as if he had spoken/shouted 
them aloud.  But they also occur so rapidly that it is difficult to know whether they are 
happening sequentially so fast as to be inseparable or are all present at the same time.  
Thus there is both a sense that the inner speakings happen at each one’s own natural rate, 
but also that they happen incredibly rapidly.  Mark also, simultaneously, experiences a 
tingling hotness in the core of his body.  He is gripping the steering wheel tightly, but it is 
not clear whether this is in his experience at the moment of the beep. 
 
Sample 3.4: Mark was looking over his graded essay paper and was reading a comment 
from his professor regarding a long sentence in the paper. At the moment of the beep 
Mark is innerly chuckling/laughing to himself and is smiling. This chuckle is an ironic 
type of chuckle.  
 
Sample 3.5: Mark was in the process of composing an RSVP list for work on his 
computer.  At the beep he is carefully highlighting a telephone number with his cursor, 
being sure not to go too far.  There was nothing else in his experience other than paying 
careful attention to what he was doing. 
 
Sample 3.6: Mark had read an angry email from someone for his work.  At the beep he 
was trying to decide whether or not it was worth responding to this person.  This was a 
holistic mental process that involved thinking about the pros and cons of responding to 
this person but there were no specifics present; he was just trying to decide. 
 
Sample 4.1: Mark was driving at night. At the moment of the beep Mark is completely 
absorbed in the bright headlights of an oncoming car; there is nothing else in his 
awareness. 
 
Sample 4.2: Mark was at Rebel Pizza with his friends. Mark and his friends had been 
watching a woman who was displaying very odd behavior – dancing, lifting her skirt, 
putting her leg up on the counter, etc. Mark and his friends were somewhat 
uncomfortable with her strange behavior, and were also amused and laughing. At the 
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moment of the beep Mark is amused by the woman’s antics – he is watching her, 
laughing, and amused at what she is doing. At the same time, though less prominently, he 
is savoring the taste/smell of the pizza he is eating. 
 
Sample 4.3: Mark was walking with his friends. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
texting message to his girlfriend, “I’ll give you a call, I’m going home.” This is 
happening more or less automatically—that is, he is not directly experiencing the “I’ll 
give you a call, I’m going home” sentence. At the same time he hears his friend Tony’s 
voice, but is not paying attention to what Tony is saying.  The voice is more or less like 
noise, devoid of meaning. 
 
Sample 4.4: Mark was in his car, stopped at a red light. He was looking at the electronic 
signage for Payday Loans. The sign was electronic and there were animated green frogs 
moving across the sign. At the moment of the beep Mark is completely absorbed in the 
frogs that are jumping across the length of the sign.  
 
Sample 4.5: Mark was on the phone with his girlfriend and was trying to decide where 
they should go jogging tomorrow – at the park or on the street. At the moment of the 
beep Mark is thinking about the various features of the park and the street, trying to make 
a decision. He is thinking about the various pros and cons of each location (e.g., The park 
track is circular, I don’t like running in circles; the length of the park track is known; 
which is easier to get to?; etc.).  There are more of these details on the “park” side of the 
decision [which Mark takes to mean he is mentally leaning toward the park, but he 
doesn’t know whether the number of details is the result of the mental leaning or whether 
the number of details causes the leaning]. At the same time, though less prominently, he 
hears his girlfriend’s voice on the phone, but is not paying attention to what she is saying. 
 
Sample 5.1: Mark was making his bed. At the moment of the beep he is thinking that he 
hates making the bed. This thought does not involve any specific words and is not being 
spoken; it is a general thought about hating making the bed. At the same time Mark is 
mildly, mentally frustrated about making the bed. 
 
Sample 5.2: Mark was sorting his laundry into darks and lights. At the moment of the 
beep Mark is holding a blue shirt and trying to decide whether the blue shirt should go in 
the light or dark pile. This process of trying to decide consists of a fast-paced thought 
made up of several elements that form a whole; these elements, if put into words (they 
did not actually involve words) include, “is it lighter or darker in color?” “Will it bleed?” 
“What pile should it go in?” and other similar thought-lets. That is, it did not seem like 
one thought which could be looked at in several different directions, but instead seemed 
like some kind of a combination or cluster of thoughts.  There are no specific words 
present.  
 
Sample 5.3: Mark was cleaning his truck and was trying to decide whether or not to 
throw away a stack of old journal articles. At the moment of the beep Mark is looking at 
the article on top and is trying to remember what the article is about in order to decide 
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whether or not to keep it. Also in his awareness, though much less prominently, is a sense 
of mental frustration that he’s let his truck get so disorganized. 
 
Sample 5.4: Mark was cleaning his pitching wedge and thinking back to his golf outing 
with his buddies the day before. At the moment of the beep Mark innerly sees himself, 
from behind, standing in a sand trap and using his pitching wedge to try to get the ball 
out. He sees his friends standing on the green, and hears them laughing as a group. His 
friend Victor’s laughing stands out most prominently.  There seems to be three visual 
experiences, of three separate sand traps, seen in quick sequence, one after the other.  All 
have approximately the same visual characteristics—Mark is seen from the back, his 
friends are on the green.  He’s not sure exactly which scene he is seeing at the moment of 
the beep.  Accompanying this seeing is a low-level thought about needing a sand wedge 
so that he doesn’t have to use his pitching wedge.  
 
Sample 5.5: Mark was watching a TV show about ancient warriors and their weapons. 
He had just watched a ninja use a weapon to slash a hanging pig. At the moment of the 
beep he is watching a Spartan warrior use a large sword to slash through the body of a 
hanging pig. At the same time he innerly sees a nondescript human torso being sliced in 
the same way as is the pig, and is imagining what the pain would feel like. This 
imagining of the pain is a mental thing, and is not felt bodily or otherwise. 
 
Sample 5.6: Mark was sorting his clean laundry and watching the Lakers playoff game. 
At the moment of the beep Mark is looking for the mate of the sock he is holding. He is 
looking at every sock one by one, and eliminating each ‘incorrect’ sock, kind of like a 
visual rejection of the non-mate socks. At the same time, though much less prominently, 
he hears the commentator on the TV.  
 
Sample 6.1: Mark is at work, trying to decide whether to discard of his newspaper in the 
company shredder, which would cost the company money, or whether to recycle the 
newspaper for free at UNLV. At the moment of the beep Mark is wondering whether he 
should take the paper to UNLV. This is a specific thought, however there are no words 
present and he is not innerly speaking.  
 
Sample 6.2: Mark was driving and was thinking about Sue Lowden’s comments 
regarding bartering chickens for medical care. He was wondering how he could find a 
‘chicken cake.’ At the moment of the beep Mark is smiling and humorously thinking that 
using the internet or “Googling it” would be the best way to find a chicken cake. This 
thinking does not having any symbols and is not innerly spoken. Mark is experiencing the 
humorousness of the situation, represented as the tension in his cheeks from smiling. 
 
Sample 6.3: Mark was driving in heavy traffic, attempting to change lanes but being 
blocked by the driver behind him. At the moment of the beep Mark is looking behind 
him, concentrating on finding a space in which to merge. At the same time he is feeling 
frustrated and frustratedly, innerly saying “this asshole!” (referring to the driver who is 
not letting him merge).  
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Sample 6.4: Mark was sitting on the kitchen floor, one of his dogs lying next to him on 
his left, one his right.  He is scratching their bellies.  At the moment of the beep Mark is 
thinking something most closely captured by the words, “I wish I could spend more time 
with you guys.” This thought is not occurring in words and is not innerly spoken, instead 
it is a general idea, directed at his dogs. Mark is also happy, which is experienced both 
bodily and mentally but he could not describe it further. Mark is also experiencing the 
sensation of his dogs’ fur on his fingers, and noticing the change in texture of fur caused 
by canola oil, from soft and fuzzy to kind of gummy, on the dog on his left. 
 
Sample 6.5: Mark was trying to find a shirt to wear to the gym, but was having trouble 
doing so because he’d gained weight and all his shirts were “suffocatingly tight.” At the 
moment of the beep Mark is frustrated/angry/sad that he has gained weight and can’t find 
a shirt that fits. The frustration/anger/sadness are three elements of one emotional 
experience. The notion that his shirts no longer fit is also present. He is expressing this 
frustration/anger/sadness by forcefully jamming shirts back into the drawer.  
 
Sample 7.1: Mark was in the car sending a text message to his friend, telling him that he 
can’t hang out because his girl’s parents are having a BBQ. At the moment of the beep 
Mark is typing the “r” or “l” of the word “girl.” Most central in his experience is his 
typing of the word girl.  To a lesser degree, he is mentally spellchecking the word “girl.” 
This spellchecking is difficult for Mark to describe, and may involve a visual comparison 
of the actual word he has typed and some mental form of the word girl. At the same time 
in his experience, but to a far lesser degree, Mark is tracking the basic gist of what his 
girlfriend is saying as she tells him how nervous/excited she is about starting her new 
nursing job.  This tracking is more or less on autopilot: he is only slightly (if at all) 
listening to her. 
 
Sample 7.2: Mark was at the store with his girlfriend. He was looking at boxes of cookies 
on the store shelf, and was trying to decide between chocolate chip and oatmeal raisin 
cookies. At the moment of the beep Mark is thinking he likes oatmeal cookies. This 
thought is not occurring in words or images, and has no characteristics but is instead 
more of an idea or notion. At the same time, Mark is craving the oatmeal raison cookies 
and mentally imagining the taste of oatmeal cookies – he is imagining the raisins and the 
sweet taste of oatmeal. This craving/imagining is located in Mark’s head.  
 
Sample 7.3: Mark was at the store with his girlfriend who was trying to decide which 
clipboard to buy. An ugly, metal clipboard had just caught his eye. Mark was thinking 
about playing a little prank on his girlfriend by suggesting she buy the really ugly 
clipboard that he knew she would not want. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
imagining the general scenario of how his prank would go – this imagining is mental, and 
is sort of in a template or ‘rough draft’ form without exact details The imagining includes 
how he’d present the prank to his girlfriend, her reaction, and how funny it would all be. 
The funniness or humor of the situation is somehow present to Mark, but he could not say 
if it was a definite feeling present in his experience.  
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Sample 7.4: Mark was buying deodorant and was trying to decide whether buying 2 
single Degree sticks would be cheaper, or whether buying the 2-pack would be cheaper. 
He was performing a sequence of very rough mental math, rounding prices up or down in 
order to make an assessment of which was cheapest. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
towards the end of the rough mental math sequence and has concluded that buying 2 
singles would equal a little less than $4 which is cheaper than buying a 2-pack at $4.33. 
This mental math is not occurring in words or images, it has no discernable 
characteristics. At this moment in time, although he has decided which option is cheapest, 
Mark has not yet decided which option he will go with.  
 
Sample 7.5: Mark was carrying lots of shopping bags in each hand. At the moment of the 
beep Mark is absorbed in the heavy feeling of the bags in his hands and arms. The 
heaviness feels like a strong squeezing on the outside of his palms and heavy downward 
pressure across the middle of each palm where the bags are.  He can also feel the 
weight/strain in his arms and shoulders. 
 
Sample 7.6: Mark was building a clothes rack. At the moment of the beep Mark is 
engaged in the task; he is carefully pulling the telescope rod outward, carefully listening 
for a clicking sound in order to ensure it is in place. At the same time Mark is thinking 
that he needs to make sure it clicks into place and that he needs to be careful not to break 
or bend the rod. These thoughts are present simultaneously; there are no words or images 
present, more of a notion or idea. 
 
Sample 8.1: Mark is driving on the freeway, somewhat aware of traffic surrounding him, 
but not much traffic and not much awareness of it.  At the moment of the beep he innerly 
sees a recreation of a video that he and his class had watched earlier; he sees the words 
“GLOBALIZATION IS GOOD” printed in block white letters below a long-haired guy 
with hair blowing in the wind—a glamour-shot kind of scene.  He had seen this same 
scene earlier; now he does not see the TV screen, the entertainment center, the living 
room wall, etc; he sees just the glamour guy and the words, with most of his attention 
aimed at the words.  At the same time he is experiencing dislike for this one-sided video, 
a mental dislike that seems to be a feeling more than a thought, but it is difficult to be 
sure. 
 
Sample 8.2: Driving on freeway, a song had come on the radio.  The song was well 
known to Mark; it was a bout a Mexican laborer who had come to the US to work and 
would like to go back to Mexico.  At the moment of the beep, Mark is thinking about the 
immigration law that had just been passed in Arizona and several of its ramifications: 
boycotts, protests, marches, lawsuits.  All these concepts were present as aspects on one 
thought; they were present without words or other symbols.  The song, apparently as a 
meaningful entity (not merely the music) was also slightly present. 
 
Sample 8.3: Mark is at home reading a photocopy of his professor’s book, which has 
seven sections, each of which is organized like the paper Mark is currently writing: each 
section begins with a history.  The paper Mark is trying to write must begin with a 
history, and at the moment of the beep Mark is trying to think about that history.  Four 
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topics of his paper are specifically present to him: USAid, Black Columbia, the role of 
the State Department, and the US War on Drugs.  At the same time, he is trying to decide 
whether there is anything else that should be included in his paper he is explicitly trying 
to decide, a thought process that exists less prominently but somehow simultaneous to the 
four-topic consideration and the answer seems to be No as indicated by the fact that most 
of his attention remains on the original four topics.  The topics are present without words 
or symbols. 
 
Sample 8.4: Mark is putting his shoes, focused on the shoelace that he is tying.  He’s 
quite concentrated on this act [telling us about this is embarrassing, as if he should have 
outgrown this].  He is also thinking (10%) that he has to pick up his girlfriend, that it’s 
frustrating because disrupts his studying plans.  He does not experience frustration. 
 
Sample 8.5: Driving, thinking that when he gets out of work tomorrow he will go to the 
UNLV library to work on his paper.  There is a slight tiredness present. 
 
Sample 8.6: Driving his girlfriend home in his girlfriend’s car, many things present to 
him in a vigilance kind of way.  At the moment of the beep, most prominent are the lights 
of the car behind him that has lit up the dirty back window of the car. He sees the 
construction site ahead of him.  He sees the orange speed limit sign, but cannot make out 
the speed—it is as if he is expecting or waiting for the speed to be seeable.  He is 
expecting his girlfriend, who is half asleep, to make some comment about the driving, 
something like “Don’t drive too fast” or “Don’t have an accident,” to which he will 
respond something like “OK, babe.”  There have been several such interchanges, and at 
the moment of the beep he is expecting another.  All this is experienced as a heightened 
awareness, a vigilant attending to everything around him. 
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